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Academics, journalists, and human rights groups have, for decades, written 
about the secretive and repressive nature of the state of Eritrea and the mass 
emigration of people from the country. At the core of these discussions have 
been discourses about human rights violations and ‘crime against humanity’ 
being committed by the government of Eritrea since the country’s 
independence. The reality, however, is that ever since its creation by Italian 
colonisers as a territorially bounded state, Eritrea has never been ruled by law, 
nor has it been subject to any rights-based system. Thus, the premise of human 
rights violations—the human rights lens through which these discourses are 
produced, and the geopolitical interests they serve—grasps neither the realities 
on the ground nor the complexities and nuances of how the human is 
differentially produced. Although the empirical evidence produced by UN 
branches, perennial human rights lobbyists and academic activists can be useful 
to back up normative claims, human rights discourses and approaches fail to 
address epistemic and methodological blind spots, leaving theoretical voids in 
our understanding of the carceral state of Eritrea and the realities of the lives of 
people fleeing the country. This study attends to these epistemic blind spots and 
theoretical voids by presenting an alternative reality that is grounded in the 
perspectives of those who have fled the country. 
Underpinned by ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of 
critical realism, this research considers the what, how, and why questions that 
underpin Eritrean refugees’ realities of becoming, and the conditions of being, 
refugees. Its key findings fall into three broad categories. First, the thesis finds 
that Eritreans are born into, and live in, conditions of lawlessness and 
rightlessness that began with the colonial occupation of what is now known as 
Eritrea, and these conditions have been maintained by the only government that 
has ruled the country since its independence. This precarious condition of ‘no 
laws nor rights’, and the modalities of punishment and control the government 
has imposed on the Eritrean people, explains why the country has been 
haemorrhaging its youthful population. Second, due to their unprotected status, 
Eritrean refugees have been left stranded indefinitely in exclusive biopolitical 
entanglements and necropolitical experimentations, in which they have been 
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treated as disposable corporealities that are always available for exploitation, 
violence, and removal without accountability. Third, the disenfranchisement of 
the refugees, and the collapse of all their human experiences and relations into 
indefinite modalities of precarity, carcerality and (im)mobility, has led to the 
total negation of their humanity. In these conditions, occurrences of 
dehumanisation and depoliticisation of Eritrean refugees are endless; murder is 
not unusual, nor is it a crime. In presenting these findings, the study does not 
only investigate the realities of being an Eritrean refugee, but also how 
processes and intertwined power relations interplay with causal powers and 
contextual circumstances that are responsible for the relegation of Eritrean lives 
to the precarious condition of being unliveable and ungrievable. 
Through these findings, this study seeks to make three key contributions. First, 
by exposing the gaps in human rights discourses and esoteric political 
imaginations, this research offers an alternative approach to understanding the 
perplexing nature of the state of Eritrea and the realities of the people fleeing 
the county, by suggesting a total absence of law and rights, using the rule of ‘no 
laws nor rights’ as a starting point. Second, this thesis looks at how, in their 
constant struggle for survival and political existence, refugees play a disruptive 
role by shaking the principles upon which the nation-state system has been built 
(Agamben, 1995a). Agamben (1995a) makes this case from an Euro-centric 
perspective, thus he fails to see the links between the ‘world of modernity’ and 
the ‘world of coloniality’, and hence, the subjectivities these worlds create, 
shape, and reproduce. Third, drawing on clues from seminal thinkers in the 
fields of sovereignty and biopolitics, such as Arendt, Foucault and Agamben, the 
thesis opens new areas of criticism to further our understanding of the role of 
the state in the biopolitical b/ordering of societies and the policing of the ability 
to qualify as human.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 About me 
From the outset, I want to make clear that I have a personal attachment to the 
object of the research inquiry and the subjects of the study. This research was 
born out of my passion and curiosity to investigate a problem that I share with 
many other Eritrean refugees. Because of my close affinity both with the 
research and the researched, I believe that it is important to introduce myself. 
I was born and raised in Eritrea. In August 2010, I completed a BA degree in 
geography and was recruited into an open national service the following month. 
Among many reasons, working for pocket money in the national service, the 
bureaucratisation of life and the generalised oppression I faced led me to escape 
Eritrea for Sudan in 2011. Once in exile, I survived detention, torture and human 
trafficking. I was labelled as an “illegal migrant”, an “alien” and as a “victim”. 
In official documents, I was referred to as an “asylum seeker” at the beginning 
and a “refugee” afterward. As of the point of submission of this thesis, I remain 
a refugee and have been granted UK citizenship. I am in the process of becoming 
a rights-bearing subject however limited the rights granted to a naturalised 
refugee may be. 
The fact that I am an Eritrean, a refugee and a victim of trafficking has shaped 
me both as a person and as a researcher. In today’s biopolitical world, people 
like me only surface as othered, marginalised, outlawed and incarcerated. We 
are much spoken about, yet we are commonly silenced. 
Other factors such as educational and professional backgrounds have also 
contributed to shaping and reshaping the “self” that makes my identity. I have 
studied both in the East and in the West. However, regardless of where I was 
educated, I studied western education. I read western scholars and write in a 
western language. Likewise, for about eight years, I have worked both in the 
East and in the West at a professional level. I have worked with displaced people 
who have survived intolerable persecution in their home countries and continue 
to suffer from human trafficking, torture and marginalisation elsewhere. The 
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work experience enriched my academic and professional ambitions, but all I 
learned was through western institutional and educational culture. 
My understanding of structures, processes and power relations has been shaped 
by the combination of Eastern subjectivity and Western institutional and 
educational culture which also shape the way systems, structures and power 
matrices treat the people I study. These complex processes, power relations and 
causal mechanisms are the objects of inquiry of this research. Positioned at a 
critical juncture between ‘the subject of study and the narrator’ (Hertz, 1996, 
p.7), I hope to investigate the causal mechanisms that outlawed Eritrean 
refugees and rendered them outliers in political life. In doing so, I write (and 
speak) in the first person as a way of maintaining my close affinity to the stories 
being told, and of recognising that my story is inescapably interwoven with 
theirs. 
I understand that my interwoven relationship with the subjects of study and the 
object of inquiry generates strengths and weaknesses in my research. As Greene 
observes, insider researchers are often familiar with how to ‘access’ the 
subjects and objects of study and ‘interact’ with them (2014, pp.3–5). For 
example, fieldwork was never a big issue for me as I already both am part of the 
field and ‘live’ within the field. In addition to having prior knowledge of the 
language and culture of the people being studied, being an insider allowed me to 
observe and analyse events, patterns and structures from their perspective. 
I also recognise that my insider status is susceptible to epistemological and 
methodological critiques. Insider research raises questions concerning 
epistemology (e.g. how researchers mediate the production of knowledge), data 
gathering (e.g. participant selection bias, conflicts of interest and ethics) and 
data analysis (e.g. biases towards findings and their interpretation) (Dwyer and 
Buckle, 2009; Greene, 2014, p.4; Taylor, 2011). I anticipated these challenges 
and used my skills to mitigate the potential weaknesses. 
Furthermore, the insider/outsider dichotomy also has a bearing on the 
philosophical assumptions of the research. Arguing from a philosophical point of 
view, Mellor contends ‘that knowing what experiences of a certain kind are like 
does not entail having had them, even if having them is usually the best and 
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often the only feasible way of acquiring that knowledge’ (2012, p.14). For 
Mellor, while ‘the ability to imagine’ experiences is a fundamental requirement 
to know them, being ‘able to recall them’ to ‘imagine them correctly’ is an 
advantage for those who had experienced the experiences over those who did 
not (2012, pp.13–14). Without disagreeing with Mellor’s logic, I would suggest 
that this must also include a critical realist approach that embraces the 
provisional status of knowledge and the need for transparency and reflexivity 
about the research process as part of knowledge production. 
As an insider researcher, I benefited not only through the use of the advantages 
of being an insider but also from having an in-depth understanding of what to 
anticipate and how to identify and mitigate context-specific problems. However, 
not all research challenges can be anticipated, nor are they all identifiable. As 
such, I recognise the unavoidability of the ‘messiness’ (Billo and Hiemstra, 2013) 
of the research process, I have sought to mitigate it and I have been transparent 
about it. 
The conduct of this study took me through both familiar and unfamiliar 
challenges on familiar turf. What remained unchanged is that I never left the 
field; I am still the field and live in it. In Chapter 5, I discuss how I navigated my 
intersecting positionality. 
 Research background, objectives and significance 
Eritrea, a country ravaged by centuries of colonialism, has over the past three 
decades transformed itself into an authoritarian state. Since its independence in 
1991, which was consolidated by a people’s referendum two years later, the 
country has never had a legislative parliament or an elected government. Its 
constitution was discarded despite being ratified in 1997 (Dorman, 2004c). The 
country’s politics are dominated by one party headed by the only president the 
country has ever seen. It is described as one of the most oppressive countries in 
Africa because of its track record of arbitrary detention, indefinite national 
service and human rights violations (COI, 2016; Plaut, 2016; Woldemikael, 2013). 
Most notably, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI, 2016) on human 
rights has accused the government of Eritrea of committing ‘crimes against 
humanity’ since its independence. 
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The government of Eritrea has, since independence, been incarcerating 
thousands of people in detention facilities and exploiting others in open-ended 
national service (Woldemikael, 2013; COI, 2016; Plaut, 2016b). These practices 
have left newly-weds separated for years, children orphaned because their 
parents died in wars or vanished in detention facilities and elderly people 
abandoned at home without care and support. This reality has led thousands of 
people to want to leave the country, but the government has established 
modalities of punishment and control to immobilise its citizens. For a successful 
exit from the country, one has to evade checkpoints, frequent roundups and a 
highly militarised border. For those who do decide to flee, crossing the border 
and safely entering a transit country is a matter of life and death. 
The difficulties Eritreans face do not end after they crossed the border. Those 
who manage to escape face rightlessness and impunity in neighbouring transit 
countries and then in destination states. In transit countries, they become 
victims of immigration detention and deportation, and if granted the right to 
seek asylum, they become part of vetting and containment regimes. Stripped of 
their rights and exiled into realms of violence, the refugees face a precarious 
life or perhaps death in detention centres, at borders, in the sea or in the 
deserts. Many thousands die in human trafficking in transit countries; others lose 
their lives by drowning when attempting to cross the sea, such as in the 
Lampedusa incident of October 2013. 
Through interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation, this 
study corroborates the realities of Eritrean refugees who have survived arbitrary 
detention, violent borders and trafficking, and bore witness apocalyptic scenes 
of their families and/or friends being ‘buried alive’, tortured to death or 
drowning at sea. Their experiences are symptoms of the activation of the 
rightlessness of the refugees and their treatment as a ‘remainder or detritus 
humanity’ (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004, p. 35). The stories provoke a 
crucial question: How and why are these people denied state protection both in 
their country of citizenship and elsewhere? In this study, examining the 
experience of Eritrean refugees as a form of biopolitical domination, I examine 
how and why Eritrean lives are systematically rendered unintelligible. 
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The scope of the research focuses on examining the experience of Eritrean 
refugees with a particular emphasis on the status of refugees in the biopolitical 
b/ordering of societies. In doing so, the study brings a new perspective to four 
overlooked areas: 
First, it seeks to understand the structural issues that cause Eritreans to 
flee their country by investigating the link between state control and 
involuntary displacement. The study uncovers the complexities and 
perplexities of life and living in Eritrea by examining conditions of “no-
laws nor rights” and the generative mechanisms driving emigration from 
the carceral state. 
Second, it examines the process of becoming a refugee. This involves 
examining the actions people take to flee the country and their 
encounters with state and non-state actors in the process. In addition to 
examining their experiences, it explores the structural mechanisms and 
biopolitical processes that led to the displacement and juxtaposes the 
process of becoming a refugee with the simultaneous process of 
unbecoming a citizen. In doing so, the study delves into the interplay of 
complex relations of subordination, domination and transformation and 
sheds light on the causal mechanisms and power relations beneath. 
Third, the study interrogates the condition of being a refugee. It 
examines the mechanisms by which refugees are processed and reduced 
to naked forms of life and the impunity with which these mechanisms 
operate to securitise their precarious status. The goal is to conceptualise 
the lived experiences of Eritrean refugees in transit and destination 
countries in a broader biopolitical context, at the centre of which is the 
carceral state. The study exposes violent practices directed to contain 
refugees in what Foucault calls the ‘carceral continuum’. This is an 
attempt to divulge not only the mechanisms by which states securitise the 
precarious status of the refugees but also highlight the practices carceral 
states employ, many of which are violent. 
Finally, it is the objective of this research to question the structural 
problems of dissociating refugees’ experiences from political life and 
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hiding the crimes they face. Despite the challenges, refugees transform 
themselves to forces of resistance and symbolic visibility by crossing 
borders, dying in treacherous waters and deserts and appearing in 
politicised spaces. Although their situation remains precarious, to 
overlook their agency is to undermine their struggle for political 
subjectivity. As Edkins (2000, p. 7) asserts, ‘depoliticization takes place 
side by side with politicisation of the bare life’. Yet, there is an irony that 
Edkins wants us to be cautious about: ‘Bare life is politicized, and 
political life disappears’ (2000, p. 7). 
The research places Eritrean refugees as the focus of its inquiry and investigates 
their (im)mobilities, precariousness and carceralities. The main goal is to 
conceptualise the refugees’ experiences and explain the causal and generative 
mechanisms that led to their experiences. Interrogating the refugees’ 
rightlessness and lawlessness has allowed the study to unpack the structural 
problems and generative mechanisms that led to the violence and unfettered 
control over the refugees’ bodies, embodiments, and freedoms. 
 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the researcher 
and offers a brief introduction to the research background, objectives and 
significance. Chapter 2 begins by offering a brief history of Eritrea and 
summarises the challenges Eritrean refugees face. This chapter also engages 
with the existing literature and the human rights approaches employed to study 
the expereinces of Eritrean refugees. Chapter 3 reviews the notion of the rights-
based international order. It locates the status of refugees in the rights-based 
system and offers a conceptual framework. Chapter 4 discusses the research 
design and philosophical underpinning and methodological approaches of the 
study in detail. 
Chapter 5 discusses the topics of researcher positionality, the research process, 
and how these influenced (or did not influence) both the research and the 
researcher. At the crux of this chapter is my critical reflection on the research 
process. 
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Chapter 6 provides a brief analysis of traditional values, customary laws and the 
exceptional judicial framework in which they operated within Eritrea. Drawing 
from Agamben’s theorisation of the state of exception, it argues that customary 
norms in Eritrea existed in an entangled relationship with the exception forming 
an all-encompassing totality. The chapter then discusses how the traditional 
values and norms were rendered obsolete and how the encompassing totality—
the “juridico-exception”—was dismantled after the country’s independence. 
Chapter 7 examines the conditions of rightlessness and the generative 
mechanisms that are responsible for emigration from Eritrea. In post-liberation 
Eritrea, the unchanged and unelected government has deployed modes of 
production and administration of power that circumvent normality and 
perpetuate exceptionality. The chapter explains that these practices are neither 
legal nor illegal in Eritrea because no law has ever existed to protect or rescue 
citizens from the threat of the state. It highlights the biopolitical exploitation, 
collective indignation and loss of rights of the Eritrean people. 
Chapter 8 unpacks the realities of the many Eritrean who leave Eritrea in search 
of safety and protection. It starts by exploring why people leave, concluding that 
fleeing Eritrea has become a necessity for survival. The chapter also examines 
the refugees’ experience of crossing the border to neighbouring countries, 
arguing that a border is a place in which multiple states of exception merge to 
the profound detriment of the refugees. It demonstrates how the survivors who 
penetrate the polity through the interstices of interwoven border controls are 
viewed as visible threats to the imagination of the host community. Moreover, 
focusing on the experience of the refugees in necropolitical spaces, the chapter 
analyses the (im)mobilities, precariousness and carceralities faced by the 
involuntarily displaced people in the process of becoming refugees. 
Chapter 9 begins by discussing how the rightless refugees, during their perilous 
journey, are not only trapped in violent and exploitative practices by state and 
non-state actors, but also continue to vanish in treacherous waters and carceral 
spectacles on either side of the Mediterranean. The chapter conceptualises the 
packed boats carrying rightless bodies as symptomatic of a systemic problem of 
‘migration management’ (Mainwaring, 2019). It then discusses the bureaucratic 
process of asylum in transit states, arguing that the primary function of such 
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systems is to create a disposable subject while at the same time presenting an 
imminent threat that needs immediate attention and swift action. The analysis 
focuses on the Dublin Regulation whose hidden matrix relies heavily on a system 
of negation and elimination that defines asylum seekers and refugees for what 
they are not rather than what they are. The chapter also discusses the hidden 
matrix of the UK asylum system: the “hostile environment”. 
The last chapter, Chapter 10, revisits some of the main findings, as well as the 
methodological and theoretical contributions of the research. It also outlines the 
need for decolonial research. 
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Chapter 2 Eritrea at a Glance 
 Introduction 
Before delving into the causal mechanisms that have led to the realities of 
Eritrean refugees, it is critical to briefly refer back to the country’s colonial and 
post-independence history, reflect on the existing literature, and to provide a 
concise overview of the methodological flaws in the existing literature. To make 
sense of the historical continuity of the issue under examination, I start by 
offering a short account of Eritrea’s history and the realities of its people. I 
begin by tracing the (non-)existence of rights in the country’s recent colonial 
and post-independence periods. I then critically review the use and misuse of 
the human rights approach, before suggesting an alternative methodological 
approach. I argue that the established narrative of human rights violations 
accentuated in the existing literature on Eritrea is flawed in terms of its 
methodology and approach. I then conclude the chapter by positing that 
understanding the experience of Eritrean refugees requires de-centring the 
human rights approach and positioning the realities of the refugees at the centre 
of the inquiry. 
 Brief history and background 
Present-day Eritrea came into existence during Italy’s colonial expansion into 
the Horn of Africa. The country, as we know it today, was carved out following 
successive border agreements between the Italian colonial government and 
Abyssinia in the first decade of Italian colonisation (Kibreab, 2009a, p. 1). From 
that point onwards, the country has gone through successive colonial ravages, 
and, since its independence in 1991, it has been involved in a border conflict 
with Ethiopia. Figure 1 shows a chronology of significant events in the country’s 
history. 
Chapter 2 22 
 
 
Figure 1: Chronology of events 
 
Italy colonised Eritrea from 1890 to 1941. Italian colonisation not only carved out 
a country called Eritrea but also introduced it to ‘a hierarchically organized 
global system of nation-states’ (Woldemikael, 2013, p. ix). The Italian colonial 
rulers drew arbitrary territorial borderlines and developed Eritrea’s 
infrastructure to accommodate colonial projects and ambitions, thereby making 
the country an Italian stronghold. In addition, the country’s inclusion in the 
global order of nation-states had a dramatic impact on the local people, their 
way of life, and their socio-political organisation. Italian settlers migrated to 
Eritrea in large numbers and imposed exploitative and discriminatory policies on 
local people; for example, locals were barred from certain streets in big cities 
and were only allowed to study up to a basic level. The local people were 
propelled ‘into a crisis of historical continuity, belonging, identity, and 
citizenship’ (Woldemikael, 2013, p. ix). Italian colonial rule in Eritrea ended 
following defeat by the Allies in WWII. 
Following on from Italian colonial rule, the British Military Administration (BMA) 
ruled Eritrea for a decade, looted its infrastructure and wealth, and divided the 
society along ethnic and religious lines. As Kibreab (2009) demonstrates, the 
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‘British policy in Eritrea was from the outset based on the denial of the 
existence of Eritrea as a political entity and of the Eritrean as a people worthy 
of a state of their own’ (p. 1). For its own political gains in the region, the BMA 
advocated for the partitioning of Eritrea between Ethiopia and Sudan. The BMA’s 
divisive policy, however, did not materialise; resistance from Eritreans and the 
international community intensified, and the BMA left Eritrea’s future to be 
decided by the international community and Ethiopia. 
In December 1950, the United Nations decided to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia 
(Kibreab, 2009a). Deprived of the right to self-determination, therefore, Eritrea 
was effectively federated with Ethiopia as an independent state in 1952. 
Nevertheless, the federation with Ethiopia did not last for longer than a decade; 
Ethiopia dissolved the federation in 1962, when it invaded Eritrea and annexed it 
as part of Ethiopia. By this time, Eritreans opposed to Ethiopia’s colonial 
ambitions had already started an armed struggle against Ethiopian occupation. 
Ethiopia’s unilateral annexation of Eritrea and the brutality it inflicted on local 
people provoked a powerful revolutionary fight for liberation. Notably, in 1961, 
a liberation war against the colonial regime began in the western and northern 
parts of the country before gaining momentum. The armed struggle started by a 
few lowlanders attracted thousands of Eritrean youths from all over the country. 
Driven by the colonial hostilities to which they were subjected, Eritrean men 
and women joined the armed struggle in large numbers. The liberation war was 
led, backed, and funded by Eritreans abroad. Leaders of the struggle 
successfully mobilised Eritreans to forge a unified rebellion against Ethiopia’s 
occupation. 
For almost three decades, successive regimes in Ethiopia worked relentlessly to 
dismantle Eritreans’ demands for self-determination. With the aim of 
suppressing separatist movements, the colonial regime normalised mass-
murders, massacres, arbitrary detention, and the torture of local people. 
Ordinary Eritreans were slaughtered and terrorised in their homes, simply 
because they preferred self-determination to colonisation. As the guerrilla war 
intensified, colonial troops began to demolish Eritrea’s physical environment and 
infrastructure; they burned forests, farms, villages, and towns, as well as 
destroying or blocking roads and bridges. Mountains were turned into minefields, 
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and hospitals and schools into detention facilities and military camps. In 
summary, the colonial regime did everything it could to consolidate Eritrea’s no-
man’s-land status, inherited from previous colonisers, and to relegate ordinary 
Eritreans to ‘the level of bare existence, merely bodies that have no rights and 
protections’ (Woldemikael, 2013, p. ix). 
Despite the colonial aggression, Eritrean people fought a bloody liberation war 
‘with a clear objective in mind: the freedom of Eritrea’ (Plaut, 2016b, p. 15). 
Following catastrophic civil wars caused by political differences, in the last 
decade of the liberation war, Eritrean people rallied behind the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and fought a fierce battle to liberate their 
country. Although the colonial regime, backed by Western countries until the 
mid-1970s and later by the Soviet Union, waged successive campaigns to crush 
the revolution, the EPLF continued to push for independence. 
In May 1991, after decades of bloodshed, Ethiopia was defeated, and Eritrea 
gained its long-dreamed-of independence. This ended the country’s troubled 
colonial history and the “state of exception” that had begun with Italian 
colonialisation and was later perpetuated by successive Ethiopian regimes 
(Woldemikael, 2013). The country’s independence was internationally 
recognised two years later, following an internationally monitored referendum in 
which 98.83 per cent of its people voted for independence (Plaut, 2016b, p. 
118). 
Nonetheless, despite the closing of Eritrea’s colonial chapter with 
independence, the suffering of the Eritrean people has never come to an end. 
Instead, their tantalising dreams were indefinitely suspended and the country’s 
independence marked the beginning of a post-liberation history dominated by a 
single man (Kibreab, 2009a; Woldemikael, 2013; Plaut, 2016b). A year after the 
referendum, the EPLF changed its name to the People’s Front for Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ) and established a provisional government headed by President 
Isaias Afwerki. This president clung to power and thwarted any possibility of a 
smooth transition. The president and his party (PFDJ) quashed the people’s 
hopes of constitutional rule, and have remained in power throughout Eritrea’s 
entire post-independence history (Kibreab, 2009a; Reid, 2009; Hirt, 2010). 
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For the first five years, the one-party government was kept busy consolidating 
its power and drafting a constitution that was later discarded. In the years 
between 1994 and 1998, the regime subjected disabled war veterans, army 
members, religious minorities, and students to arbitrary detention and forced 
disappearance for protesting against the government’s abuses of power and 
misuse of resources. Some protesters were brutally killed, others were 
arbitrarily detained for decades, and all of them were denied the chance for 
their voices to be heard (Woldemikael, 2013, pp. x–xi; Plaut, 2016b, pp. 119–
121). Martin Plaut, for example, reports an incident in which soldiers who had 
complained about the suspension of their salaries were insulted by the President 
for being ‘illegal, misguided, infantile..., [and] between 200 and 300 were 
rounded up and imprisoned’ (2016, p. 119). These were the first signs of the 
then-emerging repressive regime and its unaccountable authoritarian power. 
In a similar move, the government banned new political parties, crushed 
opposition movements, arrested prominent political dissidents, and began 
imposing strict censorship of the media (Kibreab, 2009a; Hirt, 2010; Plaut, 
2016b). It also introduced mandatory military service and began to round up any 
who wished to abstain. Since 2003, teenage students have been required to 
attend military training before sitting a national examination; if students fail the 
examination, they are forced to sign up for open-ended national service. The 
government also controls ordinary people by deploying checkpoints, prisons, and 
military camps throughout the country. Arguably, the entire country has been 
transformed into a carceral spectacle. 
Ironically, while heavily engaged in consolidating its power and exerting 
unfettered control over its citizens, the provisional government also found time 
to draft a constitution. The first draft, completed in 1995, was submitted to the 
public for discussion; a revised final draft was submitted in the following year. 
The constitution was then ratified and published in May 1997. The publication of 
the constitution had immense symbolic importance and its ratification was 
celebrated as one of the glorious moments in the country’s post-independence 
history (Plaut, 2016b). Yet, this euphoria lasted for not more than a year. 
Things took a turn for the worse in May 1998, when a war erupted between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. The war, commonly referred to as “The Border War”, 
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traumatised the neighbouring people of both countries, who share a common 
blood and history. It was catastrophic that over 70,000 soldiers’ lives were lost, 
more than a million people involuntarily displaced, and great opportunities and 
growing possibilities for growth wasted by both countries (Woldemikael, 2013, p. 
x; Plaut, 2016b, pp. 38–40). The two-year border war left children orphaned, 
young brides widowed, youths martyred, and families in a state of despair and 
grief. Neighbouring peoples, who shared a common culture, language, and blood 
through centuries of intermarriage, were separated by trenches, artillery, and 
landmines. Ultimately, the war left the people of both countries engrained in a 
state of trauma and socio-economic stagnation. 
In the year 2000, both countries signed a peace agreement, and a Boundary 
Commission was formed to draw up the disputed border. Two years later, in 
April 2002, the Boundary Commission ‘published its binding decision on the 
border’ (Plaut, 2016b, p. 42). Nevertheless, the governments of both countries, 
who had already signed an agreement to implement the decision by the 
Boundary Commission without preconditions, have not fulfilled their promises to 
their people. For nearly two decades, neither country implemented the binding 
decision of the Boundary Commission. Initially, Ethiopia was unhappy that the 
main disputed town of Badme was located on the Eritrean side, whereas Eritrea 
demanded the immediate implementation of the Commission’s ruling. 
Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia called for further talks with Eritrea regarding the 
implementation of the ruling, but Eritrea continued to insist that the border 
decision was final and binding. Failing to agree on the outcome of the decision 
and its implementation, the ‘neighbours—who shared so much in common—have 
become locked into a vicious cold peace, determined to do all they can to 
undermine each other without actually resorting open warfare’ (Plaut, 2016b, p. 
49). The costly border war became a stalemate. 
More than two decades since it erupted, the border conflict has yet to be 
resolved. The indeterminacy of the border has raised legitimate conceptual and 
practical concerns among many Eritreans. Conceptually, it throws into question 
any resounding assertion of an ontology of a sovereign state called Eritrea. In 
other words, as borders establish the limits of a country’s sovereignty, the 
indeterminacy of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border equate to a crisis of sovereignty, 
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implying a constitutional crisis and a threat to national security. For many 
Eritreans, particularly for those who fought successive wars to protect the 
country’s sovereignty, anything that calls into question the existence of Eritrea 
as an independent state is not only a national security threat but also the very 
antithesis of what the martyrs died for. Arguably, it is these national security 
concerns that appear to form the only commonalities between the majority of 
the Eritrean people and their government. 
It can be argued that Eritrea was right to call for the unconditional 
implementation of the border resolution, as both countries had agreed. The 
implementation of the border decision could have resulted in the withdrawal of 
Ethiopia’s military from occupied Eritrean lands and a return of the town of 
Badme to Eritrea, both of which are critical sticking points. From the very 
beginning, the government of Eritrea raised these legitimate concerns to the UN 
and other key players such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 
However, neither the UN nor the key players had the means or the political will 
to resolve the stalemate. Further aggravating the situation, instead of putting 
pressure on Ethiopia to accept the border resolution, the international 
community and the UN isolated Eritrea by imposing sanctions and publishing 
unproven allegations in the press of collaboration with “terrorist” groups (see 
Security Council, 2017). Despite Eritrea’s attempts to resist, the sanctions were 
maintained until late 2018 (Hirt, 2019). 
After failed diplomatic efforts, the regime misused its legitimate border 
concerns to sustain its existence and its grip on power. For decades, the 
government has consistently rebuffed any international criticism of its treatment 
of the Eritrean people, attributing the country’s domestic problems to the 
border conflict and Ethiopia’s occupation of Eritrean land. It ascribes all the 
challenges the country has faced in the post-war period to the border war and 
the disruptive international interventions. Blaming anyone but itself, the 
authoritarian government has managed to maintain its monopoly of power 
concentrated around the president, who is the commander in chief of every 
government branch. 
The legacy of the border war has played a critical role in Eritrea’s 
transformation since the conflict. In the protracted period that followed the 
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border war, the repressive state shifted its focus from geopolitical tensions to 
controlling its own people. Obsessed with the idea of preserving national 
sovereignty and security, the government suspended the constitution, which was 
born out of violence and repression, even before it had been implemented. This 
initiated an undeclared state of emergency, allowing the regime to claim 
unlimited power. In the absence of the rule of law, the regime has deployed its 
powers to punish, discipline, and control its citizens, while keeping them 
hostage in a never-ending national service. 
Through its carceral institutions, the state has penetrated into every family and 
transformed its citizens into obedient bodies, whose existence is merely to serve 
the interests of the authoritarian government. Politicians, journalists, and 
ordinary people opposed to the government’s exploitative policies are violently 
crushed; some are detained and tortured, others disappear in obscurity, without 
a trace (Kibreab, 2009a; Woldemikael, 2013; Plaut, 2016b). The country has 
been accused of committing ‘crimes against humanity’ by the United Nations 
Commission of Inquiry (COI, 2016). Yet, the government denies these accusations 
and refuses to release its grip on power. 
In June 2018, Ethiopia’s then new Prime Minister—Abiy Ahmed Ali (PhD)—
managed to break the border stalemate by agreeing to the terms of the 
Boundary Commission’s decisions. Following this rapprochement, both countries 
sent delegations and rekindled diplomatic relationships with one another (Hirt, 
2019; Addis et al., 2020; Vilmer, 2021). In the first few months, the countries 
opened their shared border, restarted high-level diplomatic visits, and repeated 
the rhetoric of peaceful co-existence. Most importantly, communication 
between the people of both countries was re-established, with scheduled flights 
starting between the capitals, telephone networks opening, and small cross-
border trading activities partially restored. Moreover, the two countries shared 
socio-cultural and religious events, with musicians and religious leaders visiting 
each other’s countries. These reconciliation attempts, however, did not result in 
a sustainable and more comprehensive alignment of the two countries, mainly 
due to the entrenched socio-economic, institutional, and political imbalances 
that continued to divide the former foes. Citing Kidane (2019), Vilmer (2021) 
perceptively points out: 
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Apart from pop singers, the two countries cannot share much: there 
cannot be parliamentary exchanges since Eritrea has no parliament, 
nor students exchanges since Eritrea does not have universities, nor 
civil society collaboration as Eritrea does not have civil society, not 
even a serious media coverage of joint initiatives as Eritrea does not 
have a free press (p. 37). 
In fact, there has been no indication that the occupied land will be returned to 
Eritrea, and borders are closed again despite being opened for a brief period. 
Within two years of the rapprochement, the tantalising hopes of peace vanished 
without any concrete outcomes. 
The greatest blow to any hopes of peace, however, was delivered at the start of 
November 2020, when a war broke out between a regional government led by 
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government of 
Ethiopia led by the transitional government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali 
(PhD). As I write this thesis, a war is raging between the TPLF fighters, on the 
one hand, and the federal government backed by Eritrean defence forces, on the 
other, which is destroying lives and livelihoods in the Tigray region of Ethiopia 
(see Abai, 2021). In contrast with the hopeful conditions that preceded this war, 
thousands of people including civilians have reportedly died; young girls and 
women raped; children separated from their parents and disappeared in the 
war-zone; tens of thousands civilians involuntary displaced; civilians subjected 
to large-scale massacres; and almost 100,000 Eritrean refugees remain trapped 
in the middle of the war in refugee camps (UN News, 2020; Abai, 2021, 2021; 
Human Rights Watch, 2021). The scale of the damage wreaked by the war has 
yet to be fully and independently assessed, but ‘war crimes’, ‘genocide’, and 
‘crimes against humanity’ have reportedly been inflicted on the people of Tigray 
since its outbreak (Abai, 2021), all of which is happening in the middle of the 
deadly COVID-19 pandemic. 
Eritrea’s involvement in the war between the regional and federal governments 
of Ethiopia has not only derailed the prospects of a comprehensive peace 
resolution between the neighbouring peoples, but also stranded the Eritrean 
people within realms of constant war, incarceration, and servitude. If there is 
one thing that has remained unchanged for the last three decades, it is the 
treatment of the Eritrean people. Both at home and abroad, Eritreans continue 
to face enslavement, detention, forced disappearance, and involuntary 
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displacement. While most people remain immobilised within the state’s carceral 
spectacle, some have already left the country. The lived experiences and forced 
migrations of many Eritreans have rendered the country almost ‘uninhabitable’ 
for its mostly young population (Woldemikael, 2013, p. viii). Those held hostage 
in solitary confinement and unending national service operate in a survival mode 
in which they are neither alive nor dead. 
In this study, I draw on stories related by Eritrean people to understand their 
situation. Collectively, Eritreans’ lived experiences represent a community in 
dismay. Whether in their home country or elsewhere, they are connected in 
their pain and grief. The challenges Eritreans face do not end once they exit 
their country; after becoming refugees, they are often excluded from the realms 
of political life and suspended in an endless carceral system (see Yohannes, 
2021). But leaving their homes and families behind is not the greatest calamity 
faced by these refugees; the calamity is that they are unable to find refuge 
elsewhere. It is the refugees’ a-political existence that I explore in this study. 
 Reflections on the existing literature on Eritrea 
In the media as well as in academic literature, Eritrea is often referred to as one 
of the world’s most secretive, repressive, and isolated states (Kibreab, 2009a; 
Plaut, 2016b). Of the scarce literature on the isolated country, much is the 
result of engaging with the Eritrean diaspora community, including refugees and 
asylum seekers. In addition to the knowledge gained through engaging with the 
diaspora community, the state also propagates its own information (often in the 
form of propaganda) as a countering strategy against the production of 
knowledge from the outside. What we know about the country is shaped by the 
competing narratives produced, on the one hand, by the repressive state that 
tries to craft an image of being a protagonist, and by Western human rights 
organisations that single out the repressive regime for its human rights 
violations. Yet, neither of these claims adequately interrogates the quirks and 
quandaries to be found in the (a)political life of the isolated state. 
The existing research focuses on establishing a causal relationship between the 
circumstances in the country and the mass emigration from the country. For 
example, the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea (COI) report 
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attempts to establish a causal relationship by claiming that Eritrean authorities 
have engaged in ‘crimes against humanity’ ever since the country’s 
independence and that its people had no choice but to leave their country. 
Likewise, Martin Plaut, in his book, Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa’s Most 
Repressive State (2016), identifies the government of Eritrea as culpable for the 
experience of Eritreans both at home and abroad, and, towards the end of his 
book, argues that the country’s president and his associates should be deposed. 
Feeding into the same narrative, Myers (2010) declares that Eritrea is ‘Africa’s 
North Korea’. Furthermore, Kibreab’s Eritrea: A dream deferred (2009) 
attributes the suffering of Eritreans to the failure of the only government Eritrea 
has seen since independence to establish institutions of protection. The book 
compares in detail the government’s failure to develop institutions that ensure 
rights and protections with Western conceptions of the rule of law and of socio-
economic institutions. The COI report and recent research attribute the realities 
of Eritrean refugees exclusively to the dire situation in the country. 
With very few exceptions, the scholarship on Eritrea feeds into a uniform 
hegemonic narrative that links the state with repression, authoritarianism, 
dictatorship, and violations of human rights. Indeed, it is widely accepted that 
the government’s repressive practices and crimes against its people are the main 
reasons why many Eritreans flee their country. I do not object to the narrative 
that the so-called ‘mass exodus’ from Eritrea is driven by the circumstances in 
the country (Reisen and Mawere, 2017, p. 36); nor do I disagree with the 
suggestion that the country has turned itself into a ‘garrison state’, in which 
citizens are subjected to cruel treatment by the ruling regime (Tronvoll and 
Mekonnen, 2014). However, I am sceptical of the hegemonic narrative of human 
rights violations in Eritrea and the underlying assumptions on which these claims 
are based. To my reading, almost the entire literature on Eritrea rests on the 
assumption that human rights once existed in Eritrea and that they are currently 
being violated by the country’s repressive regime. As I intend to examine in this 
study, I doubt whether any so-called human rights ever existed in Eritrea in the 
first place. And if assumptions about the existence of human rights in the 
country are proven wrong, the entire literature must be subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny. 
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The narrative of human rights violations in Eritrea formulates a uniform state-
centric human rights discourse that constitutively renders Eritrea, its people, 
and their voices unintelligible. Lying beneath the surface of the claims made in 
the scant literature, one can find countless unrelated comparisons, unanswered 
questions, untouched paradoxes, and constitutively excluded narratives. For 
instance, beyond the fact that both countries are assumed to be secretive and 
resistant to external interventions, what are the premises upon which Eritrea is 
compared to North Korea? How does the potentiality for similarities between the 
two countries outweigh the scope for differences? I suspect that such 
comparisons and claims are problematic, if not polemic. 
Similarly, if the COI believes that the government of Eritrea has committed 
‘crimes against humanity’ since independence, why did the United Nations wait 
for more than two decades to investigate the matter? Why did the investigation 
choose to start on the day on which the country obtained independence, while 
ignoring everything that had happened before that point? And regarding the 
realities of Eritrean refugees, why is it that their exploitation in the Sinai 
(Reisen and Mawere, 2017), in Libya, and the loss of lives in the Mediterranean 
Sea (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Proglio and Odasso, 2018) are not investigated? 
Why is it that the testimonies of survivors of trafficking remain concealed within 
the UNHCR’s and hosting states’ archives (Yohannes, 2021). Whether at borders, 
in treacherous waters, or in remote deserts, Eritrean refugees are exposed to 
death, exploitation, and incarceration with impunity. 
These, and other unanswered questions, pose philosophical and methodological 
doubts about the discourse of human right violations. The human rights 
discourses operate within a closed frame of thought that reifies the 
unintelligibility of alternative methodologies, and in the process, inclusively 
excludes other voices. This frame of thought must be shaken to understand the 
realities of Eritrean refugees. Sina Kramer, in her book Excluded Within: The 
(un)Intelligibility of Radical Political Actors (2017), offers a consistent analytical 
framework that allows critical reflection on the inclusive exception of certain 
‘actors’ and their ‘claims’, in what she calls ‘constitutive exclusion’. According 
to her, the logic of ‘constitutive exclusion’ involves two strains: 
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first, a philosophical system or political body constitutes itself by 
producing an excluded element or figure that nevertheless remains 
within it; second, this remaindered element is covered over, 
repressed, or disavowed (Kramer, 2017, p. 5). 
This logic of inclusive exclusion provides a framework for critique within which 
to understand Eritrea, as an oppressive state, and the refugee, as a depoliticised 
border concept. For instance, comparing Eritrea, which is less than three 
decades old, to “nuclear” North Korea is not only an essentialisation of 
perceived similarities but also a disregard for the distinctiveness of both 
countries. Yet, interestingly, both countries seem to be subjected to the same 
constitutively exclusionary Western political and philosophical frame of thought. 
In its three decades of war for independence, the narratives that frame Eritrea 
and Eritrean refugees have been dominated by the country’s reinscription into 
the inclusive exclusivity reified by the human rights narrative. Since its 
independence, the country seems to have been neither included in nor entirely 
excluded from the so-called international norms; instead, it has found itself 
entrenched in an indistinct realm between “integration” and “disintegration” 
within the global system. This status has undoubtedly had bearing on the 
country’s post-independent politics and representation. 
It can be argued that the narratives and discourses adopted in representations of 
Eritrea are framed and politicised within this realm of indiscernibility, which 
recognises certain claims but not others. The COI’s report is an example of this 
inclusive exclusivity. It chooses the day Eritreans celebrate a transition from 
colonialism to self-rule as its departure point and includes specific claims and 
recommendations for action, while also excluding and refusing to recognise 
multiple others. The report singles out the atrocities of the Eritrean government 
against its people and disregards everything else. Simple contextual facts, such 
as the damage caused by colonialism, the border conflict, the addition of the 
nation-state of Eritrea into an already volatile region mired in authoritarian 
politics, and the role of external interventions are simply ignored in the report. 
Considering the forms of politics and activism that the COI report galvanises, 
Müller (2016, p. 660) points out that ‘what is presented as clear-cut evidence is 
thus a rather incomplete picture too easily accepted as general truth’. 
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Likewise, the scholarship on the subject of Eritrea and Eritrean refugees, 
including, among others, Kibreab (2013, 2009), Mekonnen and Estefanos (2011), 
Reisen and Mawere (2017), Plaut (2016b), and Tronvoll and Mekonnen (2014), 
adopt an approach that chooses human rights violations as an unproblematic 
point of departure. Very few of the studies suggest alternative ontological 
categories as points of departure. In an era when so-called human rights are 
diminished to citizens’ rights, as Arendt and Agamben persuasively show, this 
fixation on a particular normative approach conceals the multiple realities that 
Eritrean refugees face and reproduces the dominant state-centric narrative. I 
argue that the agenda behind the adoption of this totalising notion of human 
rights does not go beyond advocating for the ousting of the current regime in 
Eritrea. To understand the experience of Eritreans, we must deconstruct the 
multiple ways in which Eritrea, its people, and their experiences are 
constitutively omitted from an encompassing political landscape. I suggest that 
Eritrea has been a permanent “state of exception” for centuries and that 
Eritreans have been reduced to rightlessness. 
Moreover, the state-centric approach trivialises the problems in Eritrea by 
essentialising the human rights violations as the only conceivable issue at stake. 
We should be mindful that the hypocrisy of the so-called human rights regime 
stratifies stakes and justifies the dominance of some experiences over others 
(see Mackinnon, 2018). The rights regime has established itself as a sovereign 
that inclusively excludes rights from wrongs and insiders from outsiders. It draws 
an arbitrary line between what is a “good” human rights practice and what 
is not, and it appears to enclave the former and essentially exclude the latter. In 
other words, the practices that are deemed to be acceptable feed into the 
settled hegemonic narrative as standard norms against which all other practices 
are checked, whilst the practices perceived to be unacceptable are subjected to 
excessive scrutiny (Ignatieff, 2000; Cmiel, 2004; Grovogui, 2006; Mackinnon, 
2018). As a result, sovereign states that are deemed to be repressive are 
expected to comply with the so-called international human rights norms or face 
punitive measures. 
For the states inclusively excluded on the grounds of human rights violations, the 
regime of rights enforces corrective mechanisms, takes disciplinary measures, 
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and characterises the measures as necessary for upholding human rights. If 
states do not live up to the requirements of these prescribed rights, as is often 
the case with totalitarian governments, such as Eritrea, they are expected to 
mend their laws ‘by legislation in democratic countries or through revolutionary 
action in despotism’ (Arendt, 2017, p. 383). As Mackinnon (2018) demonstrates, 
these aggressive interventions do not merely constitute twentieth-century 
pitfalls, but represent a continuum of an emblematic human rights regime with a 
shifting “genre”. Examples of twenty-first-century revolutions against autocratic 
regimes can be seen in the Arab uprising of the early 2010s, a period commonly 
referred to as the “Arab Spring”. Similarly, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by a 
United States-led coalition is a typical case of aggressive interference by the 
West. Such coercive actions are often undertaken on the pretext of national 
security and human rights violations. 
In the case of Eritrea, the measures taken against the country range from what 
would be called “constitutive silence”—that is, a silence that functions in 
‘multiplicitous, fragmentary, [and] even paradoxical ways’ (Ferguson, 2003, p. 
10)—on the country’s political interests to sanctions and media campaigns 
against the state. For example, if there was one thing that has played a 
significant role in the making of Eritrea as we know it today, it is the border 
conflict with Ethiopia. While the human and material cost of the war was 
disastrous, the “no-war no-peace” conundrum since the end of the border 
conflict has been catastrophic. However, as I stated above, Ethiopia’s reluctance 
to implement the binding border resolution and the inaction of the UN and other 
key partners to ensure that the border decision is implemented have contributed 
to the protracted no-war no-peace situation in Eritrea. This indecision has not 
only contributed to the border stalemate, but also left the country embroiled in 
a sovereignty crisis and its people in uncertainty. Crucially, the international 
community’s silence has allowed the government of Eritrea to use the 
indeterminacy of the border to impose unfettered control over its citizens with 
little consequence. 
Another overlooked area in the literature is how sanctions have exacerbated the 
challenges faced by the country. Increasingly becoming the weapons of choice of 
the so-called superpowers, sanctions are widely used disciplinary measures in 
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response to human rights violations. They can be imposed by individual states or 
by supra-state organisations, such as the United Nations Security Council or the 
European Union. Small countries such as Eritrea have become easy targets for 
costly sanctions. In fact, for almost a decade since 2009, Eritrea was subjected 
to UN Security Council sanctions for its alleged cooperation with the Somalia-
based militia group Al-Shabaab (Hirt, 2019). However, these allegations were 
undermined by the findings of a special Somalia–Eritrea Monitoring Group 
mandated to investigate the matter which reported no ‘conclusive evidence’ 
that Eritrea was involved (Security Council, 2017). Despite this lack of conclusive 
evidence, the sanctions were not lifted until November 2018 and the country 
was trapped in a blockade for a decade. 
The constitutive silence on the indeterminacy of the binding border decision and 
the UN sanctions regime have played a part in prolonging the no-war-no-peace 
impasse in Eritrea. Moreover, these irony-laden measures have also provided a 
convenient alibi for the ruling regime in Eritrea to use to establish a counter-
narrative. Putting forward the constitutively excluded claims, the Eritrean 
government ‘established a new regime of truth, its own version of reality, by 
which it justified imposing arbitrary rule and made its leader, President Isaias 
Afwerki, an absolutist head of state, unaccountable to any government body’ 
(Woldemikael, 2013, p. x). Obsessed with a self-fabricated version of reality, the 
ruling regime transformed the country into a lawless militarised camp. It 
suspended the rule of law and imposed fear, tyranny, oppression, and never-
ending uncertainty on the Eritrean people (Woldemikael, 2013; Plaut, 2016b). 
Moreover, the government has imposed a condition of rightlessness and a lack of 
sovereign protection on the citizens of Eritrea. In so doing, the government has 
turned the country into a place that is ‘uninhabitable for its growing youthful 
population’ (Woldemikael, 2013, p. viii). 
Consequently, Eritreans have been fleeing their country in search of safety. 
Every month, hundreds, if not thousands, of men, women, and children exit the 
country in order to escape generalised oppression, open-ended national service, 
and arbitrary detention (Andom, 2018, p. 579). Those who manage to flee their 
country face human trafficking, immigration detention, deportation, and death 
at borders and in the transit countries (Mekonnen and Estefanos, 2011; Andom, 
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2018). The Sinai trafficking is an example of how Eritrean refugees have been 
annihilated, with anything becoming possible: death and survival, torture and 
rescue, law and exception (Yohannes, 2021). 
Nonetheless, the refugees’ difficulties do not end in destination countries such 
as Sudan and Egypt but continues in a more systematic fashion. In transit and 
destination places, the presence of Eritrean refugees is treated as a “crisis” and 
host states do whatever it takes to expel them from the political community. 
Excluded from any form of protection, the refugees’ very existence is called into 
question. For these people, existence is not an “inalienable” right; it is the 
ultimate struggle for survival. 
After their involuntary displacement, ‘refugees become a site where certain 
forms of knowledge are reproduced and justified’ (Rajaram, 2002, p. 251). The 
refugee is represented through two seemingly contradictory narratives: one that 
focuses on the hegemonic discourse of human rights and humanitarianism, and 
the other that highlights the constitutive exclusion of refugees and their voices 
from political life. The former reproduces the “refugee crisis” narrative, while 
the latter reveals the exclusion of refugees from the realm of rights and 
“humanity” and points towards a crisis of the nation-state system (Agamben, 
1995a). The human rights approach represents refugees as ‘objects of 
humanitarian intervention’ (Malkki, 1996, p. 385). Humanitarian and relief 
organisations, such as the UNHCR, roam the world with the objective of 
providing relief and declaratory protection, while presenting the refugee as a 
monolithic group—an inaudible category of humanity (Malkki, 1996). Within this 
paternalistic representation, ‘refugees are “universal victims”: a dehistoricizing 
that makes it difficult to understand that there are individual politics and 
histories behind the pictures of teeming masses of bodies’ (Rajaram, 2002, p. 
252). 
This blind and totalising reductionism of the refugee to a human victim obscures 
the multiple crises that underlie the so-called “refugee crisis”. For example, as 
Agamben (1995a) argues, the fact that millions of refugees are placed outside 
the nation-state system signals a crisis of the nation-state itself. Likewise, the 
“delocalisation” and the turning of the border into a place of violence and 
exclusionary biopolitical surveillance suggests a crisis of the border, not of the 
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refugee (Salter, 2004a, p. 80; Amoore, 2006; Salter, 2008a); when a sinking 
migrant boat is abandoned in the middle of the sea, it is a symptom of political 
and moral crises (Cusumano, 2018; Mainwaring, 2019; Edler, 2020). Seen from 
this perspective, the so-called “refugee crisis” is the product of multiple 
constitutively obscured crises. 
 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have offered a short account of Eritrea’s history and the 
realities of its people. To make sense of the historical continuity of the issue 
under examination, I have highlighted the (non-)existence of laws and rights in 
the country’s recent colonial and post-independence periods. 
Moreover, I have reviewed the existing literature to shown that the experience 
of Eritrean refugees in transit and destination states is viewed through the prism 
of human rights. The scant literature raises three main issues. First, regardless 
of the nature and magnitude of the crimes committed, the literature concludes 
that Eritrea has violated human rights. These violations include mandatory open-
ended national service, arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, and 
the denial of political, religious and speech freedoms (Reisen, Estefanos and 
Rijken, 2014, 2014; COI, 2016; Plaut, 2016b). Second, the literature suggests 
that the government in Eritrea is largely responsible for the difficulties Eritrean 
refugees face. This is the main line of argument the COI report follows to argue 
that the government of Eritrea has committed crimes against humanity since 
1991. Third, the majority of books, journal articles and reports compare the 
specific issue of Eritrea to Western human rights norms. 
I disagree with the normative claim that the fundamental problem in Eritrea is a 
violation of human rights. As I have shown, the human rights analytical 
framework operates by acknowledging some actors and their voices, on the one 
hand, and not acknowledging multiple others and their experiences, on the 
other. Beyond these ironies, therefore, understanding the realities of Eritrean 
refugees requires critical biopolitical and necropolitical examinations. I suggest 
that the underlying cause of the experience of Eritreans is the absence of rights, 
human or otherwise. Hannah Arendt, in her work Totalitarianism (2017) and 
Georgio Agamben, in his State of Exception (2005), show that human rights are 
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reduced to citizens’ rights. They also remind us that, historically, totalitarian 
governments have extinguished the rights of citizens by suspending the rule of 
law and creating unaccountable forms of sovereign power. In the absence of 
law, the ‘exception becomes the rule’ (Salter, 2008a). 
Agamben’s theory of exception is relevant to understanding the fundamental 
problem in Eritrea. As Woldemikael (2013) argues, Eritrea has not come out of a 
‘state of exception’ since the Italian colonisation of the country in 1890. That 
state, however, is not due to the suspension of law but because of the non-
existence of law. The uninterrupted absence of law and protections, which the 
literature on Eritrea fails to investigate, has led to an effective reduction of 
Eritrean lives to a form of life similar to what Agamben calls ‘bare life’—a form 
of life that can be destroyed without committing crime or sacrilege. From this 
perspective, the fundamental problem in Eritrea is the relegation of its citizens 
to a form of life that can be destroyed with impunity. Once reduced to this form 
of apolitical life, they are thrown into a cycle of violence wherever they go. 
Official reports from international organisations, mainstream media coverage 
and some published sources tend to essentialise human rights violations in 
Eritrea in their attempts to highlight the experience of Eritrean refugees. This 
one-sided discourse that singles out Eritrea for the problems Eritreans face both 
at home and elsewhere is imposed ‘by a vocal human rights lobby whose activists 
often refer to each other’s documents in a circular fashion, which are 
uncritically repeated in much of the media’ (Müller, 2016, p.659). Müller 
contends that the COI’s accusation of Eritrean authorities committing ‘alleged 
crimes-against-humanity is a logical conclusion of this representation’ (2016, 
p.659). The COI’s decision to ignore in the report crimes committed against 
Eritrean refugees in transit countries such as Egypt and Libya support Müller’s 
argument. Müller’s insightful account points to a gap in the literature on Eritrea. 
The Eurocentric human rights approach conforms with the West’s restrictionist 
narrative against irregular migration and its bias towards a settled anti-
immigration narrative. However, this should not be seen as an attempt to 
undermine the argument that the regime in Eritrea has turned the country into a 
lawless carceral space. The nature of Eritrea’s government must not be 
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essentialised so as to obscure the challenged Eritrean refugees encounter once 
they are outside their home country. 
Therefore, Eritrean refugees are trapped in a realm that is neither exterior nor 
interior to the law. And their rightlessness is not confined to a particular place 
or time. In the next chapter, I review the status of the refugee in the order of 
rights and offer a nuanced analytical framework required to unpack the 
continued suffering of Eritrean refugees. 
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Chapter 3 The Status of the “Refugee” in the 
Order of Rights 
 Introduction 
The notion of a rights-based system has ancient origins and a multifaceted 
history. It has been shaped and reshaped by civilisations, social evolution, and 
globalisation; it has been celebrated and idolised in cultures’ historical legacies 
and political monuments; it has been stirred by revolutions and demands for 
freedom. However, its history and genealogy have been neither ‘linear’, nor 
‘predictable’ (Alston, 2013, p. 2081). Earlier histories of rights-based systems of 
administration can be traced back to ancient Persia. In Kuhrt (1983), we find an 
account of the conception of a form of rights-based governance by Cyrus the 
Great of Persia, centuries before the birth of Christianity. This is perceived by 
some history scholars as the first attempt by a ruler to adopt human rights. 
Likewise, a gradual evolutionary process of “democracy” and the rights and 
duties associated with the practice can be traced back to ancient Greek 
civilisation and the Roman and Ottoman empires. For example, progressive 
notions of rights-based systems of government and classical forms of democracy 
were proposed by the famous ancient Greek thinkers Plato and Socrates. Plato’s 
central work The Republic has dominated discourses of rights, duties, and 
morality for centuries, and it is still, to some extent, relevant to our 
understanding of the evolution of the modern concept of democracy. 
In the second millennium, the evolution of human rights was subjected to 
shifting ebbs and flows. The Magna Carta (1215) ended the supremacy of kings 
and governments over the law, while the Petition of Right (1628) helped to 
promote civil and political rights. Later, in the 18th century, the United States 
Declaration of Independence (1776) and Constitution (1787) dominated the 
politics and philosophical conceptions of human rights. The former declared: 
‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness’ (Congress, 1776). The latter 
lays out these rights in terms of legal authority. Amended many times over the 
centuries, the Constitution embodies the division of powers and governance 
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framework in the US. Two years later, in 1789, the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen was celebrated as one of the greatest 
achievements in the field of rights. It was viewed that the Rights of Man meant 
that “Man” had divorced himself from the idea of natural rights and the 
traditions of a stratified society, and crowned himself as the sovereign (see 
Arendt, 2017). The Declaration sought to universalise the notion of rights. 
After the Rights of Man, a new wave of ‘international rights revolution’ took 
over (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 289). One of the milestone achievements in this later 
history of human rights was the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in 1948. This document, like the Rights of Man, seeks to 
universalise human rights to all places and all people. In its Preamble, the UDHR 
asserts that the ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice, and peace in the world’ (United Nations, 2015, p. I). Put 
differently, the UDHR frames the relationship between the state and its citizens 
not as a national issue but as an international concern. There is burgeoning 
evidence that this has opened ways for states to intervene in the affairs of other 
independent, sovereign nations, as I discuss in the next section. 
While the UDHR contains some benign elements aimed at protecting and 
advancing certain fundamental rights, the purportedly “inalienable” character of 
the UDHR has left a large part of humanity outside of its scope. Refugees are 
mentioned nowhere in the Declaration; neither is their status clarified in the 
Charter. Arguably, it is this void that led to the 1951 Geneva Convention. The 
Geneva Convention was explicitly designed to respond to the involuntary 
displacement of refugees in Europe after WWII. It offered a framework for 
addressing the structural problems posed by the constitutive omission of the 
category of refugee from the realm of rights. As refugees began to arrive in 
Europe from across the world, the geographic limitation was later removed, with 
the introduction of a protocol in 1967. 
Despite its objectives, the Geneva Convention remained incomplete and unfit for 
the other contexts to which it was intended to be applied. For example, it failed 
to address the question of internally displaced persons. In response, various 
regional instruments were created to address specific concerns. For instance, in 
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1969, the Organisation of the African Union created a modified convention to 
meet the specific needs of refugees in Africa (OAU, 1974). Likewise, in 1984, 
Latin America adopted a nonbinding declaration called the Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees. 
The status of the refugee in the rights-based international order is perplexing. 
This is partly because the history and politics of the rights-based international 
order are problematic at best and exclusionary at worst. Mackinnon (2018) 
writes: ‘One approach, one historical legacy, is disavowed in favour of another; 
some legacies are passed down while others are made to appear discontinuous, 
part of some other genre or history’ (p. 6). If this is at least partially correct, 
then what is lost in the sedimentation of rights and which rights have we 
inherited? Most importantly, who is the bearer of these rights? What is the status 
of the “refugee” in the selective and fragmentary regime of rights? 
While I recognise the complexity of the rights-based order and its complicated 
politics, my aim is precisely to understand the status in modern political life of 
the specific category of the refugee. Thus, the goal of this chapter is not to 
provide an exhaustive analysis of the contested history of human rights but to 
highlight some crucial episodes of how the rights-based order evolved over the 
past few centuries in order to locate the position of the refugee. In doing so, I 
review some episodes and critical junctures in the history of the evolution of the 
present rights-based order. First, I critically discuss the transformation from 
“the rights of man” to “human rights”. In this part, I refer to Arendt’s work 
on totalitarianism to analyse the decline of the so-called rights of man and the 
subsequent propagation of human rights. 
Second, I locate the position of the refugee in the international rights-based 
order. In this section, I argue that the refugee is reduced to a surplus figure 
whose rights and human dignity are forfeited in the process of domestication of 
human rights by nation-states. Third, I discuss the concept of refugee, its legal 
definition, and its status in political life. Drawing on Arendt’s characterisation of 
the refugee as the ‘scum of the earth’ and Agamben’s equating of the refugee to 
what he calls ‘bare life’, I argue that the refugee must be reconceptualised as a 
“border concept” whose ontological register and physical existence are 
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positioned in a realm of indiscernibility between life and death. Last, I offer 
concluding remarks. 
 From “the rights of man” to “human rights” 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man was a significant human rights achievement 
in the eighteenth century. The Declaration was hailed as a radical departure 
both from “history” and from the “natural rights” upon which humans had for so 
long relied (see Arendt, 2017, p. 390). The rights of man were proclaimed to be 
independent and yet remained unprotected. Arendt (2017, p. 380) explains: 
Man himself was their source as well as their ultimate goal. No special 
law, moreover, was deemed necessary to protect them because all 
laws were supposed to rest upon them. Man appeared as the only 
sovereign in matters of law as the people was proclaimed the only 
sovereign in matters of government. 
In Arendt’s view, through the Rights of Man, man sought to crown himself as the 
source and bearer of the so-called “inalienable” rights. Such an abstract 
formulation of the Rights of Man, however, left unanswered two fundamental 
questions: first, the Rights of Man failed to address who the “Man” of the Rights 
of Man was; and second, as Arendt points out, if one assumes that “Man” was 
intended to refer to an individual member of the human community, then how 
inclusive were these rights. 
Addressing the first question, Arendt persuasively explains the intersection of 
the Rights of Man with ‘an “abstract” human being who seemed to exist 
nowhere, for even savages lived in some kind of a social order’ (2017, p. 381). 
According to Arendt, “Man” has never been free from the greater social order of 
which he had been proclaimed the ruler. She argues that the “Man” of the Rights 
of Man was merely a member of a community organised in a system of nation-
states. This immersion of the “Man” in the new social order meant identifying 
‘the rights of man with the rights of peoples in the European nation-state 
system’ (Arendt, 2017, p. 381). If this assertion is at least partially correct, then 
the questions of universality and inalienability merit an examination. 
The Rights of Man turned out to be a quixotic rhetorical project that only 
protected the rights of a selected portion of humanity. The futility of this 
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quixotic project was laid bare in the subordination of women’s rights and the 
rightlessness of stateless and involuntarily displaced people (Rancière, 2004; see 
Arendt, 2017; Mackinnon, 2018). Rancière (2004), for example, observes that 
‘equal-born women were not equal citizens’ despite their wishes to be political 
(p. 303). And such, too, was the fate of minorities such as stateless people and 
refugees. These categories of people were effectively removed from the realm 
of rights and placed into a realm of perpetual exceptionality. As Arendt (2017) 
articulates, ‘it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own 
government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was 
left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them’ (p. 381). 
This nakedness was materialised in the subjugation of the Jews in the 
concentration camps of twentieth-century Europe. 
In Arendt’s analysis, the erosion of the Rights of Man gave rise to the creation of 
minority rights that are supervised by supra-state organisations. In the aftermath 
of WWI, the League of Nations was founded with the prime objective of 
‘maintaining peace’, but also to respond to the needs of displaced people 
(Easton-Calabria, 2015, p. 416). The foundation of a new body with the 
responsibility of looking after minorities appeared to be a triumph for the 
sovereign state, as it served to successfully separate the rights of citizens from 
the rights of the rest of humanity. This separation of citizens’ rights from the 
rights of the remainder of humanity was a radical departure from the initial 
promises of ‘inalienable rights’ in conceptions of the rights of man. This 
departure unveiled the irreparable existential damage inherent in the abstract 
formulation of the rights of man. 
Dealing with the inseparable questions of universality and inalienability, both 
Arendt and Rancière arrive at the same conclusion: the “Man” of the Rights of 
Man and the claims of inalienability are simply abstractions that do not exist in 
reality. The Rights of Man, after all, turn out to be a fictitious edict. Ultimately, 
it ended dramatically and paradoxically; both its logic and rhetorical 
manifestation have dissolved in a relatively brief time frame. 
With the decline of the rights of man, “Man” became “Human”. After all, 
Rancière (2004) proclaims: ‘The actual subject of these Rights of Man became 
Human Rights’ (p. 298). In the post-WWII era, there was a broader international 
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consensus regarding the imperative to ensure that the atrocities that led to the 
devastating world wars would not happen again. By this time, the terms “natural 
rights” and “the Rights of Man” were disappearing, giving way to the term 
“human rights”. In 1945, the United Nations was officially created, with over 
fifty countries signing the United Nations Charter. Three years later, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. This was followed by the drafting of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The ICCPR focuses 
on fundamental freedoms, such as the right to life and freedom of speech and 
religion, while the ICESCR emphasises essential needs, such as food, health, 
shelter, and education. Together, the three documents form the International 
Bill of Rights. 
The UDHR sets out standard human rights norms, which member states have 
agreed to uphold. In its Preamble, the UDHR recognises ‘the inherent dignity and 
[…] the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’, and 
notes that these rights should be ‘protected by the rule of law’ (United Nations, 
2015, p. 1). The UDHR opposes any form of discrimination (Articles 2 and 7), 
prohibits ‘slavery’ in all its forms (Article 4), protects everyone against ‘torture’ 
(Article 05), and prohibits ‘arbitrary detention’ (Article 9). Article 3 of the EDHR 
declares that ‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’ 
(United Nations, 2015, pp. 6–8). Overall, the document has 30 articles 
proclaiming and extending in general terms fundamental freedoms, rights, and 
protections to all people. 
There is a broader consensus that the UDHR and other human rights documents 
cover the core principles of the post-war human rights regime. Their principles, 
however, were not protected by any law until the 1990s, when ‘Western 
organisations — the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, 
and Human Rights Watch — roamed the globe looking for infractions’ (Cmiel, 
2004, p. 117). These organisations, coupled with activism and human rights 
movements, successfully advocated the creation of an international human 
rights law. Similarly, the UN expanded its organs and established new branches. 
Most notably, the foundation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
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UN Commissions of Inquiry (COI) enabled the human rights regime, respectively, 
to secure an international jurisdiction and a fact-finding mission. The creation of 
these human rights regimes enabled the UN to expand its jurisdictions and 
executive powers. 
Nevertheless, the proliferation of human rights organisations has created 
unpleasant relationships between sovereign states, who resist intervention and 
the involvement of human rights organisations. For example, the relationship 
between the Organisation of the African Union (OAU) and the ICC has been an 
embattled one (see Murithi, 2013). Similarly, the new human rights regime also 
meant that Western supra-national organisations such as NATO could act as 
patrons of the so-called ‘inalienable rights’ proclaimed by the regime. These 
organisations began to interfere in other nations’ matters with the pretext of 
“upholding” human rights where they believe these rights are violated. Such 
interventions can be traced back to the Nuremberg trials and NATO’s 
persecution of war crimes (see Cmiel, 2004, p. 117). In the last decade, the ICC 
convicted Congolese warlords and rebel leaders (see Human Rights Watch, 
2019). 
Moreover, the universalisation of human rights agenda raised questions of socio-
cultural relevance across the continents of Africa, South America, and Asia. 
African and Latin American countries rely on traditional practices of communal 
justice and customary laws to shape their human rights practices, as opposed to 
the so-called international human rights norms. As Grovogui (2006) demonstrates 
with a persuasive analysis of the Haitian human rights discourses, the notion of 
‘ennobling existence through authoritative ethical categories is not foreign to 
other regions and cultures’ (p. 5). At variance with Western traditions of human 
rights are also “Asian values”, including discourses of “Orientalism” and varying 
practices of human rights in the Middle East and South-East Asia (Mauzy, 1997, 
pp. 215–2017; Said, 2003). These competing practices and discourses 
overwhelmed the universalisation agenda of the West-led rhetoric of human 
rights. The notion of universal human rights promoted by the international 
human rights organisations, therefore, ‘must necessarily concede the Western 
origination of the concept and the ontological primacy of related Western 
institutions’ (Grovogui, 2006, p. 4). 
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Furthermore, the ever-increasing powers of the human rights regimes risk 
leading to interference in states’ sovereignty over their domestic matters. The 
proliferation and coalition of human rights organisations, in fact, offer a sharp 
critique of states’ exercise of their sovereign powers. In recent decades, the 
international human rights organisations supported by superpowers have 
established a formidable force to deter sovereign states from committing human 
rights violations. Non-governmental organisations have not only established 
procedures for investigating and uncovering human rights violations, but they 
also demand “explanations” from sovereign states and take measures against 
their oppressive practices (see Sikkink, 1993, p. 414). While such interventions 
may have shrunk state control over domestic matters, they do not remove 
states’ sovereign protective and/or repressive powers over their citizens. The 
interventions, however, have promoted ‘a reconceptualized sovereignty in which 
a state accepts that gross violations of human rights will no longer be an issue 
solely within its domestic jurisdictions’ (Sikkink, 1993, p. 415). Yet, the state 
remains both a primary source of threat to and protection for its citizens. 
Within a human rights-based order, therefore, states retain greater control over 
their citizens’ rights, and even more so over non-citizens’ rights. In fact, it can 
be argued that human rights have begun to be focused on, if not administered 
by, sovereign states. This means that states can choose to unconditionally 
remove undesirable groups of people from the polity and expel them into 
spheres of exceptionality. At this point, in essence, the state has successfully 
domesticated human rights to a form of citizens’ rights and assigned the Rights 
of Man to those deprived of rights. Rancière eloquently affirms: 
Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, 
along with medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, 
clothes, and rights. It is in this way, as the result of this process, that 
the Rights of Man become the rights of those who have no rights, the 
rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman repression and 
inhuman conditions of existence (2004, p. 307). 
The refugee has become a prototype of the rightless human being whose 
ontological and biological existence depends on humanitarian rescue. 
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 Locating the refugee in the rights-based order 
The category of refugee came into existence ‘when the link between state, 
citizen, and territory [was] broken’ (Betts, Loescher, and Dawson Books, 2011, 
p. 89). Obviously, most refugees were once citizens, unless they were born 
refugees in refugee camps or in diaspora. As Arendt persuasively demonstrates, 
the refugee is created when ‘a condition of complete rightlessness’ is deployed 
to denationalise citizens (2017, p. 387). For Arendt, losing one’s home and a lack 
of state protection are essential preconditions for the creation of the refugee. 
Removed from home and disconnected from the nation-state, the refugee was 
‘perceived as suffering from both political disenfranchisement ... and economic 
poverty’ (Long, 2013, p. 9). In other words, the refugee became both a subject 
of political exception and humanitarian intervention concomitantly. 
Over time, the refugee has been transformed into a constitutively excluded 
figure. During the interwar period, the refugee was treated as a category of 
migrants: ‘exile and destitution could be solved through continued movement’ 
(Long, 2013, p. 9). To this effect, the League of Nations issued refugee 
passports, known as “Nansen Passports”, which allowed refugees ‘to travel and 
settle in other countries’ (Chetail, 2003, p. 4). This freedom of movement, 
employment, and settlement in other countries was facilitated ‘as a form of 
burden sharing’, whereby refugees were expected not only to be self-sufficient 
but also to contribute to solving broader unemployment problems (Long, 2013, 
p. 10). Hence, refugee resettlement projects during the interwar period relied 
heavily on producing surplus labour for national and international development 
programmes. Long (2013) asserts: ‘Refugee exile was thus one part of a broader 
concern to tackle the much greater project of global unemployment through 
targeted migration’ (p. 10). 
However, despite the interwar period’s emphasis on refugees’ resilience and 
self-reliance, refugees were subjected to widespread exploitation and political 
marginalisation. In the 258th United Nations meeting in 1949, for example, the 
USSR criticised Western states for their exploitative treatment of refugees in 
refugee camps. In this meeting, USSR representatives criticised the West in that: 
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The [refugee] camps were being turned into a slave market where 
representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Australia and so forth came to recruit cheap labour ... The IRO 
[International Refugee Organization] presided over this market, and 
had been reduced to a mere employment agency, acting in the 
interests of the capitalists, whose only idea was to obtain the labour 
that they needed at the lowest price (United Nations, 1949, cited in 
Long, 2013, p. 17). 
The USSR might have been advancing its own political agenda, but these 
comments suggest that refugees were being exploited by their host states, who 
showed scant regard for the refugees’ need for protection and human dignity. 
One would argue that while the refugees’ labour was deemed crucial to the 
success of national development projects aimed at emerging from the Great 
Depression, little attention was given to refugees’ political inclusion. Yet, the 
interwar period witnessed: 
[...] the emergence of not only the first international refugee regime, 
but a participatory refugee regime with the joint aims of refugee self-
reliance and host country development ... Innovative rehabilitation 
strategies included material assistance while emphasizing bottom-up 
methods and refugees’ ability to contribute through their own skills, 
expertise and financial means (Easton-Calabria, 2015, p. 421). 
From the 1930s onwards, these participatory approaches were gradually eroded 
and replaced by state-centred restrictionist, containment, and removal 
strategies. The Nazis’ project to incarcerate and exterminate the Jewish and 
non-Jewish people in concentration camps is the most heinous and obvious 
example of the political exception of minorities. But other refugees and 
minorities in various parts of the world were also held in carceral spaces in 
situations of incommunicado for protracted periods without their basic needs 
being met and deprived of necessary legal protections. In general, the category 
of the refugee has become an increasingly depoliticised figure whose rights and 
dignity have been forfeited. 
Since the signing of the Geneva Convention in 1951, refugees have lost their 
“migrant identity” and consequently their rights to movement and employment 
(Long, 2013, p. 15). The Geneva Convention, also known as the Refugee 
Convention, was created after the Second World War as a response to the 
involuntary displacement of people in Europe. Since then, refugees have been 
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framed as a unique category of migrant, as defined by the Refugee Convention. 
Moreover, the UNHCR was given an institutional mandate to oversee this 
transformation. Seen through the prism of the Refugee Convention and the 
UNHCR, ‘a refugee is generally presented as a figure of humanitarian rescue, 
qualifying for protection only by virtue of the absence of any explicit economic 
aspirations’ (Long, 2013, p. 7). 
The Refugee Convention defines a refugee ‘as someone who, owing to events 
that occurred prior to January 1951, fled his or her homeland because of fear of 
persecution’ (Betts, Loescher, and Dawson Books, 2011, p. 119). According to 
the Convention, a person has to cross an international border and prove ‘fear of 
persecution’ on the grounds of nationality, ethnicity, religion, political opinion, 
and/or membership of a social group. The Convention remains the most 
important international legal instrument governing the protection of refugees. 
Most importantly, it provides a definition of refugees that distinguishes them 
from other migrants (Article 1) and sets out the legal basis for protecting 
refugees from being returned to their country of origin, through its non-
refoulement clause (Behrman, 2018, p. 2). 
However, due to its narrow definition of a refugee, the Refugee Convention 
presents some serious limitations. First, it excludes other involuntarily displaced 
people. Regardless of the reasons for their displacement, internally displaced 
people are not classified under the category of refugee; nor are those who have 
migrated across an international border in search of safety owing to the 
destruction of their place of habitation by natural disaster. The Refugee 
Convention, Behrman (2018, p. 13) points out: 
[...] ignores at least three other major refugee crises of the time: the 
largest forced migration in world history involving some 14.5 million 
people who crossed the borders following the partition of India and 
Pakistan in 1947, the 800,000 Palestinians forced from their homes by 
the Zionists in the following year and the refugees created by the 
outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in 1950. 
Given these major limitations in the past, the Refugee Convention can barely be 
expected to be capable of protecting the rights of refugees in the current era of 
“mixed-migration” (van der Klaauw, 2009). 
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Second, with the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, the Refugee Convention 
expanded its scope to include forced migrants from other parts of the world. 
The 1967 Protocol removed temporal and geographic limitations relating to the 
status of refugee, giving the Convention international status. However, the 
limitation related to the grounds for establishing “fear of persecution” did not 
go away. Similarly, as Behrman (2018) points out, ‘the restrictive definition of a 
refugee, as one fleeing their home state for reasons of persecution on grounds of 
the denial of social or political rights, remained’ (p. 15). In other words, the 
temporal and geographic extensions failed to address context-specific regional 
challenges. As a response to this failure, the continents of Africa and Latin 
America adopted regional agreements to deal with specific refugee issues in 
their respective regions; the 1969 OAU Convention and the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration were created to govern refugee problems in Africa and Latin 
America, respectively. These regional agreements recognised the limitations of 
the Refugee Convention and expanded the definition of refugee to include more 
people within the category. 
Lastly, despite its central role in extending some fundamental rights to refugees, 
the 1951 Convention is also heavily criticised for placing ‘the rights of the state 
above those of the refugee’ (Behrman, 2018, p. 1). Behrman (2018) clarifies: 
‘there is no right of asylum, only a right to claim it ... The effect is inescapably 
to place the refugee at the mercy of a whole series of controls over their 
movements’ (p. 2). The irony is that, for involuntarily displaced persons to claim 
asylum, they have to cross an international border in a world where borders are 
excessively militarised and equipped with sophisticated surveillance technology 
(Salter, 2004b, 2008b; see Aas, 2011; Behrman, 2018). Obviously, crossing an 
international border does not guarantee asylum protection; instead, asylum 
seekers have to deal with increasingly dehumanising asylum regimes that 
transform people into manageable figures. 
In effect, asylum seekers are captured within a vetting bureaucracy that grants 
or does not grant them asylum. While those awarded a favourable decision are, 
at least in principle, protected by the 1951 Convention, those whose claims are 
refused by the state become targets of immigration detention and removal from 
the polity. Behrman (2018) summarises: ‘The burdensome apparatus of screening 
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procedures, surveillance and detention that is so ubiquitous today is not a 
betrayal of the spirit of the 1951 Convention, but rather is an expression of it’ 
(p. 15). Ultimately, the 1951 Convention remains a highly politicised, Euro-
centric, and deeply colonial legal instrument (Mayblin, 2017, 2020; see Krause, 
2021). 
While the 1951 Convention sets out refugees’ rights and entitlements, the 
UNHCR constitutes an institution mandated to oversee the implementation of 
these rights and entitlements. The organisation not only establishes who 
qualifies to be a refugee but also puts itself at the forefront of responding to 
refugee problems. Its primary mandate includes monitoring the protection of 
asylum seekers and refugees as well as providing humanitarian assistance and 
durable solutions. In general terms, the UNHCR’s mandate covers safeguarding 
protection needs in both emergency and non-emergency circumstances, as well 
as inside and outside camp settings during asylum seekers’ involuntary 
displacement (see Betts, Loescher, and Dawson Books, 2011). 
Moreover, by coordinating the responses of state and non-state actors to refugee 
problems, the UNHCR has expanded its humanitarian reach. The organisation, 
for instance, works closely with the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) at the macro-level and with local organisations at the micro-level. With 
these expansions and collaborative associations, the UNHCR has evolved into a 
giant humanitarian organisation and assumed a ‘moral and expert authority to 
justify its interventions in global affairs’ (Betts, Loescher, and Dawson Books, 
2011, p. 110). Put differently, the organisation has the powers to declare ‘the 
existence of a refugee crisis’, mobilise resources, and take the lead in 
responding to the ‘crisis’ (Betts, Loescher, and Dawson Books, 2011, p. 110). 
One could argue that the UNHCR has increasingly become a crisis manager. 
Thus, the signing of the 1951 Convention and creation of the UNHCR with the 
specific purpose of resolving forced displacement as a global problem have 
inevitably stripped the refugee of the rights and dignity previously bestowed 
upon him/her by the so-called human rights. The central argument here is that 
human rights are reduced to citizens’ rights, at the expense of minorities and 
involuntarily displaced people (Rancière, 2004; see Arendt, 2017). Rancière 
(2004), for example, asserts: ‘the only real rights [are] the rights of citizens, the 
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rights attached to a national community as such’ (p. 298). Ultimately, the 
disenfranchised refugee has become a subject of the hidden paradox of 
humanitarianism — a paradox that begins with humanitarianism vacating ‘its 
ethical sanctuary for the world of politics and power’ (Betts, Loescher, and 
Dawson Books, 2011, p. 106). The power at play here is the sovereign power 
responsible for the creation of rightless refugees as well as for their subsequent 
elimination from the realms of rights. This power operates, Betts et al. (2011, p. 
108) affirm: 
by pointing a gun and forcibly repatriating refugees over the border 
and back to a place that remains a threat to their safety, or by 
assuming that a “refugee” is not only vulnerable but also probably 
does not have enough education, experience, or knowledge to make 
good decisions. 
This is difficult to disagree with. In today’s world, refugees are thrown into 
realms of abjection at borders, refugee camps, and hot spots; bestialised in 
torture camps run by human traffickers; drowned in treacherous waters; and 
stuck in bureaucratic asylum regimes (Yohannes, 2021). A charity-owned rescue 
vessel, carrying children, women, and men who had escaped violence at home in 
search of safety, trying to land safely but refused entry and abandoned in 
treacherous waters has become the recurring representation of humanitarianism 
in the twenty-first century. Thus, in today’s humanitarianism, both ‘compassion 
and care exist alongside command and control’ (Betts, Loescher, and Dawson 
Books, 2011, p. 105). 
As shown so far, therefore, the notion of human rights organised around a 
system of nation-states never fails to produce both a surplus and undesirable 
category of humanity. As Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2004) eloquently assert, 
‘There is thus an interiorized humanity and a remainder or detritus humanity 
left over from the interiorizing process’ (p. 35). The refugee is this surplus figure 
whose rights and human dignity are forfeited in the process of domestication of 
human rights by nation-states. If this is at least partially correct, then how do 
we conceptualise the refugee? 
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 Conceptualising the refugee 
As of the end of 2019, there were more than 79.5 million involuntarily displaced 
people in the world (UNHCR, 2020). This figure, according to UNHCR (2020) 
reports, comprises internally displaced persons (45.7 million), refugees (26.0 
million), asylum seekers (4.2 million), and Venezuelan forced migrants (3.6 
million). Given such numbers, Agamben rightly argues that ‘the novelty of our 
era, which threatens the very foundations of the nation-state, is that growing 
portions of humanity can no longer be represented within it’ (1995b, p. 117). 
What concerns Agamben here is not merely the growing numbers of displaced 
people but their constitutive exclusion from social and political life. Leaving 
aside the numbers and labels, the displaced people are forced to live in 
precarious circumstances and experience homelessness, (im)mobility, 
vulnerability, and, ever increasingly, death. They suffer not only the ‘loss of 
their homes’ and lack of ‘government protection’, but also the impracticality of 
making a home and receiving guaranteed protection elsewhere (Arendt, 2017, p. 
384). 
Prominent philosophers and political theorists such as Arendt and Agamben have 
extensively shown that the refugee has become a luminous figure for throwing 
into question the inalienable character of human rights and for exposing the 
‘original fiction’ of the nation-state as an inclusive unit (Agamben, 1995, p. 117; 
Arendt, 2017, Chapter 9). This notion of the refugee as a threat to the structural 
foundations of the nation-state not only has alarming potential but also 
represents a radical deviation from the conception of the refugee as a suffering 
human being. This shift has a significant bearing on our understanding of the 
fate of the refugee and other minority categories. 
Arendt insists that the devastation experienced by displaced people who lose 
their homes and sovereign protection is not the result but the precondition for 
refugees’ unconditional rightlessness, which can only be remedied by finding a 
new polity. For Arendt, there are no such things as undeniable rights to which 
these persecuted minorities have guaranteed entitlement, because the nation-
state has domesticated these rights and denied the minorities fundamental 
rights and protections. According to Arendt, this denial of the ‘right to have 
rights’ — the denial of ‘a right to belong to some kind of organized community’ 
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— has entirely stripped the minorities of their humanity (2017, p. 388). Arendt 
(2017, p. 391) portentously warns: 
For it’s quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical 
political possibilities, that one fine day a highly organized and 
mechanized humanity will conclude quite democratically—namely by 
majority decision—that for humanity as a whole it would be better to 
liquidate certain parts thereof. Here, in the problems of factual 
reality, we are confronted with one of the oldest perplexities of 
political philosophy.  
From this standpoint, Arendt argues that the involuntarily displaced people are 
relegated to the status of ‘the scum of the earth’, who can be violently subdued 
with impunity (2017, p. 349). It is this condition of absolute rightlessness, Arendt 
asserts, that led to the brutal extermination of Jews and other minority groups 
in the concentration camps of 20th century Europe. 
In today’s biopolitical world, as Arendt shows, it appears that no legal avenues 
or political will exist to protect refugees from absolute nakedness and 
unimaginable brutality. It has become increasingly clear that the precarious 
status of being a refugee has dramatically increased the level of vulnerability 
and mortality experienced by this group of people. The sheer number of deaths, 
arbitrary detentions, deportations, and trafficking of refugees from various 
origins, and in different places of transit and destination, such as the Gaza Strip, 
Yemen, Myanmar, and on either side of the Mediterranean Sea make for some of 
the most tragic stories of our time (Green, 2015; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018; 
McIntyre et al., 2018; Mainwaring, 2019; Yohannes, 2021). At the US-Mexico 
border, children have been confiscated and separated from their parents for 
years by state institutions (Davies, 2020; Hinojosa Hernandez and De Los Santos 
Upton, 2020). Regardless of time and space, the refugee has been expelled into 
realms of unending violence. 
While Arendt persuasively exposes the failures of the hopeless idealism 
associated with the nation-state as an inclusive unit as well as the fictitious 
rhetoric of inalienable rights, Agamben critically analyses the exclusionary 
politicisation of life and the sovereign power responsible. In so doing, Agamben 
attends to Arendt’s assumptions and reveals implicit philosophical questions that 
must be taken seriously in any attempt to conceptualise the refugee. Agamben 
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articulates the political vulnerability of the figure of the refugee and its 
precarious relationship to the law and the sovereign power. He provocatively 
argues that the refugee has broken ‘the identity between man and the citizen’ 
and thrown into inquiry ‘the old trinity of state/nation/territory’ (Agamben, 
1995b, p. 117). He identifies the refugee with a product of an archaic Roman 
law — homo sacer — which, according to Agamben (1998a), represents a form of 
life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death. 
Agamben highlights the ‘double exception’ suffered by the homo sacer (“bare 
life”), who was excluded from both ‘human and divine law’ (1998, p. 52). In 
other words, homo sacer is a form of life that can be destroyed without 
committing homicide or sacrilege. Examining the nature of the violence that the 
“bare life” is exposed to, Agamben (1998) contends: 
This violence—the unsanctionable killing that, in his case, anyone can 
commit—is classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither as 
the execution of a condemnation to death nor as sacrilege. 
Subtracting itself from the sanctioned forms of both human and divine 
law, this violence opens a sphere of human action that is neither the 
sphere of sacrum facere nor that of profane action (pp. 52–53). 
Agamben claims this atrocious violence takes place in the ‘sovereign sphere’, 
which he defines as ‘the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without 
committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrilege, and sacred life—that 
is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has been captured 
in this sphere’ (1998, p. 53, emphasis in original). In Agamben’s view, the 
sovereign banishes the “bare life” to a sphere in which there is no distinction 
between law and lawlessness, but where, nevertheless, the naked life remains in 
connection with the sovereign that decrees the ‘sovereign ban’ (1998, p. 53). 
Explaining the paradoxical relationship between the law and the exception, 
Agamben (1998) writes: ‘The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, 
in withdrawing from it. The state of exception is thus not the chaos that 
precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension’ (p. 18, 
emphasis in original). Put in other words, ‘the rule has lost its content, that it is 
nothing but the empty principle, an empty form of relation’ (Ojakangas, 2005, 
p. 9). According to Agamben, the “bare life” is left without recourse to the law 
and subjected to banishment and abandonment. Put differently, the exclusion is 
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at the same time a form of inclusion, as it is intrinsic to the sovereign power 
that decrees it. Agamben refers to this paradoxical relationship between the law 
and the exception as an ‘inclusive exclusion’ (1998a, p. 20). 
Agamben is essentially suggesting that the refugee is relegated to the status of 
“bare life”. He suggests that the refugee is left abandoned within a zone of 
indiscernibility between the law and exception in which the “sovereign ban” is 
the only force enacted. The refugee’s ambiguous relationship with the law 
means that laws are put in place not to protect refugees, but to ban and 
ultimately to exclude them from political life. In other words, the refugee is 
subject to the law while, at the same time, lacks any recourse to it for 
protection. In an era of ‘smart borders’ and exclusive ‘biopolitical filtering’, 
Agamben’s state of exception has becomes the ‘rule’ (Salter, 2008b) and his 
characterisation of “bare life” a defining characteristic of the refugee. 
The refugee, however, is not only rendered rightless but also securitised in a 
continuum of unimaginable unending violence. To make sense of these 
shameless acts of violence against refugees, we have to step outside the politics 
of numbers and borders, and reverse our understanding of the refugee as a mere 
human victim that needs humanitarian rescue. The figure of the refugee, as 
Agamben accurately puts it, ‘should be considered for what he is, that is, a 
border concept that radically calls into question the principles of the nation-
state and, at the same time, helps clear the field for a no-longer-delayable 
renewal of categories’ (1995b, p. 117). Arguably, it is only through such a 
conceptualisation that we can understand why the refugee—the naked and 
pained body—has become a representative figure of our time. 
Therefore, as I have shown so far, it is unhelpful to reduce the concept of the 
refugee to the scope of the 1951 Convention; similarly, it is impossible to 
measure the refugee’s vulnerabilities and precarities using the “fear of 
persecution” formula. Refugees are people whose lives are endangered in 
manners suggested by Agamben’s political theory. In the last few decades, it has 
become routine for Eritrean refugees to succumb to death or deprivation at 
borders, in unbearable deserts, in carceral spaces, and in treacherous waters. 
These (im)mobilities, precarities, and carceralities cannot be reduced to the 
“fear of persecution” formula. Hence, following Arendt and Agamben, I will 
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adopt a broader and paradigmatic view of the refugee, rather than the narrow 
definition laid out in the 1951 Convention. In this thesis, the refugee is 
understood as a “border concept” whose ontological register and physical 
existence are positioned in an indiscernible realm between life and death. 
 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the notion of the rights-based international 
order and the status of refugees in the rights-based system. The main goal of the 
review is to offer a conceptual framework to understanding the realities of 
Eritrean refugees by de-centring the futile application of the human rights 
approach in the context of Eritrea. The story of Eritrea, as shown in chapter 2, is 
more than just one of a post-colonial state that failed to operate within the 
scope of international human rights norms. It is the story of people who fought 
for the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 2017, p. 388) and yet met oppression and 
rightlessness. Since the country’s independence, Eritreans continue to 
experience oppression and violence, both at home and elsewhere. The 
authoritarian regime has imposed on its people punishments and unfettered 
controls that feature arbitrary detention, indefinite national service and forced 
disappearance. It has imposed these controls by detaining thousands of ordinary 
people, politicians, journalist and religious leaders in underground cells; 
recruiting men, women and children into open-ended national service; and 
deploying violent measures of arrest, roundup and mobility controls (Kibreab, 
2009a; Woldemikael, 2013; Plaut, 2016b; Yohannes, 2021). These controls and 
violations give an impression of a state that has failed to protect the dignity and 
freedoms of its people. 
Human rights as conceptualised in the West have yet to be recognised in the 
context of Eritrea. Historically, the country has long been at odds with the West 
and the Euro-centric notions of human rights. It is worth noting that Eritrea did 
not even exist when the UDHR was agreed in 1948, nor has the country 
institutionalised these rights since its independence. It has never had elections 
or an elected parliament of the kinds found in Western countries or elsewhere; 
nor has it ever have a constitution (Dorman, 2004a; Plaut, 2016b). The country 
has never been under a “rule of law” since its independence. Thus, none of the 
celebrated “freedoms” enshrined in the so-called international human rights 
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norms have ever existed or been implemented in Eritrea. Hence, given the 
absence of rights and laws, the claims of human rights violations in Eritrea are 
unconvincing. That which does not exist cannot be violated, and we cannot 
understand the realities of Eritreans by looking at non-existent virtues. This is 
why the narrative of human rights violations represent a fictitious fallacy at best 
and toxic political propaganda at worst. 
The difference between “violation” and lawlessness—"exception”—appeals to a 
biopolitical dialectic between “political” and “a-political” forms of life. While 
“violation” implies the existence of rights or protections, “exception” embodies 
a lack that is constitutively excluded from the realm of rights and legal 
protections. In the absence of rights and laws, the state as a supposed guarantor 
of rights and protections appears to be the only legal order, and, as such, it 
continues to perpetuate the rightlessness and lawlessness. Hence, it is this 
concealed state of rightlessness and the dispensable life inscribed in the very 
foundation of the state of Eritrea that must be at the centre of our 
investigation. In order to examine the realities of refugees, the refugee must be 
considered as our ontological vantage point. It is only through such examination 
of and objection to the dominant narratives that we can uncover the perceived 
violations and concealed rightlessness. 
One method of examining concealed ways of knowing is to adopt ‘an ontology of 
exclusion ... one that accounts for offshore silences, black holes, and 
concealment of what happens along the peripheral zones of sovereign territory’ 
(Mountz, 2011, p. 321). Mountz’s proposal to shift our ontological positions from 
the state to hidden ontological departure points such as ports, camps and 
(im)mobilities is a useful starting point for identifying the causal mechanisms 
that have led to the problems refugees face during their journeys to perceived 
safety. While Mountz is right to accentuate the relevance of these overlooked 
ontological departure points, we must also be cautious about the systematic 
nature of their exclusion and concealment. In other words, these peripheral 
spaces and the experiences of the people inhabiting them are also included by 
their very exclusion, as Agamben would argue. Moreover, Mountz’s spatial 
analysis confines concealments and exclusions to the territorial margins of the 
state and fails to interrogate the constitutive biopolitical exclusion of some 
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forms of life. Not only does the sovereign render camps, ports of entry, and hot 
spots all invisible, but it also excludes the refugees contained in these carceral 
spaces from political life. 
In this study, I employ an approach that takes “ontologies of exclusion” as points 
of departure and rely on analytical frameworks that can uncover constitutive 
concealments. One way of doing so, which, I believe, is best suited to this study, 
is to combine Mountz’s (2011) notion of “ontologies of exclusion” and Kramer’s 
(2017) framework of “constitutive exclusion”. ‘Constitutive exclusion’, argues 
Kramer (2019): 
[…] can be both a useful tool for reading the structure of philosophical 
systems and a useful analytic for understanding operations of 
hegemony and oppressions—specifically those that render some claims 
unintelligible as political claims or some persons unintelligible as 
political agents (p. 11). 
For studying the condition of Eritrean refugees, Kramer’s framework allows not 
only to begin from a position “outside” of the inclusively exclusive human rights 
framework, but also to unpack why some forms of life and their experiences are 
constitutively excluded. For this study, therefore, I refrain from the narratives 
of human rights violations and integrate Mountz’s “ontologies of exclusion” and 
Kramer’s “constitutive exclusion”, as two sides of the same coin. 
Therefore, I use the dark spots in the nation-state system and the experiences of 
the disposable figure they create as ontological sites from which to start 
interrogating the experience of Eritrean refugees. My intention is simple and 
clear: to de-centre the focus from the human rights approach and territorial 
imagination of the refugee problem and to put the precarious status of the 
refugee at the centre of the inquiry. 
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Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology 
 Introduction 
This chapter clarifies the research questions and offers a detailed discussion of 
the research design, including philosophical underpinning, theoretical framework 
and methodological design of the study. It concludes by offering a short 
summary of the main points discussed. 
 Research questions 
This research draws on the experiences of Eritrean refugees both before and 
after becoming refugees to investigate how and why they are constitutively 
excluded from “sovereign protection” both inside and outside of their country of 
origin. Among others, the study seeks to answer the following questions: 
• Why and how do Eritreans flee their country of origin? 
• How do state and non-state actors respond to their flight? 
• What is the nature of the refugees’ experiences and treatment before, 
during, and/or after their flight? 
• What is the status of the refugees in the biopolitical life? 
• Is there a link between the refugees’ status and their experiences? 
In short, the study investigates the mechanisms that cause Eritreans to flee their 
country; their (non)-experience of becoming and being refugees; the causal 
mechanisms that led to the refugees’ exception from “sovereign protection”; 
and the (im)mobilities, precarities, and carceralities that their unprotected 
status entails. 
 Philosophical underpinnings of the study 
Led by scholars of the philosophy of science, debates about the nature of reality 
(ontology) and how we claim to know it (epistemology) continue to reverberate 
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along a continuum between objectivist and interpretivist approaches to science 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Wynn and Williams, 2012; Gorski, 2013). Those who 
tend to position themselves at either end of the continuum—naïve objectivists 
and extreme interpretivists—seem to embrace between them the most divergent 
ontological and epistemological views. While objectivist scholars suggest a 
theory of ‘reality as a concrete structure’ that can only be explored through 
positivist epistemologies, interpretivists view ‘reality as a projection of human 
imagination’ that requires relativist epistemologies (Morgan and Smircich, 1980, 
p. 492). Depending on the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, these 
seemingly contrasting ontological and epistemological assumptions present 
varying degrees of philosophical relevance for underpinning scientific research. 
In between the extreme versions of objectivism and subjectivism lie various 
empiricist (e.g. positivism and empirical realism) and relativist (e.g. critical 
realism, constructivism, radical humanism, and critical theory) approaches 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Fleetwood, 2005; Gorski, 2013). These positions 
range from the early manifestations of postpositivism, which recognise the 
impact of biases, to “moderate” forms of social constructivism and critical 
realism (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Archer, 1998; Van Den Belt, 2003; Gorski, 
2013). So, where among the ontological and epistemological debates about 
reality does this research locate itself? The short answer is that this study relies 
on a particular strand of realism—critical realism, to be specific. 
Roy Bhaskar, the founder and seminal thinker of critical realism, opens his 
critique of the various ontological and epistemological assumptions about reality 
by arguing that the philosophy of science must deal with what he calls the ‘two 
sides of knowledge’ (2008, p. 11). He asserts that we must recognise: 
that men [sic] in their social activity produce knowledge which is a 
social product much like any other, which is no more independent of 
its production and the men who produce it... This is one side of 
“knowledge”. The other is that knowledge is “of” things which are not 
produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of 
electrolysis, the mechanism of light propagation. None of these 
“objects of knowledge” depend upon human activity (Bhaskar, 2008, 
p. 11). 
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Here, the distinction that Bhaskar makes is not merely between the natural and 
social sciences, but between what he calls ‘transitive’ (our changing conception 
of the world) and ‘intransitive’ (the invariant and mind-independent ‘objects of 
knowledge’) dimensions of knowledge (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 11). In other words, 
critical realism ‘assumes that our knowledge of the intransitive entities that 
comprise an independent reality is formed in the transitive dimension, mediated 
by the social structures to which we belong’ (Wynn and Williams, 2012, p. 793). 
It admits that its underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions are 
both provisional and fallible and that causal powers can only be studied in “open 
systems” (Archer, 1998, p. 27; Roberts, 2014, p. 2; Hartwig, 2015, pp. 166–167). 
In doing so, critical realism leverages the fundamental tenets of both empiricist 
and relativist paradigms and, therefore, has become an increasingly popular 
paradigm for conducting research (Archer, 1998; Demetriou, 2009; Wynn and 
Williams, 2012; Gorski, 2013). 
Concerning ontology, critical realism recognises the existence of an 
independent, stratified, and emergent reality ‘that is inevitably mediated... by 
human language and social power’ (Gorski, 2013, p. 664). In other words, it 
assumes the existence of a single multi-layered reality with multiple 
interpretations. From this standpoint, Bhaskar identifies ‘three overlapping 
domains of reality, viz. the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical’ 
(2008, p. 46, emphasis in the original). Clarifying the differences between these 
three ontological domains, Gorski (2013, p. 665) notes that: 
The domain of the real consists of all the “mechanisms” that exist in 
the world, which is to say, of all the various levels and types of 
entities with their various levels and tendencies. The domain of the 
actual consists of all mechanisms that have been activated, even if 
they have not been observed. The domain of the empirical...consists 
of all mechanisms that have been activated and observed. 
In short, the domain of the empirical is a subset of the domain of the actual, 
which is itself subsumed in the domain of the real. Table 1, adapted from 
Bhaskar (2008, p. 47), summarises the different ontological levels of reality. 
Table 1: Overlapping domains of reality (adapted from Bhaskar, 2008, p. 47) 
 Domain of the Real Domain of the Actual Domain of the Empirical 
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Mechanisms    
Events    
Experiences    
 
Concerning epistemology, critical realism makes a distinction between 
epistemology and ontology, based on the view that the former understands the 
production of knowledge as a process of mediation between the intransitive 
mechanisms, on the one hand, and the theoretically aware and reflexive 
researcher, on the other (Archer, 1998; Wynn and Williams, 2012). It admits the 
difficulty of observing causal mechanisms and ‘accepts that the socially 
constructed view of reality held by a given actor or actors may be incorrect with 
respect to the intransitive domain of an independent reality’ (Wynn and 
Williams, 2012, p. 790). As such, the epistemology of critical realism not only 
understands the potentiality for systematic bias but also highlights the need for 
reflexive ideographic research (see Roberts, 2014). 
This research project has three main reasons for relying on the philosophy of 
science of critical realism. First, in line with the assumptions of critical realism, 
this study assumes that the phenomenon under investigation is multi-layered, 
and its causal mechanisms are both ‘stratified’ and ‘emergent’. The conditions 
that led to the realities of Eritrean refugees embody multiple stratified systems, 
processes, and policies that create the circumstances for the domination, 
subordination, and exploitation of refugees. Drawing from Bhaskar’s ontological 
domains, this project has identified examples at all three levels of the stratified 
reality. Table 2 shows some of the examples discussed in this thesis. 
Table 2: Examples of overlapping ontological domains 
Ontological Domain  Examples 
Empirical Participants’ accounts of precarities, carceralities, and 
(im)mobilities  
Actual The concrete structures that led to the lived experiences, 
such as the “carceral complex” with its border and 
asylum regimes 
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Real Underlying mechanisms of reoccurring soft and hard 
powers within local and global institutions, organisations, 
structures, and conventions; rules and regulations; 
theories and practices; and traditions and customs. 
 
Second, in line with the ontological and epistemological beliefs of critical 
realism, this study admits from the outset that its findings are incomplete and 
that they should be subjected to revision. This follows from the study’s 
adherence to the realist ontological principle that the world is not reducible to 
our knowledge of it (Archer, 1998; Wynn and Williams, 2012; Roberts, 2014). For 
example, if we take the example of a migrant boat abandoned to sink in the 
Mediterranean Sea, how much of the complex causal mechanisms that led to the 
incident do we really investigate within the domain of the real? I would argue, at 
least from a realist point of view, that some social scientists (for example, 
constructivists and interpretivists) tend to confine the scope of qualitative 
research to the realms of observable effects of social structures (the domain of 
the empirical) and their constituent social facts (the domain of the actual). 
Critical realism, however, frees the philosophical assumptions of a qualitative 
study from such confinement, for it upholds that ‘the nature of reality is not 
easily and unproblematically apprehended, characterized, or measured, which 
means that humans experience only a portion of it’ (Wynn and Williams, 2012, p. 
790). That is not to say that it is within the scope of this study to measure all 
the causal efficacies of the invariant dimensions of knowledge. Nevertheless, 
however imperfect this study might be, it recognises, at least as a matter of 
principle, that there is an independent reality “out there” that might have a 
causal effect. 
In addition to examining the experience of Eritrean refugees at the theoretical 
and conceptual levels, one of the implicit goals of this study is to communicate 
the research participants’ demands for change. The study does not raise the 
muted voices of the subjects of study, nor does it claim to speak for them. 
However, it seeks to unravel the mechanisms that created the conditions for 
docility (if not dismay) and the unfoundedness of the structural justifications 
used to defend the status quo, so that the horror and futility of these people’s 
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experience and the unfoundedness of its justification necessitate the need for 
fundamental change. Bhaskar’s theorisation of what he calls ‘dialectical critical 
realism’ provides an ontological foundation for communicating such a need for 
radical change (Bhaskar, 2008; Gorski, 2013); for example, Gorski (2013, p. 668) 
asserts that dialectical critical realism ‘is also a more adequate ontology of 
change, a better account of the real forms and processes of change, and one 
that is more adequate to the radical implications of emergence’ (emphasis in the 
original). Thus, the philosophical assumptions of dialectical critical realism 
bridge the gap between theory and practice. This is the third reason why this 
study is underpinned by critical realism. 
 Theoretical framework 
In terms of its theoretical frameworks, this study is guided by highly debated 
theories of sovereignty, biopolitics, and necropolitics to understand not only the 
complicated relationship between the individual (micro-level) and the state 
(macro-level), but also to examine biopolitical mechanisms that render some 
forms of life undeserving of protection and dignity. The study understands the 
fallibility and provisional status of both the empirical evidence and existing 
theories and moves between them to make nuanced explanatory inferences.  
In line with its primary goals, the research combines three political theories. 
Firstly, the research draws heavily on Foucault’s notion of “carceral system”. 
This is particularly relevant for explaining the modalities of punishment and 
control that are responsible for the involuntary displacement of the subjects of 
study. Secondly, the argumentation about the relegation of the category of 
refugees to an illegible figure constitutively subtracted from political life is 
heavily informed by Arendt’s conception of the “right to have rights” and 
Agamben’s notion of “bare life”. Thirdly, the line of reasoning concerning the 
intricacies of the socio-political processes, power relations, and mechanisms 
that underpin the creation of the unprotected life (and its destruction) draws on 
the theory of the “state of exception” introduced by the German jurist Carl 
Schmitt and later developed by Giorgio Agamben. 
As detailed in Chapter 3, this study refrains from using a human rights 
framework in favour of critical but adaptive and reflexive theories of sovereignty 
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and biopolitics. The human rights approach was ruled out based on practical 
concerns and on the underpinning philosophical grounds for this research. 
 Methodological framework and research design 
Methodology is generally understood as ‘a proposed set of techniques combined 
with the underlying assumptions about the world (the ontology) and the 
assumptions about how to establish true statements about the world (the 
epistemology)’ (Olsen, 2007, p. 2). As this definition indicates, the various 
ontological and epistemological assumptions scholars make about reality have 
implications for methodological choices (Roberts, 2014; Iosifides, 2016, p. 33); 
for example, objectivist approaches favour nomothetic methodologies, whilst 
subjectivist approaches tend to rely on idiographic methodologies. The 
methodology selected for this qualitative social research study depends heavily 
on a critical realist viewpoint. 
Critical realism takes the link between philosophical underpinnings and 
methodology seriously (Archer, 1998; Iosifides, 2016). The fundamental tenet of 
the critical realist paradigm is that ‘some real things and generative mechanisms 
must exist (and act)’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 42). Under realist presumptions, our 
object of inquiry should not only be about investigating what real things are, but 
also about understanding the processes, the entwined relations, and their 
interplays with causal powers and contextual circumstances that are responsible 
for the emergence and transformation of these real things (Archer, 1998; 
Iosifides, 2016). Therefore, as Bhaskar insists, ‘generative mechanisms...must be 
analysed as the ways of acting of things; and their operations must be 
understood in terms of the exercise of tendencies and causal powers’ (2008, p. 
175). In this way, critical realism seeks to avoid methodologies that reduce 
reality to an observable realm of knowledge. 
The methodological approach of this thesis is greatly influenced by the 
complexity of the phenomena under investigation and the underpinning 
philosophical assumptions. Underpinned by a critical realist perspective, this 
study comprises in-depth qualitative research that involves theoretical and 
conceptual analysis, data triangulation, participant feedback and validation, and 
analysis of the empirical evidence and theories to illuminate the deeper 
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biopolitical processes, such as the structural patterns, regularities, and 
tendencies that produce and transform the phenomenon under investigation. It 
provides insights regarding the underlying causal factors that led to the 
precarious status of Eritrean refugees. Methodologically, therefore, the thesis 
hopes to form ‘abstract research, which aims at a theoretical description of 
mechanisms and structures, in order to hypothesize how the observed events can 
be explained’ (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011, p. 3, emphasis in the original). 
Thus, underpinned by ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
assumptions of critical realism, this research is designed to answer the what, 
how, and why research questions articulated at the start of this chapter. As 
Iosifides correctly suggests, this qualitative study ‘aim[s] to describe 
phenomena, events or situations (“what” questions), understand social processes 
(“how” questions) and/or to explain events or outcomes (“why” questions)’ 
(2016, p. 168). It relies to a great extent on participants’ accounts to answer 
these questions. Participants’ accounts are analysed to describe what happened 
and to understand the processes and causal mechanisms that are involved in the 
creation, perpetuation, and transformation of the participants’ experiences. 
4.5.1 Methods 
The study sources data from both primary and secondary sources. The primary 
data was gathered through fieldwork, which involved participatory observation, 
focus groups, and semi-structured interviews, mainly with Eritrean refugees, but 
also with staff from humanitarian organisations engaged in the provision of 
services to Eritrean refugees. The data gathered through these methods was 
triangulated and validated before being analysed using NVivo software; for 
example, data from focus group discussions was checked against data from semi-
structured interviews. I also conducted feedback sessions with the participants, 
which were crucial for data validation and triangulation. In addition to the 
primary data, a range of secondary data was synthesised from existing literature 
and official reports. 
I conducted fieldwork in Egypt and the UK, but also involved participants from 
other parts of the world via online interviews. I chose to conduct fieldwork in 
both Egypt and the UK for practical and methodological reasons. As a resident of 
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the UK who had previously lived and worked in Egypt, not only do I have a more 
extensive network of potential participants in these locations, but I am also 
aware of some of the structural issues in these places that might have a 
significant impact on refugees’ experiences. In addition, Egypt and the UK are 
major transit and destination countries for Eritrean refugees, respectively. 
For Eritrean refugees, the carceral spaces in places of transit, such as the Sinai 
Peninsula of Egypt, symbolise liminal spaces in which life and death are made 
inseparable (Reisen, Estefanos and Rijken, 2012; Simpson, 2014). Once 
processed into illegible figures, their suffering continues in destination countries 
such as the UK in an even more systematic fashion (Darling, 2009). With the 
objective of mapping out these realms of carceralities, precarities, and 
(im)mobilities, and explaining the causal mechanisms that underpin them, I used 
multiple methods and data triangulation and validation techniques, which are 
discussed below in detail. 
4.5.1.1 Participatory observation 
Widely used in ethnographic research, participatory observation is broadly 
defined as ‘a unique method for investigating human existence whereby the 
researcher more or less actively participates with people in commonplace 
situations and everyday life settings while observing and otherwise collecting 
information’ (Scott and Buchmann, 2015, p. 1). This definition highlights three 
elements of data gathering through participatory observation: the role of the 
researcher, the participation of the subjects of study in the research, and the 
setting in which the data is gathered. It is essential to clarify these elements to 
unpack their implications for the researcher’s positionality and reflexivity. 
First, the role of the researcher is to actively engage with the subjects of study 
in order to understand the complexities of their real-life experiences. To 
comprehend the phenomenon under investigation from an insider’s perspective, 
the researcher is expected to learn the language and culture of those being 
studied, understand the power dynamics at play, and involve the participants in 
the production of knowledge (Hall, 1992). Second, the subjects of study play a 
central role in shaping the production of knowledge. As much as the experiences 
and day-to-day activities of the subjects of study are of paramount importance 
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to the research, the subjects’ awareness of the researcher’s presence and of the 
research being carried out also has a significant bearing on the research, as does 
the researcher’s relation to the subjects (Aktinson and Hammersley, 1998). 
Finally, participatory observation involves observing the day-to-day activities 
and interactions of the subjects of study in their “natural” setting. This means 
the researched, not the researcher, should have control over the interactions 
and activities. The researcher’s role, as Hall (1992) argues, is to observe, listen, 
learn, and reflect. 
From the outset of this research, I have clarified that I am a member of the 
community being studied. I was not only born in the category of people being 
studied but also share their lived experiences and inhabit the settings in which 
they interact daily. As an insider, I speak their language(s), understand their 
culture(s), and share their lived experience(s). Thus, I represent a “hybrid 
identity” that constitutes identities such as Eritrean, refugee, researcher, etc. 
However, beyond being just an insider and part of the everyday activities of the 
community, the participatory observation allowed me to observe the 
phenomenon being studied with purpose, while, at the same time, opening a 
critical space for reflection on widely held perceptions, assumptions, and 
practices. I approached the study, to the best of my capacity, with honesty, 
integrity, reflexivity, and professionalism throughout the data-gathering process 
and beyond. 
In addition to my day-to-day experience of living in the community, I carried out 
planned observations, first in the UK, and then in Egypt. In the UK, I attended 
immigration and asylum tribunal hearings, local charity needs assessments, and 
social events, such as masses, weddings, and other public events. Such 
observations enabled me to learn about the patterns, tendencies, performances, 
and application of the laws or principles that relate to the various needs of 
people with or without refugee status in a variety of different settings. These 
observations also caused me to critically reflect on the unequal power relations 
that exist between service users and service providers, as well as on the 
subjectivity that these unequal power relations create and shape. 
In Egypt, I visited community centres, churches, mosques, and other public 
spaces that Eritrean refugees regularly visit. I also took part in community 
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activities, such as weddings, religious ceremonies, and mourning rituals. 
Moreover, I visited immigration detainees, where I saw their scarred and 
emaciated bodies and listened to their poignant stories. I came across refugee 
victims of human trafficking being returned to Eritrea (the very country they had 
fled) because they had no option but to agree to deportation. The victims were 
forced to choose between deportation and arbitrary detention in Egypt, with the 
majority choosing the former because of the indeterminate nature of detention 
in Egypt and the poor conditions to which they would be subjected there. 
In addition, during my fieldwork in Egypt, I worked as a volunteer with Saint 
Andrew’s Refugee Services (StARS)—a local charity based in Cairo—for about six 
weeks between January and February 2020. In my volunteering role, I reviewed 
internal refugee resettlement referrals, incident reports such as sexual and 
gender-based violence reports, and reports of torture and human trafficking. I 
also conducted what Halliday et al. (2008) refer to as ‘shadow writing’. I 
interpret the activity of shadowing as observing both professionals and their 
service users in a workplace in order to gain a better understanding of how and 
why things operate the way they do. In this ‘non-participant observer’ role 
(Halliday et al., 2008, p. 193), I attended on-call needs assessment screenings, 
counselling and psycho-social support sessions, staff training sessions, and team 
meetings. I also had one-on-one chat sessions with more than a dozen refugee 
staff about the challenges faced by unaccompanied refugee children and youths 
in transit countries. Towards the end of my volunteering time with StARS, I 
organised group and individual feedback sessions and made some 
recommendations and suggestions. 
Beyond the basic aim of obtaining observable data, the fieldwork and 
volunteering in Egypt was deeply informative regarding the interplay between 
theory (research) and practice (e.g., service provision). Although, as someone 
who had previously lived and worked in Egypt for about three years, I was 
already familiar with some of the reoccurring structural patterns, the 
observations allowed me not only to identify structural regularities and 
tendencies in practice but also to explore the causal mechanisms behind the 
structural patterns and the role research can play in informing and unpacking 
such patterns. 
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4.5.1.2 Focus groups 
Focus group discussion is broadly understood ‘as a research technique that 
collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher’ 
(1996, p. 130). The researcher plays the role of moderator, whose task is to 
facilitate a focused discussion on a topic and listen to participants’ views. 
Participants take a more active role in the discussions by expressing their ideas 
and viewpoints, debating and discussing the subject matter, and challenging and 
scrutinising each other’s ideas and perspectives (Kitzinger, 1994; Morgan, 1996; 
Gibbs, 1997; Leavy, 2014). Realistically, however, focus groups can be 
challenging to organise, facilitate, and manage. 
For the purpose of gathering primary data for this thesis, I used interactions and 
discussions between members of a group about their shared experiences that are 
directly relevant to the research questions. Below, I briefly explain the 
recruitment process, the structure of the discussion sessions, and how the 
participants engaged with one another. 
Participant recruitment 
I recruited focus group participants in the UK and in Egypt. In the UK, I recruited 
six participants—four based in Leeds and two in Bradford—and conducted 
discussion sessions with the participants on two occasions. I contacted the 
participants through my networks in the Eritrean refugee community and local 
charities. The participants include two single mothers, two unmarried young 
women, and two adult males. One of the unmarried young women had been in 
the UK without legal status for more than sixteen years; the second one had 
been waiting for the Home Office to decide on her asylum claim for about a 
year. The remaining four participants all had refugee status in the UK. 
The focus group participants in Egypt were recruited from the Eritrean refugee 
community in Cairo and the recruitment process was similar to that of the UK. I 
recruited thirteen participants (seven females and six males) in total, and 
randomly divided them into two groups of six and seven. Eight of the thirteen 
participants were recruited with the help of the Eritrean Refugee Community in 
Cairo (a community organisation that works closely with the UNHCR-Egypt 
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community outreach and protection programmes and other local services). The 
other five participants were my key informants and had been working for the 
UNHCR, IOM, StARS, and other local charities as professional community 
facilitators, interpreters, or psycho-social caseworkers. I recruited these key 
informants with the help of my former colleagues who were still working for the 
organisations listed. Of the thirteen participants, five are survivors of human 
trafficking and the remaining eight had arrived in Egypt with the help of 
smugglers. 
All nineteen focus group participants were above the age of twenty. They were 
originally from various parts of Eritrea and had various ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds. 
Discussions and participant engagement 
As stated, I organised three focus groups—one in Leeds and the other two in 
Cairo. Each of the three focus group discussions lasted between 75 and 130 
minutes, and each of the groups met twice for the discussions. In total, six focus 
group sessions (three “initial discussions” and another three “thematic 
discussions”) were conducted at different times. 
The primary purpose of the initial group discussions was to explore widely held 
views, experiences, and perspectives regarding the reasons why many people 
leave Eritrea, and in doing so, risk their lives undertaking perilous journeys. I 
started the discussions by asking all participants to introduce themselves and 
their backgrounds, before moving on to discuss the questions relating to why 
many people leave Eritrea and the challenges they face after exiting the country 
(see Table 7 in Appendix A). All the discussions were held in Tigrigna, as it is the 
language spoken and preferred by all participants. 
The main objective of the thematic group discussion was to facilitate a theme-
focused discussion in order to develop a detailed understanding of the themes 
that emerged during the initial discussions and semi-structured interviews. In 
comparison to the initial group discussions, these focus group discussions were 
longer and more structured. In the discussion of the preliminary themes, I asked 
participants to clarify specific points and provide reasons for and explanations of 
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the causal factors. These discussions contributed towards my understanding of 
the structural issues, such as the power relations, systematic protection 
problems, patterns of organised criminal activities, and causal factors related to 
the refugees' plight. 
Admittedly, at least in one focus group session, the discussions deviated slightly 
from the original plan and expectations. In one group, during the thematic 
discussion, the participants were split between those who supported and those 
who opposed the Eritrean government. These disagreements reflect a similar 
division across the Eritrean diaspora. In such circumstances, I limited my role to 
removing the heat from the discussions and to allowing all participants to 
express their ideas clearly. These discussions were very lengthy; for example, 
the aforementioned example took up to 130 minutes. Interestingly, the calming 
effect of traditional Eritrean coffee cannot be underestimated. As is part of 
common practice, the discussion session began with introductions and ended 
with warm goodbyes, with all the participants ultimately leaving in a happy 
state of mind.  
In all of the focus group discussions, my role involved providing ideas to prompt 
the discussion, asking questions for clarification, making sure that each of the 
participants had a chance to express their ideas, and refocusing the discussions 
by bringing the topic back to the preliminary themes. All participants 
contributed to the discussions, although the level of participation varied 
between group members and from one group to another. Afterwards, the data 
gathered from the focus group discussions was triangulated with the data from 
the observations and semi-structured interviews for final coding and analysis. 
4.5.1.3 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are ‘neither completely structured nor completely 
unstructured interviews. ... [They are] somewhere in the middle as the standard 
approach to qualitative interviewing’ (Leavy, 2014, p. 286). Compared to other 
forms of interviews, semi-structured interviews provide greater flexibility and 
give more control to interviewees over what they are able and willing to share. 
As Leavy (2014) points out, less structured interviews maximise ‘knowledge-
producing potentials of dialogues’ and position the interviewer ‘as a knowledge-
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producing participant’ (p. 286), as opposed to a knowledge-extracting partner. 
Semi-structured interviews enable both the interviewer and interviewee to 
create a semi-informal environment for friendly interaction. 
Although interview modes vary depending on research design and interview 
settings (Oltmann, 2016), face-to-face and virtual interviews (e.g. via Skype) are 
the most common modes. I conducted both face-to-face and virtual interviews 
with a wide range of participants from different places and various walks of life. 
The face-to-face interviews were useful for generating detailed qualitative data 
and capturing the participants’ views from their perspectives. The online 
interviews focused on the experiences of Eritrean refugees after they had 
resettled in third countries, such as the UK. These interviews were also helpful 
for mapping out common patterns of journeys to destination countries. 
Moreover, the semi-structured interviews conducted with focus group 
participants were very informative and helpful for understanding some of the 
arguments raised during the group discussions. Data from these interviews were 
used for the thematic group discussions. 
Recruitment 
In total, I recruited thirty-five participants for face-to-face and virtual semi-
structured interviews. Of the thirty-five participants, thirty are Eritreans and 
five are international staff from various humanitarian organisations. I used two 
strategies for recruiting participants for the semi-structured interviews. First, I 
selected two participants from each focus group for individual interviews to 
develop a detailed overview of their experiences. Thus, six participants were 
recruited through this process (four from the two focus groups in Cairo and two 
from the focus group in Leeds). I chose these participants after the first focus 
group discussions based on their lived experiences, roles in the community, and 
professional knowledge. Of the six participants, two were community 
facilitators, two were local charity caseworkers, and the other two were victims 
of Sinai trafficking. Some of the preliminary themes that emerged from the 
interviews with these participants were discussed in the thematic focus group 
sessions. 
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Second, in addition to the six participants recruited from among the focus group 
members, I recruited twenty-nine other participants by networking with 
community and local organisations. Of the twenty-nine, twenty-four are 
Eritreans from various parts of the world and the remaining five are 
professionals from various organisations. In the initial stages of the recruitment 
process, as part of the participatory observation, I visited several established 
community groups and religious institutions and attended various community 
activities and celebrations, all of which was very helpful for recruiting 
participants for the interviews. In Cairo, for example, I attended community 
activities and visited outreach services, public events and celebrations, local 
churches, mosques, charities, and detention centres. These extensive networks 
enabled me to recruit participants from various backgrounds and experiences. In 
the UK, I invited participants through friends and community leaders. 
Also, I recruited participants for online interviews through various social media 
groups (e.g., on Facebook and WhatsApp) of which I am a member. This way I 
was able to recruit participants from the Americas, Europe, and Africa. 
Furthermore, among the participants I interviewed were Eritreans that I had met 
at conferences in Switzerland, London, and Cairo. These participants were able 
to provide expert knowledge in the subject area of this research. 
Among the six professionals were my former colleagues and their friends and/or 
colleagues. They include a legal advisor from the UNHCR, a social worker, a 
member of the Red Cross staff, and two researchers in a similar field. All of the 
interviews with the professionals were conducted face to face in English. 
Venues, type of questions asked, and language used 
The face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted in Egypt, the UK, 
and Switzerland. In Egypt, the interviews were held at the StARS office and the 
Eritrean Refugee Community centre. In the UK, the face-to-face interviews were 
arranged at a local charity centre in Leeds. Face-to-face interviews with 
participants from Switzerland were conducted in a café of their choice. Each of 
the interviews lasted between 60 and 120 minutes, during which the participants 
were asked open-ended questions. Depending on the participants’ language 
preference, the face-to-face and online interviews with Eritrean refugees were 
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conducted in one of the three languages they speak—Tigrigna, Tigre, and Blin. I 
did not use interpreters for interviews, as I speak all of the languages used. 
Finally, data generated through the interviews were triangulated with data from 
other sources before coding and analysis. 
4.5.2 Data coding and analysis 
In Chapter 3, I have shown the relevance for this study of Sina Kramer’s 
conceptualisation of “constitutive exclusion” as an analytical approach. According 
to Kramer, ‘constitutive exclusion can be... a useful analytic for understanding 
operations of hegemony and oppression—specifically those that render some 
claims unintelligible as political claims or some persons unintelligible as political 
agents’ (2017, p. 11). As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the case of Eritrea and the 
experience of Eritrean refugees is viewed through the prism of a state-centric 
human rights violation framework. However, the hegemonic narrative of human 
rights violation fails to situate the problems Eritrean refugees face within a 
broader biopolitical process that renders refugees unintelligible as political 
subjects. It also fails to recognise the non-existence of rights (human or others) in 
Eritrea. I argue that an open, flexible, and adaptive strand of Kramer’s concept 
of constitutive exclusion addresses these philosophical and methodological issues. 
Another framework that I found significantly relevant to the design of this 
research and that I employed throughout the research process is what Layder 
(1998) calls ‘adaptive theory’. ‘Adaptive theory’, as Layder conceptualises it: 
endorses an epistemological position which incorporates both the 
“internal” subjective point of view of social interaction while 
simultaneously appreciating that such activity always takes place in 
the context of wider social settings and contextual resources (Layder, 
1998, p. 140). 
Objecting to both naïve positivist and naïve interpretivist approaches to 
research, adaptive theory provides a middle ground in which ‘both objective and 
subjective aspects (and diffuse mixtures of the two)’ can be combined in the 
conduct of social research (Layder, 1998, p. 141). Such a reflexive and adaptive 
stance is consistent with the philosophical underpinnings and methodological 
approach of this research as articulated above. 
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Thus, I undertook a flexible analytical approach that blends together Kramer’s 
constitutive exclusion and Layder's adaptive theory. While constitutive exclusion 
was implicitly used to identify and examine the (un)intelligibility of refugees’ 
lives and their political agency, adaptive theory allowed me to follow a context-
specific combination of both ‘deductive and inductive procedures’ of data 
analysis (Layder, 1998, p. 135). At a philosophical level, constitutive exclusion 
and adaptive theory embrace elements of both subjectivism and positivism, in 
line with the fundamental tenets of the strand of critical realism I adopt in this 
thesis. Therefore, taking the concepts of constitutive exclusion and adaptive 
theory together as analytical approaches allowed me to critically reflect not 
only on what gets coded or analysed and how, but also on what does not get 
coded or analysed and why. 
For clarity, I divided the coding and analysis process into five stages, as follows: 
 
Figure 2: Coding and analysis stages 
 
Stage 1: Understanding and becoming familiarised with the data 
This stage began with data gathering and involved understanding and 
familiarising myself with the participants’ stories, journeys, treatment, coping 
strategies, and mobility patterns. At this stage, I also conducted preliminary 
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they attach to the data (e.g., by asking for clarification and participant 
feedback). For example, participants used the phrase ‘avoid fish’ to refer to 
efforts to avoid having their fingerprints taken in transit countries such as Italy. 
These units of meaning were rather like brainstorming ideas and talking points 
that clustered based on word similarities, as the NVivo extract below depicts. 
 
Figure 3: Items clustered by word similarity 
 
Stage2: Organising and building codes 
Following the clustering of items in Stage 1, I continued to read and reread the 
data, and created units of meaning or codes. In this study, “a code” is 
understood as: 
a researcher-generated construct that symbolizes and thus attributes 
interpreted meaning to each individual datum for later purposes of 
pattern detection, categorization, theory building, and other analytic 
processes (Saldaña, 2013, p. 4). 
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I used NVivo software to organise the data and form initial codes. The initial 
codes were created by applying inductive reasoning to the data generated 
through participant observation, interviews, and focus groups (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Initial Codes 
 
Stage 3: From codes to categories 
At this stage, I used both deductive and inductive approaches to identify 
systematic patterns, structures, behaviours, and experiences by comparing the 
different codes. These were then grouped into categories and subcategories. For 
example, a cluster of codes may be grouped together under a category or 
subcategory using a process known as “axial coding” (Allen, 2017). Axial coding 
is understood as ‘the process of integrating categories and subcategories...[to 
make] connections between categories that reveal themes, new categories, or 
new subcategories’ (Allen, 2017, p. 2). 
Comparative analysis of various codes and categories was conducted to generate 
what Attride-Stirling (2001, p. 388) calls the ‘basic themes’. The purpose was to 
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link the basic themes with concepts and theories and create macro-level 
themes. 
Stage 4: Linking themes and concepts to theories 
Once categorisation had been finalised and themes formed, the ‘basic themes’ 
(categories and sub-categories) were revised and organised into clusters of 
‘global themes’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 388). While the ‘basic themes’ are 
basic clusters of categories, the ‘global themes’ are understood as ‘macro 
themes that summarize and make sense of clusters of lower-order themes 
abstracted from and supported by the data’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 389). For 
example, immigration detention (initial code) is associated with state violence 
(basic theme), which is then linked with carceralities (global theme). Similarly, 
issues of safety and security are associated with at least two basic themes, 
namely, life transit countries and life destination countries. These basic themes 
were then linked to the global themes, such as precarities and carceralities. In 
this way, I identified four global themes: carceralities, (im)mobilities, 
precarities, and capabilities. These global themes are intertwined and 
overlapping, as can be seen in the coding structure presented below (Figure 5). 
Next, the global themes were linked to the theories and philosophies 
underpinning of the research to formulate propositions and arguments from 
which descriptive and causal inferences were developed. 
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Figure 5: Final coding structure 
 
Stage 5: Explanation 
The final stage of the data analysis involved explaining the micro and macro 
elements of the global themes to test the hypotheses, theories, and predictions 
presented in the literature review, as well as to make corroborated inferences 
about the phenomenon under investigation. I adapted Srivastava and Hopwood's 
(2009) useful “iterative framework” to narrow down the focus to the specific 
research questions. Table 3 briefly summarises how the framework was used to 
explain the data. 
Table 3: Explanation (Amended from Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009, p. 78) 
Explanation Sample extracts 
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What the macro themes 
say 
Reasons for exiting Eritrea: 
• Open-ended national service 
• Detention, torture, and forced disappearance 
• Non-existence of institutions of law and protection 
• Erosion of family and societal values 
• Lack of opportunities 
Challenges after they become refugees: 
• Trafficking, border controls, detention, deportations, etc. 
• Being stuck in unsafe transit countries 
• Feelings of indignity and rightlessness 
• Suffering from engrained trauma  
Capabilities and potentialities: 
The data shows that physical ability (e.g., fitness and age), gender, 
social networks, education, coping strategies, resources, cultural 
factors, and socio-economic and political situation in transit and 
destination countries make a difference to the refugees’ 
experiences. 
The research inquiry 
(what I wanted to 
know) 
• The reasons for involuntary displacement, the process of 
exiting, and the actors involved in the process 
• The response of state and non-state actors, and the treatment 
of Eritrean refugees 
• The underlying causal mechanisms and biopolitical processes 
that lead to the above 
The ‘dialectical 
relationship’ between 
global themes and the 
research inquiry 
The data respond to the research inquiry in a way that diverges from 
the state-centric rhetoric and representation of refugees. The micro 
and macro themes depict the experience of the refugees as being a 
result of a systematic interplay between state and non-state actors 
and the biopolitical order in which they operate. However, although 
the themes provide insights into the underlying biopolitical processes 
and causal mechanisms, they have to be analysed at a broader 
theoretical and practical level in order to shed light on the 
generative causal factors that led to the realities of the Eritrean 
refugees. Thus, both the primary (inductive procedure) and 
secondary (deductive procedure) data were used to unpack 
biopolitical processes and structural problems. 
 
Throughout the research process, I went back and forth between the different 
stages of coding and analysis until a satisfactory ‘theoretical saturation’ (Baker, 
Edwards and Doidge, 2012) was reached and causal mechanisms identified. 
During this process, coding and analysis were treated as ‘cyclical act[s]’ (2013, 
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p. 8). Moreover, various techniques were employed at all stages of the research 
process to ensure validity and reliability, as I discuss below. 
4.5.3 Validity and reliability 
Traditionally closely associated with quantitative research, the concepts of 
validity and reliability are nevertheless gaining increasing attention among 
qualitative researchers, too (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Johnson, 1997; 
Adcock and Collier, 2001). Validity is associated with the accuracy and reliability 
with the consistency of the ‘measurements’ used in scientific research (King, 
Keohane and Verba, 1994). The two concepts are often described together not 
only because of the similarities in terms of their goals but also because of their 
impact on each other. Together, validity and reliability are essential for 
rigorous, defensible, and replicable qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003). It is 
also worth noting that it would be difficult to warrant accuracy and 
trustworthiness in research without taking into consideration both consistency 
and replicability. I, therefore, treat validity and reliability as two sides of the 
same coin in this research, but refrain from suggesting that validity and 
reliability should be approached as twin concepts in all contexts. 
Broadly speaking, in qualitative research, there are three types of validity, 
namely, ‘descriptive validity, interpretive validity, and theoretical validity’ 
(Johnson, 1997, p. 284). Descriptive validity is understood as the accuracy with 
which a researcher reports participants’ experience. Considering this type of 
validity raises a question about the data collection: how do we achieve an 
accurate description of what has happened? The second type of validity, 
interpretive validity, ‘refers to accurately portraying the meaning attached by 
participants to what is being studied by the researcher’ (Johnson, 1997, p. 285). 
Lastly, theoretical validity ‘refers to discussions of how a phenomenon operates 
and why it operates as it does’ (Johnson, 1997, p. 286). For Johnson, theory and 
data triangulation are the keys to answering these questions of accuracy. 
Promoting validity alone is not enough to maximise the trustworthiness and 
quality of research; evaluating consistency and replicability is also a crucial 
aspect of the research process (Golafshani, 2003). In other words, stability and 
repeatability are as important as accuracy and truthfulness in determining the 
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quality and rigour of research. Reliability can be promoted by applying various 
strategies, such as triangulation, participant validation, transparency, and 
reflexivity (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Adcock and Collier, 2001; 
Golafshani, 2003). 
To promote both validity and reliability, I combined Johnson’s (1997) approach 
to validity with Golafshani's (2003) perspective on reliability. The phenomenon 
under investigation is grounded in multiple realities that require micro and 
macro elements. As such, to assure validity and reliability, ‘multiple methods of 
searching or gathering data are in order’ (Golafshani, 2003, p. 604). Table 4 
below summarises the validity and reliability techniques I employed throughout 
the research process. 
Table 4: Validity and reliability strategies 
Validity Strategies Research Stages Reliability Strategies 





checking of data 
Briefing and debriefing 
Transparency 





Consistent ways of 








Rich synthesis of theories 
Explaining applicability 
 
The above table summarises how I promoted validity and reliability throughout 
the research process. In line with Johnson’s three types of validity, I divided the 
research process into three broad stages: data collection, data interpretation, 
and data explanation. In the data collection stage, the triangulation of both data 
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and methods was employed to promote validity. I gathered primary data from 
multiple sources using multiple methods. 
In addition to the cross-checking of data, other techniques, such as briefing, 
debriefing, and transparency, were also used during the fieldwork to maximise 
reliability. During my engagement with the participants, I often clarified my 
intentions and expectations and summarised the participants’ contributions to 
the research after discussion or interview sessions. I spoke to the participants in 
their own languages to clarify any misunderstandings or concerns they might 
have about their involvement in particular and about the research in general. 
Hence, the data-gathering methods—interviews, focus groups, and participatory 
observation—were designed to promote accuracy and consistency in translating 
the data into units of meaning. The data collection methods incorporated 
participant validation, a detailed description of events and lived experiences, 
and reflexivity. For example, the thematic focus group discussions were 
designed to capture the participants’ views from their own perspectives. In 
addition, feedback from the participants was gathered during interviews. The 
use of verbatim and direct quotes from the participants’ accounts was another 
example of data validation. 
The last stage of the research process involved data explanation, which was 
followed by the writing-up of the final draft. I synthesised multiple theories to 
explain the data and test predictions. I explained not only the applicability or 
inapplicability of certain theories and theoretical and analytical frameworks, but 
also identified gaps, stratified realities, and causal mechanisms. I made 
corroborated inferences about the phenomenon under investigation that, I 
believe, address the research questions. 
 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have argued that the phenomena of study, that is, the 
experience of Eritrean refugees, is systemic and therefore its components and 
the system in which it operates must be observed at different levels. Attending 
to micro and macro levels, the research questions are designed to examine the 
nature of the causal factors, their interplay and the power dynamics between 
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them. In so doing, the study discusses multiple axes of immobility, precarity and 
carcerality and discounted capabilities.  
For ontological and epistemological underpinning, this study draws on a critical 
realist approach and an understanding that its methods, findings, conclusions 
and theories are fallible and provisional. It holds the philosophical position that 
the representation of the phenomenon under study is trivial and aims to shift the 
discussion ‘from something that is actual, to a more fundamental “something” 
that grounds its possibility’ (Collier, 1994, p. 20).  
For theoretical orientation, the study draws on Arendt’s theorisation of 
totalitarian governments, Agamben’s “state of exception” and Foucault’s 
notions of “carceral system” and biopolitics. Arendt’s and Agamben’s works 
inform the discussion of why refugees lack sovereign protection, both in their 
country of origin and elsewhere. Foucault’s “carceral system” is employed to 
unpack the mechanisms of incarceration and securitisation of the refugees’ 
unprotected status.  
This study adopts a qualitative research design that relies on both secondary and 
primary sources of data. While secondary data was needed to formulate an 
initial theoretical framework, the primary objective is to describe participants’ 
experiences and explain them through theoretical and conceptual frameworks. 
The accounts from the participants include personal experiences, such as their 
journeys, treatment, interactions with state and non-state actors and their 
ability (or inability) to make their own decisions and choices. The primary data 
was collected by participatory observation, focus groups and semi-structured 
interviews with participants. As shown, various validity and reliability strategies 
were used to triangulate data, methods and theories. 
The next chapter focuses on my critical reflection on the research process, 
researcher positionality and ethical considerations. 
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Chapter 5 Reflexivity and Positionality 
 Introduction 
As a practice and concept, reflexivity is attracting growing epistemological 
attention in qualitative research (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004; Taylor, 2011). 
Reflexivity is broadly understood as critical reflection on the process of 
knowledge production, which involves scrutinising ‘factors [that] influence the 
researcher’s construction of knowledge and how these influences are revealed in 
the planning, conduct, and writing up of the research’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 
2004, p. 275). Although it may vary depending on the research inquiry and 
context-specific circumstances, knowledge production, in general, and research, 
in particular, are often “messy” and complicated processes (Maccarini and 
Prandini, 2009; Billo and Hiemstra, 2013; Iosifides, 2016). Reflexivity promotes 
validity and transparency not only by communicating the messiness and 
simplifying the complexity of the research process, but also by opening up a 
space for reflective practice that involves affirming strengths and identifying 
(and evaluating) weaknesses (Archer, 2010). Thus, reflexivity as a concept is a 
‘social mechanism’ whose function is to simplify ‘complexity’ (Maccarini and 
Prandini, 2009, pp. 84–85). 
In Chapter 1, I summarised why I believe that my status as an insider was mostly 
positive in conducting this research, even though I encountered some practical 
and theoretical challenges, as I discuss in Chapter 10. Here, I will focus on the 
topics of researcher positionality, the research process, and how these 
influenced (or did not influence) both the research and the researcher. This 
chapter is divided into three subsections: researcher positionality, reflexive 
framework, and ethical considerations. 
 Researcher positionality 
In broader terms, positionality is defined as ‘where one stands in relation to 
“the other”’ (Merriam et al., 2001, p. 411). This definition comprises two 
elements: the actors and their relationship. The actors referred to here are the 
researcher and the researched, and the question of positionality relates to how 
the former positions him/herself in relation to the latter and the impact of this 
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positioning in the conducting of the research. Positionality assumes that both 
the researcher and the researched belong to complex social structures and 
power relations, and therefore comprise intertwined subjective and objective 
elements (Merriam et al., 2001; Moser, 2008; Bourke, 2014). Thus, in the 
production of knowledge, researchers are not merely objective observers but 
active participants whose personalities and positionalities are involved in the 
research process (Moser, 2008). This prompts the questions of what personalities 
and positionalities were involved in this research, and how they impacted the 
process and findings of the research.  
I begin my attempt to answer these questions by confessing that the question of 
positionality was something that I struggled to work out throughout the 
research. My challenges were directly related to my “hybrid-self” and the 
ambiguous status I embody, particularly with regard to the translation into 
positionality of these “identities” while also understanding the intricate power 
relations they invoke. The notion of a “hybrid self” implies the union of multiple 
socio-cultural identities in the self (Marotta, 2008, pp. 296–297).  
Over the past decade, my “selfhood” has been assimilated into a hybrid self that 
embodies indissociable identities (e.g., sex, gender, skin colour, education, and 
nationality) and othered labels (e.g., legal status, social class, and political 
affiliations). I am a male, heterosexual, dark-skinned, formally educated, and 
multilingual Eritrean. In terms of my personality, I would describe myself as a 
shy, humble, curious, thoughtful, and hardworking person. I love reading books, 
following the news, going to church, and watching football. I am a Manchester 
United F.C fan. Since leaving Eritrea, I have had various unpleasant labels 
attached to me. These include categories with negative connotations, such as 
kafir (infidel), “illegal” migrant, asylum seeker, refugee, and so on.  
Thus, I possess a hybrid self that comprises all of the indissociable identities and 
the othered labels listed above. Negotiating these multiple identities and labels 
in the fieldwork was one of the challenging aspects of this research project. 
Depending on where I was based and with whom I was dealing, the hybrid self 
that I embody invoked various ambiguous power relations. To unravel these 
ambiguities and the fluid positionality they call for, I decided to present my 
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researcher positionalities in relation to research subjects and participants; data 
and theory; and humanitarian organisations. 
5.2.1 Research subjects and participants 
When referring to “research subjects”, I mean involuntarily displaced Eritreans, 
and all of their families, relatives, and friends in the diaspora. I often refer to 
them collectively in this research as “Eritrean refugees”. When referring to 
“research participants”, I am discussing those who participated in this research, 
including the non-Eritrean participants. The hybrid self that I constitute appeals 
to my varying relationships with these different groups of people.  
My relationships with Eritrean refugees and my positionality in relation to them 
can be understood through the metaphor of “living in the field”. According to 
Pole and Hillyard, ‘fieldwork’ is the ‘total experience’ of ‘the entire research 
process’, which includes ‘research design, method and methodology, field 
relations, politics and ethics of research, analysis, dissemination and subsequent 
impact’ (2016, p. 5). If this definition is at least partially accurate, then the 
“field” can be considered as the setting in which the “fieldwork” is conducted. 
From this perspective, as a native insider, I conducted the fieldwork from within 
the field, while living in the field.  
I have more similarities than differences with the subjects of study. I am an 
Eritrean refugee, speak the same language as them, and share a common culture 
with them. The hybrid self that I embody is the product of a combination of my 
Eritrean identity and the biopolitical process that Eritrean refugees encounter. I 
presented myself to the participants as an Eritrean refugee whose role was to 
research the challenges that Eritrean refugees face. Some of the participants 
already knew me because of my active role in the community. Thus, I engaged 
with them on more or less equal terms.  
However, my researcher role also offered me certain privileges that were not 
shared by the subjects of the study. For example, my relationship with the 
participants in Egypt was different from my relationship with the participants 
who had a settled status in Europe, Australia, or Northern America. The below 
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participant remarks from a focus group discussion conducted in February 2020 in 
Egypt expose some of the nuances in terms of the power dynamics. 
You finished your journey; you’re in England. Your English must be 
good... You tasted European waters. All of us [referring to focus group 
participants] stuck in Egypt with no opportunities but suffering... 
You’re lucky, and we are proud of you for still thinking about us. 
Phrases such as ‘tasted European waters’, ‘lucky’, and ‘finished your journey’ 
imply unequal status and imbalanced power relationships. The participants made 
a distinction between ‘us’ (referring to the focus group members) and ‘you’ 
(referring to me). This kind of distinction was often made by the participants in 
Egypt. On the other hand, most of the participants in the so-called developed 
world would either call me by my name or refer to me as arkey or mehazay, 
meaning “my friend”; some of them even addressed me with English slang 
expressions, such as “bro”. These references appeal to parallel positionalities. 
These nuances in terms of my positionalities highlight ‘moments of being both 
insider and outsider’ (Merriam et al., 2001, p. 416). Yet, such moments of 
ambiguity were dominated by an all-encompassing “inside”, as I was living in the 
field. ‘Fieldwork is about doing and being [there]’ (Pole and Hillyard, 2016, p. 
15); I was not merely doing research; I am the field and live in it with the 
refugees as a refugee. Despite living a relatively stable life, I continued to 
experience an unpleasant feeling of being “the Other”. During my fieldwork in 
Egypt, for example, there were occasions when I was stopped and searched by 
police, and times when I was told to go home by commuters on the busy streets 
of Cairo. These were manifestations of the activation of the othered self that I 
constitute. The subjects of study live through these unpleasant encounters and 
they understand the systemic nature of the politics and poetics of marginalised 
existence. The more the participants understood the othering regimes faced by 
all refugees, regardless of their status or place of domicile, the faster the 
superficial boundaries of “us” vs “you” diminished.  
My interaction with the non-Eritrean participants seemed to be more formal but 
nevertheless friendly. The interviews with professionals and humanitarian 
workers were conducted in formal office-based settings or in quite cafés. These 
participants were friendly; the fulcrum of the unequal power relations did not 
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seem to be located between the participants and me but between the 
participants and their respective organisations, or between the ‘bosses and 
workers’, as Hsiung (2018) puts it. For example, my engagement with 
participants from humanitarian organisations in Egypt was confined within the 
boundaries of their organisational codes and regulations. Admittedly, this had a 
bearing on the type and quality of data gathered, as the participants do not 
seem to have disclosed sensitive structural and operational information about 
their respective organisations. Nonetheless, the participants showed great 
flexibility and willingness in their individual capacities, which was immensely 
helpful.  
5.2.2 Engaging with data and theory  
At times, engaging with the data and theory was both viscerally touching and 
challenging. Listening to the participants’ harrowing stories was heart-breaking. 
The interview data contain disturbing descriptions. They include the participants 
saying such things as ‘they raped and buried my friend alive’; ‘I have been in 
prison in Libya for almost four years’; ‘my son is 12, and he is in the Shagarab 
camp on his own’; ‘all my family died in the sea… I have no one to live with’; 
‘they raped and killed my sister in front of me’, and so forth. Every time I read 
or listened to these stories, I kept asking myself what I can do about it and what 
the point is of this research. Ultimately, I realised that I could do nothing but 
write about this reality. As a refugee myself, I relied on my own lived and 
professional experience to cope with the visceral pain of reading, listening to, 
and analysing the poignant stories. 
My intellectual engagement with theorists such as Agamben, Foucault, and 
Arendt was equally perplexing. I found their seminal works on biopolitics and 
power to be provocative as much as informative. I suspect that their competing 
political theories revolve around the esoteric Western epistemological tradition. 
Although I was immensely influenced by their theories, I was also critical of their 
reductionist approaches that disavow some socio-cultural and political claims 
and constitutively render some forms of life illegible. At a personal level, this 
internal disagreement challenged me during the research process by prompting 
questions relating to “power” and “self”. Who am I to engage with this vanguard 
group of scholars? What does my “novice-self” think about them? Where does my 
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“academic voice” lie in relation to theirs? These questions of “power”, “self” 
and “intellect” reverberated in my mind without finding real answers. Every 
time I attempted to answer them, I ended up with more questions than answers.  
As an insider researcher, therefore, I was perplexed by the questions of power 
and politics. At the same time, observing such poignant stories from the “inside” 
made me realise the shared “humiliation” and the muted “anger” that the 
othered category of the refugee must bear (Malkki, 1996; Rajaram, 2002). In the 
back of my mind, as Flam rightly points out, these ‘self-feelings [of being the 
other] remain[ed]—at best—ambivalent, moving between shame, humiliation and 
anger’ (2010, p. 188). Not only was I constantly reminded of these feelings by 
cues in the data, but I also encounter them in everyday life. Whether it is 
standing in a queue for hours at the airport or being told to go home on the 
streets, I live through reminders of the omnipresent ‘technology of everyday 
bordering’ (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, 2018, p. 240).  
Despite these challenges, however, I believe that I maintained the integrity of 
the data and the research to the best of my capacity. A combination of personal 
and professional experience, ethics and research integrity training, and 
supervisor support was vital for maintaining integrity and rigour in this research.  
5.2.3 Engaging with humanitarian organisations 
My fieldwork in Egypt involved volunteer work with a local organisation called 
St. Andrew’s Refugee Services (StARS). The organisation provides education, 
legal assistance, psycho-social, financial, and community outreach services for 
refugees in Egypt. I was previously employed by the organisation as a senior 
psycho-social caseworker between 2014 and 2015. During this earlier period, I 
worked with unaccompanied children who had survived human trafficking, 
torture, and detention. I was involved in developing coordinated support for 
these traumatised and disenfranchised children to explore their natural 
resilience potential.  
My volunteering role with StARS provided me with an opportunity to observe and 
reflect on the challenges refugee face; but it also presented me with a challenge 
in terms of my researcher positionality. Despite not being new to the 
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organisation and the services it provides, I was acutely aware of my researcher 
identity. I noticed that some colleagues were less confident about talking openly 
to me, while others would constantly seek my assistance in dealing with their 
complex case management. Among the former group were colleagues for whom I 
had previously worked as their caseworker, while the latter group comprised 
former colleagues and friends with whom I had previously worked. Ironically, I 
also noticed that some service users insisted on meeting me, particularly those 
who knew of my previous involvement with the organisation.  
Thus, it was essential for me to consider my intersecting positionalities in 
relation to the diverse staff and service users I worked with. In addition to 
recognising and respecting the various socio-cultural backgrounds and 
sensitivities, I actively sought ways to immerse myself in the day-to-day 
activities of the colleagues around me. Some of the strategies I employed to 
bridge the different positionalities included taking part in team briefing and 
debriefing; attending team meetings and feedback sessions; joining informal 
chats during lunch time; and being friendly and approachable. However, it is 
also important to note that these different and intersecting positionalities did 
not have direct implications for the research process. Below, I discuss how I 
maintained honesty, integrity and reflexivity throughout the research process. 
 Reflexivity in practice: learning, reflection, and 
unlearning 
I have discussed the impact on the researcher’s positionality of the hybrid self—
the indissociable identities and othered labels—that I embody. I now turn to the 
question of whether the hybrid self has had an influence on the research, or 
vice-versa. I discuss iterative reflexive practices that involve overlapping 
processes of learning, reflection, and unlearning. In the context of this research, 
reflection is understood as understanding and scrutinising the hybrid self, the 
research, and their relationship as objects of inquiry (Archer, 2010, p. 2). 
However complicated and messy it might have been, this doctoral thesis was 
completed through a reflexive and transparent process in which both my hybrid 
self and the research shaped, transformed, and scrutinised each other. 
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Metaphorically examining the research process in terms of a “journey”, 
Palaganas et al. (2017) asserts that: 
During the research process, we often find ourselves ruminating on 
the ways in which our own aspirations, characters, values, 
philosophies, experiences, belief systems, political commitments, and 
social identities have shaped the research. We also pondered about 
how the research may have touched, affected and possibly 
transformed us, as professionals, as researchers and as persons (p. 
430).  
The assertion that the researcher and the research shape and transform each 
other resonates with my own experience of doing research, which involved three 
entwined processes, namely, learning, reflection, and unlearning. The research 
required an ongoing process aimed at achieving the right combination of the 
three processes, as portrayed in the multidirectional cycle below. 
 
Figure 6: Reflexivity in practice 
 
I began this research by situating the overarching research question within the 
broader literature and learning about relevant ontological and epistemological 
assumptions and their implications for research design. I attended a considerable 
number of courses, seminars, and workshops, and read dozens of related journal 
articles and book chapters, as well as a few books. In my personal memoir, I 
describe the first semester of the PhD programme as a ‘period of intensive 
learning’. Throughout this period, I continued to rewrite the proposed research 
question and redrafted the research design several times.  
Learning
UnlearningReflection
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I gradually deepened the habit of critically reflecting on the literature, the 
research design and impact, the philosophical and methodological underpinning, 
and the hybrid self that I embody. The habit of constantly engaging in 
‘epistemological reflexivity’ has helped me to test ‘the assumption that there 
can be a privileged position where the researcher can study social reality 
objectively’ (Palaganas et al., 2017, p. 432). If objectivity is about a complete 
detachment from the messy reality of the research process and the knowledge it 
produces, then, by adopting a reflexive critical realist approach, I have 
essentially conceded that I cannot guarantee it in its naïve form. When 
conducting research that involves social reality, the notion that the researcher 
has to remain ‘impersonal, disconnected, distanced and inhuman’ and deny his 
or her ‘own agency in doing so’ is not compatible with the critical realist 
objective of integrating the researcher as an integral ‘agent with the object of 
research as a “real” thing’ (Olsen, 2007, p. 1).  
One of the biggest challenges I encountered while conducting this research 
project is related to what Phipps (2019) calls the ‘struggle to decreate’. 
Reflecting on her extensive experience of engaging with people at the thresholds 
of political life, Alison Phipps eloquently articulates her experience as follows: 
I have learned from indigenous people and those seeking or waiting 
for refuge with whom I have come into relationships, work and 
patterns of life which have required me to struggle, to unlearn and to 
decreate (Phipps, 2019, p. 14). 
The tasks of struggling, unlearning, and decreating are not merely good research 
practices for an experienced outsider researcher; they are symbolic acts of 
“epistemic healing” by embracing inclusive modes of knowing while also 
simultaneously refusing to give in to the long-standing neo-colonial forms of 
knowledge production (Khan and Naguib, 2019). I, therefore, chose to situate at 
the centre of my inquiry the refugees’ realities. I listened not only to the stories 
and lived experiences of the participants but also to the meanings the 
participants attach to them. In the process of understanding the refugees’ 
experiences, I attempted to scrutinise Western notions of biopolitics and their 
application in the specific context of Eritrea. In Chapter 6, for example, I 
introduce concepts from the anachronistic customary and traditional norms 
practised in Eritrea to elaborate context-specific descriptions and meanings.  
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Furthermore, as a person and a researcher, I also unlearned as much as I learned 
during the research. I unlearned my own preconceived assumptions about the 
subjects of study and the challenges they face. Likewise, I attempted to unlearn 
my obsession with Western education and began to learn other ways of knowing. 
Above all, I found ways of listening to my ‘sensibilities, private emotions, 
passions, intuitions, fears, griefs or betrayals’ as Phipps (2007, p. 7) reminds us 
to do. For these reasons, I regard my experience of doing research as a 
transformative process that involved iterative processes of learning, reflection, 
and unlearning. 
 Ethical considerations 
This research project involved human participants with complex and precarious 
life experiences, as well as professionals and “experts” with a myriad of vested 
interests. Hence, I undertook the required ethics and research integrity training 
before embarking on the research. I also sought ethical approval prior to going 
into the field, as required by the University of Glasgow’s Ethics Committee. 
Moreover, as an insider with lived and professional experience, I was not only 
able to anticipate the potential ethical risks, but also prepared thoroughly to 
mitigate the potential risks in advance of going into the field.  
In practice, dealing ethically with the diverse groups of people in an 
unpredictable environment proved to be complicated, messy, exhausting, and, 
at times, emotional. To mediate the “messiness” of the research and address 
the ethical questions arising from its complexity, I followed Guillemin and 
Gillam's (2004) helpful framework, which involves discussion of both ‘procedural’ 
and practical ‘dimensions of ethics in research’ (p. 262) as well as ‘ethically 
important moments’ that require special attention (p. 265). Guillemin and 
Gillam describe the distinction between ‘two major dimensions of ethics in 
qualitative research’ as follows: 
(a) procedural ethics, which usually involves seeking approval from a 
relevant ethics committee to undertake research involving humans; 
and (b) “ethics in practice” or the everyday ethical issues that arise in 
the doing of research (2004, p. 263).  
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However, the central ethical question for this research was not only about the 
distinction between the two dimensions of ethics –procedural ethics and ethics 
in practice –but also the dialectical relationship between them. Besides 
anticipating the mismatch between the two dimensions of ethics, other crucial 
ethics-related elements of the research involved developing contingency plans 
for every conceivable scenario in advance and addressing ethical issues at the 
right time. As suggested by the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK 
and the Commonwealth (ASA), I identified three primary context-oriented 
ethical responsibilities: participants’ safety and data security, community-
related safety concerns, and the researcher’s safety. 
5.4.1 Participants’ safety and data security 
At the centre of the ethical concerns for this research were the participants’ 
safety and data security. To ensure maximum participant safety and data 
security, I adhered strictly to the guidelines proposed by the ASA, the Scottish 
Educational Research Association (SERA), and the General Data Protection 
Regulations (GDPR). However, it is also necessary to mention that such 
guidelines were either non-existent or less relevant outside of Europe. For 
example, in Egypt, the GDPR, ASA, and SERA are commonly followed data 
protection guidelines. As such, I followed the UNHCR guidelines for working with 
refugees in conjunction with the aforementioned guidelines. These guidelines 
are binding, and they were referred to as the gold standard during the fieldwork 
in Egypt. When in any doubt, I consulted UNHCR legal advisers and StARS psycho-
social caseworkers. 
To ensure the participants’ safety, deep consideration was given to the location 
and type of venue for the interviews and focus group discussions, timing, 
participant vulnerability, and the nature of questions being asked, all of which 
are critical aspects. The majority of the face-to-face interviews and all of the 
focus groups were conducted in the offices of local charities or in local 
community centres. In some cases, when participants preferred to be 
interviewed in their community centres, I followed the safety guidelines 
provided by the community centres. About timing, I adapted to the availability 
of the venues and to the participants’ preferred times. There were 
circumstances in which it was not appropriate to stick to the planned length of 
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the interviews and/or focus group discussions. For example, there were 
instances when focus group discussions continued for longer than planned 
because the participants wished to discuss the topics slowly while having a 
traditional Eritrean coffee in their community centre. On such occasions, the 
coffee ceremony dictated the length of time dedicated to the discussions.  
Despite adhering to ethical procedures and having contingency plans in place, 
there were moments when things did not go according to plan. There were 
‘ethically important moments’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004), when I had to act 
in certain ways to assist vulnerable participants. In practice, such unique and 
ethically sensitive moments can occur at any time during the research process. 
As Guillemin and Gillam (2004, p. 265) note: 
There can be all sorts of ethically important moments: when 
participants indicate discomfort with their answers, or reveal a 
vulnerability; when a research participant states that he or she does 
not want to be assigned a pseudonym in the writing up of the research 
but wants to have his or her real name reported; or the case 
described by Orb et al. (2001) of interviewing victims of violence 
about a difficult and distressing experience. 
I must admit that I encountered many such ethically significant moments 
throughout the fieldwork. For instance, there were two instances in which I had 
to break with the standard ethical and data confidentiality procedures to help 
the participants involved. The first instance occurred during an interview session 
with an Eritrean woman named Harnet, who had been in the UK for sixteen years 
and had lost contact with her relatives in Eritrea. Harnet had come to the UK as 
a child with her mother, who had died in the first two years in their new 
country. Since that point thirteen years ago, she has been an asylum seeker 
without any legal status. Harnet told me that the UK Home Office had refused 
her claim several times because she did not have documents to prove her 
identity and had no relative to testify her Eritrean origins. Immediately after 
learning that I am originally from the same city in Eritrea as her grandparents, 
Harnet started to question me about her family, in the hope that I might know 
them.  
The second incident occurred during a phone interview with a participant named 
Sham, who was in Libya at the time. Sham left Eritrea for Sudan in the middle of 
Chapter 5 101 
 
2018, and after a difficult few months in Sudan, she attempted the risky journey 
to Europe via Libya. Unfortunately, she was abducted by traffickers who treated 
her ‘like a dirty dog’, as she described it. While her friend was strangled to 
death while being raped, Sham was kept by her traffickers for their sexual 
gratification. Luckily, after several months of her ordeal, she managed to escape 
the traffickers with the help of an Eritrean smuggler. After the escape, Sham 
needed to contact friends and relatives to seek financial assistance but did not 
have their contact details. So, she asked if I could track down her close relatives 
in Europe and share her contact details with them. 
In both of the real-life scenarios described above, the participants were 
desperate for help; however, to provide the specific assistance they requested 
would evoke mixed emotions and breach the limits of the procedural ethics. I 
was therefore trapped in a dilemma between acting in line with my role as an 
active community member and fulfilling my role as a dispassionate researcher. 
As Taylor correctly points out, ‘such an uncharted leap across the 
personal/professional divide is bound to cause some degree of both personal and 
professional crises’ (2011, p. 13). The intersecting roles I embodied - 
simultaneously being both an active community member and a researcher - 
generated moments of crisis. During these ethically important moments, the 
notion of doing no harm by acting in accordance with the procedural ethics was 
insufficient, suggesting the need for enacting ‘other moral values’ (Hugman, 
Pittaway and Bartolomei, 2011, p. 1280). In fact, firm adherence to procedural 
ethics would have reversed the central principle of “do no harm” that underpins 
the rationale for the procedural ethics. In such circumstances, researchers are 
required to ‘think seriously about what protections they can offer that are 
meaningful to study participants and appropriate for the context’ (Fujii, 2012, p. 
719). 
I therefore showed flexibility by going beyond the procedural ethics and assisted 
the participants with their causes. Concerning the first scenario, while I knew 
that Harnet’s grandparents had died a few years before, I could not tell her this 
right away. After discussing possible options, Harnet agreed to be referred to a 
local church community, which supported her during her difficult time. Based on 
the information I provided, the local church also assisted Harnet in tracing her 
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extended family members who currently live in Eritrea. Likewise, I assisted Sham 
in finding her relatives in Europe. Once I had managed to find her relatives, I 
notified them of the unpleasant news that Sham had been trafficked to Libya 
and that she desperately needed their help. In both scenarios, it was an 
indispensable asset to have the necessary professional skills and social network 
to deal with the circumstances as they arose. 
Regarding the participants’ data, I implemented strict data protection and 
confidentiality measures. I obtained signed participant consent, and anonymised 
field notes and other identifiers as I took them. The participants were referred 
to by de-identified names. I have followed strict standards of confidentiality 
throughout the research process and carefully removed or changed any details 
that might have rendered research participants identifiable in the thesis. This 
entailed the use of pseudonyms and also the changing of such identifying 
information such as location at time of interview, hometown, ethnic origin, 
significant dates, and family links. I have used my insider knowledge of the 
anthroponymic personal naming systems of my subjects in order to establish a 
systematic process for pseudonymisation that ensures none of the names used 
might indicate a participant’s ethno-linguistic, religious or cultural background. 
Personal data are coded so that even someone with insider knowledge would be 
unable to identify individual research participants’ stories, journeys and socio-
cultural backgrounds.  
Furthermore, written notes were taken in order to minimise the use of audio 
records, which might be uncomfortable for some participants. I typed interview 
notes into a spreadsheet created in the University of Glasgow’s OneDrive, as 
recommended by the university. As part of the strict confidentiality measures, 
any notes written on sheets of paper or in notebooks were scanned and uploaded 
to the university’s OneDrive, after which they were immediately destroyed. 
Where there was no immediate internet availability for uploading purposes or 
secure connections were not available, data was stored on an encrypted 
external hard drive and deleted after uploading. Throughout the research 
process, data protection was understood not as “a one-off event”, but rather as 
a “process” that should be maintained until the end of the research (ASA, 2011, 
p. 5; Fujii, 2012, p. 717). 
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In some cases, due to the “problematic” nature of obtaining informed consent in 
public settings (for example, during participant observations where it was not 
possible to obtain signed consent from all the people being observed), I made 
sure that informed verbal consent was sought, as recommended by ASA. 
Whenever observing small groups, I always sought written consent from the 
participants. In addition to openly engaging with the refugee community, I also 
established connections with community outreach staff from the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR, and local charities. Moreover, I 
took note of the operational guidelines of the organisations and their 
organisational codes of conduct. From an ethical perspective, my active 
engagement with both the refugee communities and their service providers was 
vital for establishing trust, maintaining professional integrity, and acquiring best 
practices. 
However, despite my attempts to make the data protection regulations 
contextually relevant, there were moments when the participants reminded me 
of some context-specific inconsistencies in the confidentiality procedures. In one 
of the focus group discussions I conducted in Cairo, for example, the participants 
expressed concerns about the consent form and what they would prefer it 
included. Salwa, one of the participants, summed up the group’s view as 
follows:  
Hyab, these papers [the consent forms] are English bureaucratic 
procedures, but we will sign them because it might be a requirement 
for you to do so. You know, we are in Egypt, not in Britain...Your 
university does not know us, nor does it care about us. But we trust 
you and that you would protect our identities and data...We also 
know you’re not one of those manipulative journalists...You’re one of 
us. 
When the participants raised such concerns, I suggested that the participants 
and I discuss them together and come up with some good practices. After about 
twenty minutes of discussion over a traditional Eritrean coffee, we came up with 
what the participants described in Tigrigna as mebste’a, which can be roughly 
translated as a “promise”. In the context of Eritrean culture(s), promises are 
understood as guaranteed protections against any sensitive disclosures. In other 
words, breaking promises is infrequent. The idea of obtaining informed consent 
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and verbally affirming a non-disclosure agreement worked well with this specific 
group.  
However, as shown in the earlier examples, any unequivocal commitment to 
keep a ‘promise’ also presents a dilemma because it places the emphasis on 
maintaining confidentiality, ‘rather than on when a breach of confidentiality 
might be ethically required’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004, p. 264). I continually 
reflected upon such ethical dilemmas throughout the research process; for 
example, I created a group of five research participants to act as my ‘peer 
supervisors’. From the start of my fieldwork, I organised fourteen peer 
supervision meetings (almost one a month) with this group, and they acted as my 
main mentors throughout the research process. The group comprised a former 
journalist, a trafficking survivor, a university student, a working professional and 
a researcher. In addition to taking part in interviews and focus group discussions, 
they provided me with continued guidance and advice on issues related to the 
limits of ethics and working with vulnerable refugees such as survivors of human 
trafficking.  
Moreover, alongside other participants, the peer supervisors also read through 
all my draft findings and helped to validate my interpretations of the data. They 
have been a great support to me in navigating the messiness and complexities of 
doing research. If the University of Glasgow was to fully recognise the research 
participants' contribution to knowledge and their lived experience of the 
wretched reality, the peer supervisors would have been awarded doctoral 
degrees; that is what it takes to decolonise our knowledge production. The 
UNESCO Chair at the University of Glasgow agreed to provide a certificate of 
recognition to my research participants for their contribution to knowledge. 
Such a gesture, for them and for me, was empowering. It showed the university 
going beyond extractive practices of knowledge production and the tokenism of 
epistemic best practices, instead seeking to bridge the missing link between the 
real bearers of knowledge and the processes of knowledge production, 
recognition and dissemination. 
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5.4.2 Responsibility towards the community 
Ethical risks that involve the wider community were infrequent in this research 
project. As Fujii correctly notes, however, ‘researchers should consider the 
implication of their presence throughout their term in the field and continue to 
take note of local political and social conditions as these shift and change’ 
(2012, p. 721). This was particularly relevant in the context of the fieldwork in 
Egypt, where refugees live in a precarious situation without basic protections. At 
the start of my fieldwork, for example, I was warned by members of the Eritrean 
refugee community in Cairo not to present myself as a researcher to Egyptian 
nationals such as landlords and security guards. Instead, I was advised to pretend 
to be an Eritrean refugee residing in Cairo. Hiding my researcher identity also 
meant advising friends and the research participants not to openly talk about my 
research activities, for their own safety as well as mine. This issue was raised in 
my first focus group discussion in Cairo in January 2020 by a participant who 
summed up the concerns as follows: 
We will discuss all the topics you want, including the most sensitive 
ones like our experiences in the Sinai, but please keep your computer 
safe from the Egyptian mafia...If they find it, they will get all the 
information we gave you and we will all be jailed, including you. 
In addition to taking these reminders into consideration, I also adhered to all of 
the required professional standards and maintained research integrity 
throughout the research process, as required by the university’s research 
integrity guidelines. 
5.4.3 Researcher safety 
Like the research subjects, I experienced fear due to the constant threats and 
discriminatory practices directed against refugees. Whether in the UK or Egypt, 
my legal status and social-cultural background meant that I lived in constant 
fear of marginalisation. To cite just a few examples, in the first ten months of 
the PhD programme, my partner and I were forced to change address after 
receiving abuse directed against us, including a hand-written letter stating, ‘We 
don’t need black people in this building’. Also uncomfortable were the long 
hours spent standing in queues on my way to or from fieldwork and the 
bureaucratic procedures required by my travel. The normalisation of these 
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emotional and physical insecurities in everyday life had an ethical bearing on my 
own safety. I lived through sporadic moments of feeling unwelcome, low self-
esteem, and suppressed anger.  
If my personal safety and security concerns were very minimal during the 
fieldwork in Egypt, it was because I took every precautionary mitigating measure 
that I could think of. I also worked closely with the Eritrean refugee community 
and local organisations, as well as with my friends, former colleagues, and 
supervisors. Before embarking on the fieldwork in Egypt, I conducted risk 
assessments and followed the security protocols and University of Glasgow 
internal procedures for clearance. When in the field, I abided by check-in 
procedures with my supervisors (usually by WhatsApp). Equally indispensable was 
my own previous experience of working for organisations in Egypt, including the 
UNHCR, StARS, and IOM. I also had a broad support network established in Cairo. 
 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I offered my critical reflection on the research process, 
researcher positionality and ethical considerations. I have demonstrated that the 
affirmation of strengths and the evaluation of weaknesses are understood as 
informed choices based on data and reasoning. When reflecting on crucial 
aspects of the research process, therefore, I reflected on the choices made, the 
reasons for making such choices, and the implications of these choices for the 
research process. In short, I have shown how a combination of personal and 
professional experience, ethics and research integrity training, and supervisor 
support were used to maintain integrity and rigour in this research.  
In the next chapter, I provide a brief analysis of traditional values, customary 
laws and the exceptional judicial framework in which they operated within 
Eritrea.  
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Chapter 6 The Limit of Traditional Norms 
 Introduction 
‘Where are our mamets and hanetays’? 
The above question arose in an interview with Medhin, an Eritrean mother who 
now lives in the diaspora. In a face-to-face meeting, Medhin agreed to tell me 
her family story in detail. 
She began by telling me that her husband had died a few years before, after 
suffering from a chronic disease for almost a decade. She and her deceased 
husband had had three sons and a daughter named Haregu, all of whom had 
died. The three sons were killed in the successive wars with Ethiopia (one during 
the battle for liberation and the other two in the recent border conflict with 
Ethiopia) and Haregu drowned in the Mediterranean Sea trying to cross to 
Europe. Having lost her entire family one by one over the past few decades, 
Medhin had spent much of her life in grief. She had difficulty accepting the fact 
that she had not been able to bury any of her offspring.  
Although Medhin had been mourning for decades, Haregu’s death was 
particularly painful. Fearing that she was ageing, and her health deteriorating, 
she had wanted her daughter to be with her, but Haregu was conscripted for 
indefinite national service. Medhin had never thought of leaving her hometown, 
where she was loved and supported by her childhood friends and close relatives; 
nor had she wanted to leave Eritrea, but she had been forced to leave after her 
only daughter left Eritrea to escape the draft. She followed Haregu to a 
neighbouring country, where they lived together until the daughter decided to 
pursue the risky journey that took her life. Having lost all her family, Medhin 
lived in exile and was scared of returning to Eritrea because of her secret exit 
from the country.  
Although Medhin spoke with confidence and a determination to tell her story, 
she admitted that she had been exposed to unparalleled grief over the years 
without anyone to support her. She spoke with conviction of her sons as martyrs 
who had died for her own liberation and the liberation of the country they 
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loved. Nevertheless, despite gladly accepting their martyrdom, she did not 
understand why her convictions had turned out to be unfathomable nightmares. 
Comparing her present situation with her childhood, Medhin lamented: 
I was born to a family of mamets and hanetays… I was mamet. If you 
ask me about now, I am nothing; I am an abandoned creature… I don’t 
have blood around me but bones… the bones of my sons and a 
daughter, and of my husband. They’re all gone, and I can’t wait to 
join them soon.  
From speaking to her, there was no doubt that frustration and the feeling of 
guilt for being alive dominated her life. For her, just being alive was a 
nightmare, and this was made worse by the fact that she was far from the only 
Eritrean to experience such a liminal existence. Tracing back her family tree 
over the last half-century, she listed more than a dozen men and women, young 
and old, who had perished in wars and dangerous journeys to exile. For her and 
many other Eritreans, this was not a new phenomenon; it was a generations-old 
tragedy that had been inflicted on them with impunity.  
In this chapter, drawing insights from Medhin’s evocative response and 
customary codes and bylaws traced back to the 15th century, I hope to shed light 
on the juridico-political landscape of the traditional communities in present day 
Eritrea. Moreover, I analyse stories of participants with lived experience to 
develop concepts that are rooted in the customary norms. The chapter has three 
sections. In the first section, I provide a brief analysis of traditional values, 
customary laws, and juridico-exceptional framework they operated in. I argue, 
drawing from Agamben’s theorisation of the state of exception, that the 
customary norms existed in an entangled relationship with the exception forming 
an all-encompassing totality. In the second section, I discuss how the traditional 
values and norms were rendered obsolete and the encompassing totality—the 
‘juridico-exception’—was dismantled after the country’s independence. In the 
last section, I revisit the main findings and draw concluding remarks.  
 The merger of the norm and the exception 
Let me begin by clarifying Medhin’s evocative question. When I asked Medhin 
about the reality that Eritreans faced and have been facing, she replied with the 
puzzling question: ‘Where are our mamets and hanetays’? While I was trying to 
Chapter 6 109 
 
process the inquiry in my mind, she continued her questioning with a fading 
intonation: ‘Son, isn’t that what you’re trying to find out about’? I could only 
nod my head as a sign of approval for a question that I struggled to understand. I 
could however see that Medhin was pointing me towards a socio-cultural 
interpretation of the grim reality she faced and the underlying events that led to 
it. 
If translated roughly without considering the socio-cultural context, Medhin’s 
question would mean: ‘Where are our heroines and heroes’? Yet the words 
heroines and heroes are not exact equivalents of the Tigrigna words mamets and 
hanetays. In Tigrigna customs and traditions, the mamet and hanetay (both in 
singular forms) represent conceptual epithets which have deep cultural 
meanings and predefined gender roles. These two terms are not merely words; 
they are archaic epithets used to symbolise deep socio-anthropological meanings 
and social roles. In the oral tradition of the Tigrigna ethnicity of Eritrea, mamet 
and hanetay convey deeply rooted cultural meanings entailing exceptional 
qualities and higher social status. While the mamet is a feminine figure that 
represents a symbol of beauty and elegance, the hanetay is a masculine figure 
associated with a rare feat. Although both epithets are in Tigrigna, similar 
concepts are reflected in most of the ethnicities in the country. In this study I 
refrain from translating the epithets and treat them as essential conceptual 
figures.  
Hanetay is an epithet given to a male who has achieved a feat such as killing a 
lion. According to oral traditions, the hanetay has a long history and is still 
prevalent in some parts of the country. In traditional Tigrigna culture, killing a 
lion is considered as an exceptional feat and demonstrates semantic, 
metaphorical and conceptual higher qualities. The origin of the cultural 
interpretation of the epithet is not clear, but some oral traditions, 
predominantly among Orthodox Christians, link the interpretation to biblical 
references. At least five of the interviews I conducted for this study also linked 
the meaning of hanetay to biblical events. As far as I know, however, there is no 
evidence other than word-of-mouth to show the religious origin of the cultural 
meaning of hanetay. 
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After a reasonably thorough search, I found 37 verses in the Holy Bible about 
lions and, in almost all the verses, the lion is represented as an ‘eater’, a 
‘killer’, and a ‘strong’ creature. Judges 14:5 seems particularly relevant to the 
understanding of hanetay among Eritrean people. In that verse, Samson asks his 
father to allow him to marry a young Philistine woman, but his father responds 
that he would prefer Samson to marry a woman from his own community. 
However, Samson insists on marrying the Philistine and both his parents decide 
to take him to the city of Timnah, where he has seen the young woman. The 
verses in Judges 14:5-6 read as follows: 
As they [Samson and his parents] approached the vineyards of Timnah, 
suddenly a young lion came roaring towards him [Samson].6 The Spirit 
of the LORD came upon him in power so that he tore the lion apart 
with his bare hands as he might have torn a young goat. 
The story continues with a narrative that Samson fed himself and his parents 
honey from the lion’s carcass and makes a riddle out of it: ‘Out of the eater, 
something to eat; out of the strong, something sweet’ (Judges 14:9).  
The oral traditions about hanetays among Eritreans are similar to the 
interpretation of Samson’s riddle, but there is no reference to divine power in 
the case of hanetay. Unlike the Biblical narrative, the hanetay is associated with 
courage, strength, ingenuity and, to some extent, wisdom. For these reasons, a 
hanetay constitutes a higher social status; such a man is offered a special seat 
and dinner on ceremonial occasions, and his death generates the most poetic 
mourning. Also, Hanetay is dressed in a specially designed costumes part of 
which comes from his victim’s (lion) mane. Yet he is an ordinary figure whose 
extraordinary achievement is recognised in the community. The recognition of 
his achievement by the community, not by a divine power, describes his higher 
social status in society. Thus, hanetay is an epithet of nobility that embodies 
what Bourdieu (1989) calls ‘symbolic power’ to articulate one’s social status in 
relation to others. He embodies neither a divine power nor a king’s status, but a 
higher rank in society.  
Paradoxically, the hanetay also embodies a naked biological body that can be 
sacrificed for the protection of his family and community. The vanity and 
nakedness of his status are elaborated and articulated through his exposure to 
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death. If a war or an attack by an enemy was to happen, the hanetay is 
expected to protect his community like any other member. In fact, he is seen as 
a war-like figure and identified with bravery among his peers. Wars or battles 
are not waged in his name, but in the name of a village or community. Nor does 
his higher social status give him an advantage over his fellow community 
members; he is always exposed to death when his community is under threat.  
In traditional Eritrean patriarchal social organisation, the community is not only 
higher than the individual, but also calls its members to ‘death’ for its own 
protection. Ethnic groups and subgroups in Eritrea operated as subnational 
autonomous entities whose continuity was secured through the sacrifice of their 
members. Before they were rendered obsolete following the country’s 
independence, the ethnicities had their own customary laws to delineate right 
from wrong, lawful from unlawful.  
If the concept of hanetay in the traditional patriarchal society represents an 
honourable masculine figure, the idea of mamet depicts a symbol of purity and 
elegance in the community. Mamet mostly refers to unmarried women who have 
not engaged in activities and relationships that are perceived as ‘immoral’ by 
the community. For generations, the mamet was identified with beauty and 
elegance and people sang about her beauty and celebrated her virtue. Even in 
modern Tigrigna songs and comedies, the mamet features as an enchanted idol 
of romance, attractiveness and wisdom. In the oral traditions and tales, there 
are no faults in the Mamet’s beauty and elegance and no limits to her wisdom 
and intelligence. Unlike the hanetay who must achieve exceptional feats, the 
mamet acquires her totemic feminine figure through the effect of her body and 
meekness of wisdom on the perception of the community towards her. Yet, just 
as the hanetay was not necessarily a ‘king’, the mamet was not a ‘queen’ 
bestowed with authority to rule. This is not to undermine the notion that she 
was a queen in her own right, like any other woman in the community.  
In a contemporary feminist perspective, characterisation as a mamet would be 
denounced as ‘objectification’ of women (Nussbaum, 1995). It is true that the 
idea of the mamet is a product of the community’s objectification of a woman’s 
body and mind and her self-realisation of this status in society. However, in the 
specified context and time, the epithet mamet carried a sense of respect and a 
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symbol of righteousness. In the traditional patriarchal society of Eritrea, the 
community was perceived as a collection of men and women in which the former 
had control over the latter. These practices are not yet eliminated from society 
and unequal relationships between men and women, between hanetays and 
mamets, are widely prevalent in rural areas.  
Interestingly, the mamet also embodies a concealed potential for the ‘bare life’ 
of the community by acting as a figure who can consecrate the virtues and 
continued existence of the community. For example, the mamet exposes the 
nakedness of her community through her involvement in murder cases. The legal 
procedures for dealing with murder disputes varied from one customary law to 
another, as well as depending on the desire for reconciliation of the murderer’s 
and victim’s extended families and the intent of the murder (Estifanos, Abraham 
and Gebremeskel, 1938; Favali and Pateman, 2003). In Tigrigna and other 
ethnicities such as Tigre and Blin, ‘garn gualn’ (‘compensation plus a girl’) is a 
common practice for ending a blood feud (Estifanos et al., 1938). ‘Gar’ is the 
compensation paid by the family of a killer for murdering someone from another 
community and ‘gual’ translates to mean a ‘girl’ or an unmarried woman given 
in marriage by the murderer’s family to the victim’s family as part of resolving 
the homicide dispute between the two communities. Exploring this practice, 
Favali and Pateman (2003, p. 94) note:  
In addition to reconciliation and payment of blood money, peace was 
often secured by a marriage between a girl belonging to the lineage of 
the murderer and a man of the lineage of the victim. In the case of 
both parties, in principle, the closest relatives available had to be 
chosen.  
A marriage for the purpose of ending a blood feud was permitted only if the 
families were not from the same community, as a marriage between members of 
the same lineage was considered as taboo and illegal. In fact, payments of 
compensation (gar) within close family lineage are rare; murder case between 
close family members is often treated as a family affair. However, a marriage 
for the purpose of settling homicide was not treated as a private family matter 
but as a community security issue. For example, Higi Logo Chiwa (the codes and 
bylaws of the Tigrigna-speaking Logo and Chiwa clans) ‘strictly forbids’ both 
victims’ and murderers’ clans from carrying weapons and breaching the specific 
Chapter 6 113 
 
legal procedures on the day of the wedding, and if either of the clans is found to 
be carrying weapons or refuses to follow the procedures, they are subject to 
monetary fines (Estifanos, Abraham and Gebremeskel, 1938, p. 222; Hagos, 
2014, p. 144).  
After the marriage, the husband is forbidden from physically abusing his partner 
for ‘any reason’, because abusing the woman would re-instigate the blood feud. 
Hagos (2014, p. 144) perceptively explains: 
A woman married to dry blood feud is exceptionally treated against 
any form of domestic violence. The husband is strictly prohibited from 
causing any domestic violence. Domestic violence is regarded as a 
stirring the blood feud. 
In the traditional community, contrary to contemporary feminist perspectives, a 
woman married in this way to a man from the family of the victim was not 
necessarily perceived as ‘commodified’ or less valued, but as a well-respected 
woman whose marriage ended the most heinous crime in the community. She 
was treated with great respect for bridging two communities and restoring the 
blessings of coexistence. Ironically, however, the woman earns the respect and 
social status she is afforded through sacrificing her body in the process of 
securing the community’s coexistence. As Hagos (2014, p. 144) succinctly 
explains:  
The trickle of bleeding in deflowering the bride is deemed equivalent 
to the shed bleeding of the deceased. The husband, being either the 
son or the nearest relative of the deceased, is deemed to revenge 
through breaking the hymen of the daughter or nearest relative of the 
homicide perpetrator. 
In the marriage for the purpose of settling homicide disputes, no ‘consent’ was 
sought from the woman and if the woman escaped, either the perpetrator or his 
close relative was killed in the homicide revenge; if the perpetrator fled, his 
‘brother [or close male relative] was killed to settle the shed blood’ (Hagos, 
2014, pp. 144–145). As such, the woman appears to be exchanged for the 
community’s continuity and the individual security of men, including the 
perpetrator.  
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Blood compensation and marriage (garn gualn) was a commonly used practice for 
resolving a murder dispute; granting asylum for the murderer was another 
procedure. In both cases, however, the crime of murder brought the possibility 
that the entire community could be reduced to Agamben’s enigmatic figure of 
‘bare life’. According to the traditional codes and bylaws, if, after both sides 
have agreed to end the blood feud through compensation and marriage, a person 
from the victim’s family kills or attempts to kill someone from the murderer’s 
family and is killed in the process or afterwards, their death is not considered as 
murder (Estifanos, Abraham and Gebremeskel, 1938, p. 164). Whoever goes 
against the agreement to end a blood feud becomes an outlaw who can be killed 
without committing murder. Thus, the traditional codes constitutively excluded 
those outlawed in this way in a realm of extra-legality. 
The story of Yonas—an Eritrean man who lived in Europe—confirms the possibility 
of the murderer’s family being exposed to unconditional threat of death. Yonas’ 
father had killed a man from a different tribe in a fight over a strip of land. 
After the killing, both the murderer’s and victim’s tribe agreed on garn gualn—
compensation with Yonas’ sister to marry the son of the victim—to resolve the 
murder dispute and potential blood feud. As Yonas described, however, this did 
not go ahead: 
It was agreed for the son of the victim to marry my sister, but she did 
not want to marry him… So, she left Eritrea for Saudi Arabia… It is 
complicated… Let me say this. After my sister had left, we were all 
targeted by the tribe… The [victim’s] tribe accused my dad of helping 
my sister to escape and they threatened to kill him, and ultimately 
killed him and my youngest sister in a revenge. 
The murderer’s family could not offer another girl because it would be 
considered as an insult to the victim’s family. The garn gualn agreement was 
already abandoned by the victim’s family, which was allowed under the 
customary law (Estifanos, Abraham and Gebremeskel, 1938, p. 164). As such, it 
was obvious that Yonas’ family were exposed to unconditional threat of death; 
they became ‘bare life’ as Agamben would say. This was confirmed by the killing 
of his father and young sister. Unfortunately, the killing of the murderer (father) 
and his daughter might not end the blood feud. When I asked Yonas if the blood 
feud has since stopped, he replied that he ‘did not know’ but he had hopes that 
religious leaders and elderly people in his village would intervene. He thinks 
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neither his father’s nor his sister’s killing was ‘lawful’ because he believes the 
other victim was killed unintentionally in the fight. Yonas recognised that the 
victim’s blood was ignored for so long and that his father had to pay the price, 
but the murder of his innocent sister was unjustifiably egregious. Worth noting, 
it was often men who kill and become target of revenge which was another 
reason that made the killing of Yonas’ sister so exceptional and unjustifiably 
vicious. 
All three murders happened before Eritrea’s independence, and neither of the 
families brought the issue to the state’s judiciary system after the 
independence. Hence, the dispute was not resolved and both families remained 
suspicious of each other. The irony therefore is that the hostile relationship 
between the families continued, but in a concealed way, in a realm outside the 
scope of any form of protection. If they were to confront each other, both 
families (and their tribes) could have exposed each other to an unconditional 
threat of death. This reveals the limits of the customary laws and the concealed 
bare life status of the families and communities involved.  
In the above example, or in any other scenario where an individual or a family 
feared for their lives after committing murder, the community voluntarily would 
take an initiative to grant asylum to those who feared for their lives. As Favali 
and Pateman (2003, p. 87) note: 
If after the crime the murderer managed to escape to someone’s 
house, he received protection, and his protectors had to accompany 
him out of their own territory until he reached safety. Other special 
places, such as a holy grove, cemeteries, and venues where 
assemblies were held offered him the same asylum. Whoever tried to 
follow the murderer into one of these sanctuaries could be murdered 
by anybody in the community, and no blood feud or money could be 
demanded in this case.  
This was what the killer of Yonas’ father and sister did after committing the 
murder. As Yonas told me, the murderer moved from his hometown and sought 
asylum from a community in another town; he even got married to a woman 
from the guarantor community and lived with them with his wife and three 
children. For Yonas, for the murderer to walk free was unfathomable; he wanted 
to bring him to justice. Nonetheless, the fact that Yonas lived in exile as a 
Chapter 6 116 
 
refugee means that he cannot bring the murderer to justice in his home country. 
The only alternative was, according to Yonas, ‘to either live with the trauma of 
it’ or ‘embroil’ in a spiral of revenge with the murderer’s family. He feared for 
his life and described in Tigrigna his experience as langa langa hiwet, which 
literarily and semantically translates to ‘life in limbo’. 
The customary practice of granting asylum to a murderer entails exposure to 
bare life of the communities involved. This is not to say that the asylum practice 
was intended to render the death of the victim unsanctionable, nor does it mean 
the grant of asylum exonerates the murderer or his lineage from wrongdoing; it 
was envisioned to guarantee the immediate protection of the murderer and a 
temporary halt to potential hostilities until the reconciliation and compensation 
process of garn gualn was considered by both sides. However, if the family of 
the victim decided not to adhere to the principle of garn gualn and wanted to 
kill the murderer, the customary law did not object to it; for example, the 
Adkeme-Melga’e customary legal system affirms that ‘if the victim’s family were 
to refuse a proposal for compensation and wanted to kill, they should kill in the 
same manner their loved one was killed’ (Estifanos et al., 1938, p. 164, my 
translation).  
The customary law’s inclusion of revenge by the family or clan of the person 
slain suggests the invitation of the exception as part of the customary norms. If 
a person from the victim’s family committed murder in revenge, the customary 
law offered protection to the avenger. In the above example, however, the 
families went beyond the limit of the customary norms by engaging in an 
unsanctionable killing that resulted in the murder of two people. Incongruously, 
unrestricted protection of the cruel revenger was implied in the customary 
norms through the recognition of the asylum sanctuaries despite committing 
double murder. By seeking asylum, the murderer was guaranteed protection, at 
least in principle, despite committing homicide, and the family of the murdered 
would be killed with impunity by the guarantors if they were to attack the killer 
of their loved ones.  
The irony of granting asylum to the murderer is that the victim’s clan was 
pushed to the limit of the law and could do whatever it took to retaliate for the 
killing of their family member. In the worst-case scenario, they could decide to 
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pursue the killer and confront the guarantors of protection, but if they chose to 
do so, they would risk being killed with impunity. The victim’s family could also 
be involved in a vendetta with the murderer’s family. In this case, the entire 
community—the victim’s extended family, the murderer’s clan and the asylum 
guarantors—could be embroiled in an unsanctionable killing in a realm outside 
the scope of the traditional norms. Thus, granting asylum to a murderer could 
only be guaranteed by exposing the entire community to a potential 
unsanctioned threat of death. From this perspective, the customary laws 
seemingly excluded the exception from the norm while also remaining in an 
oxymoronic relationship with it. 
 Independence and the abolition of the traditional 
norms 
In a centralised system of nation-states, the logic of the nexus of the exception 
and the norm in the traditional Eritrean society was inevitable that it would 
require abolishing the juridico-exception or abandoning the traditional norms 
altogether. In either case, however, the community would have to either return 
to John Locke’s ‘state of nature’ or surrender to a new political entity. Thus, 
Eritrea’s independence in 1991 offered a new radical turning point in the 
juridico-political landscape of the country. It marked the end of two dominant 
forces that shaped the juridico-political landscape of the country: colonialism 
and the customary laws. Firstly, it brought to an end the centuries of successive 
colonial domination. As I briefly discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, the country’s 
independence has led to the creation of an autonomous state with its borders 
demarcated and its sovereignty recognised on the international stage.  
Secondly, the formation of an independent state of Eritrea created a political 
situation in which communities would have to abandon their traditional codes 
and surrender to the state. Initially the transitional government ratified a 
constitution to replace the customary codes and bylaws as a source of law, but 
the constitution was discarded before implementation at the brink of the border 
war with Ethiopia (Hedru, 2003; Woldemikael, 2013). The government used the 
border war as a pretext to set aside the juridico-exception totality and create a 
new encompassing regime at the centre of which is an unaccountable sovereign 
power that rules by centrally administered orders. On the specific issue of garn 
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gualn, ‘the customary codes have been implicitly amended and the settlement 
of homicide through martial union is barely practiced. It has been substituted 
with the scheme of blood money’ (Hagos, 2014, p. 145).  
Historically, as Arendt (2017) argues in her book The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
centrally administered authoritarian governments use ‘rule by decrees’ to 
render traditional norms anachronistic. Referring to the effectiveness of the 
‘rule by decree’ in dismantling customary norms, Hannah Arendt writes: 
It can easily overcome the variety of local customs and need not rely 
on the necessarily slow process of development of general law. It is the 
most helpful for the establishment of a centralized administration 
because it overrides automatically all matters of local autonomy. 
(2017, p. 319) 
Like many other authoritarian regimes, the post-independence transitional 
government used centrally administered decrees to replace traditional norms 
with the rule of an iron fist (Hirt, 2010; Woldemikael, 2013). The traditional 
sources of community rifts—Blood, Land and Sex (2003) as Favali and Pateman 
describe them—are violently suppressed under the new regime of rule by 
decrees. For instance, adjudication of all criminal activities involving serious 
crimes such as murder has become a matter of state jurisdiction.  
Once the traditional norms were rendered anachronistic, communities lost their 
source of law and the state become a reference point for everything. Breaking 
from long-preserved traditional norms has led to reconfiguration of the social 
fabric of communities. After the traditional norms were dismantled piece by 
piece, the patriarchally organised communities were finally united into an all-
encompassing political whole. The traditional social divisions and gendered 
hierarchies were abolished. In the traditional community, the relationship 
between the individual and the community was based on mutual respect, and 
each had powers over the other. The individual had the power to invoke the 
state of exception or not. If I return to the example of murder, anyone from 
either side of the families involved could instigate the blood feud. By doing so, 
the revenger could impose unsanctionable killing on the community. After 
independence, however, such a complex relationship between the individual and 
the community was shifted to a servant/master relationship between the 
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individual and the state. Eventually, individuals lost their sense of communal 
identity in favour of territorially rooted national identity (Sorenson, 1991; 
Bernal, 2004).  
The new relationship between individuals and the state has impacted people’s 
aspirations and life goals. Linking the breakdown of the traditional ‘hybrid 
system of norms and values’ to the concept of ‘anomie’, Hirt (2010) shows that 
‘culturally prescribed aspirations and the socially structured means to realize 
these aspirations are dissociated, as culturally accepted goals cannot be reached 
using socially accepted means’ (pp. 10–11). She links the ‘normlessness’ to the 
open-ended national service that is commonly referred to as Warsai Yikealo 
Development Campaign (WYDC). The WYDC was introduced by the government in 
2002 with the goal of rebuilding the country’s economy and infrastructure in the 
aftermath of the border war with Ethiopia. However, it has since then installed 
as an apparatus to keep all able-bodied Eritreans in an indefinite national 
service (Hirt, 2010; Kibreab, 2013). Hirt argues that, by installing and 
legitimising indefinite national service, the government has disconnected ‘a 
whole generation’ from their ‘customary values’ and ‘societal goals’ (2010, p. 
11). 
The immediate post-independence period can be described as a period of 
biopolitical surrender in which the state achieved a complete surrender of the 
community and the individual to its mighty power. In this biopolitical process of 
surrendering to a new political entity, a phenomenon started by the Italian 
colonisation and fully realised after independence, the juridico-exception was 
dismantled, and the traditional way of living was disavowed. Eventually, the 
country was dragged into a rule of ‘exception’ that is based on the nonexistence 
of law, not the suspension of the law.  
Therefore, the grim reality in Eritrea emanated from a moral vacuum and 
political exception. Many older generations of Eritreans such as Medhin had lived 
through the norms and traditions of the community, had been part of the 
struggle for independence, and had seen the abject transformation that Eritrea 
has undergone since independence. The younger generations witnessed their 
country irrevocably dismantling customs and tradition and transforming itself 
into a lawless space and its people to unprotected citizens. In post-liberation 
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Eritrea, hanetay and mamet have lost their social status and became 
immobilised in a carceral system as captive servants of the state as I will discuss 
in the next chapters. While the former is transformed into an indispensable 
servant of the country, the latter has become a ‘sex slave’ at its worst (Kibreab, 
2017a). In short, they are immobilised in a realm of permanent exception. 
 Concluding remarks 
The interplay between social organisation, crimes and the customary laws 
suggests three conclusions from which the limit of the traditional norms and the 
rule of juridico-exception can be drawn. First, it is clear that traditional Eritrean 
societies had customary laws to deal with their transgressions and disputes, and 
to uphold their societal values, but it can be argued that the customary norms 
have not progressed from their early stages. Centuries of colonialism—from the 
century-long Turkish occupation to the Ethiopian annexation of the country—
have not only curtailed the evolution of the customary norms but also 
threatened them with abolition. As Mbembé (2003, p. 25) articulates, ‘Colonial 
occupation itself was a matter of seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over 
a physical geographical area—of writing on the ground a new set of social and 
spatial relations’ (emphasis in original). The Italian occupation was a notable 
example. Not only did the Italian colonial rule create Eritrea, it also formed a 
new pyramid of social strata divided into two categories: the settler Italians and 
the native others. At the top of the pyramid were the settlers enjoying the 
benefits of the colonial structure, and the natives were suffocated with fear, 
violence, discrimination and unimaginable brutality (see Barrera, 2003). The 
local Eritreans’ customary laws were banned, their traditional ways of life 
challenged, and they were condemned to the status of naked life in their own 
homeland (Woldemikael, 2013). Eventually, the entire country was transformed 
into a lawless bounded space. 
The rule of the state of exception that fully came into effect during the Italian 
colonisation was deployed as an untenable rule by the colonial regimes that 
followed. Shortly after Italy’s defeat, the British Military Administration (BMA) 
imposed a policy of plunder and surrender. It looted Eritrea’s infrastructure and 
divided the local communities on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, and 
geographic location. The BMA’s policy was an antithesis to Eritrea’s 
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independence and self-rule. The colonial administration’s agenda of erasing 
Eritrea as a country was later continued by Ethiopia, for over three decades of 
brutal suppression. Hence, the exception was the dominant paradigm of 
governance during colonialism.  
Yet, it is also important to note that despite the imminent threat of the 
exception and colonial abolitionist agenda, customary codes, practices and ways 
of living continued to play a vital role in the fabric of the traditional 
communities who, for generations, inhabited what is now called Eritrea. Written 
sources of the customary practices can be traced back to the 14th century and 
have survived centuries of colonialism and constant foreign invasion to ensure 
continued coexistence between communities (Estifanos, Abraham and 
Gebremeskel, 1938; Hagos, 2014, pp. 10–13). Although they did not evolve to 
meet the current demands of the community, the remnants of the traditional 
codes and practice continue to play a significant role in the operation of 
restorative justice in the rural part of the country. That said, they are not 
enshrined in a constitutional law as there is none in independent Eritrea. The 
remains of the traditional codes and norms are now on the brink of extinction.  
Second, in the context of Eritrea, in contrast to Agamben’s theory of the ‘state 
of exception’, the formation of such a sphere beyond the recourse of the 
traditional norms was not a consequence of the suspension of the law. According 
to Agamben, the state of exception refers to the creation of a sphere in which 
the norm is separated from its application and the latter is suspended. In 
Agamben’s terms: 
This means that in order to apply a norm it is ultimately necessary to 
suspend its application, to produce an exception. In every case, the 
state of exception marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur 
with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an 
enunciation without any real reference. (2005, p. 40).  
As in the example of granting asylum for murder, the customary legal norms give 
way for the state of exception to become the rule, not because of the 
suspension of their application but because of their insignificance beyond the 
limit point. The limit point—the threshold at which the customary law renders 
itself insignificant—was reached at a point of transition from the norm to the 
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exception. Once a blood feud was instigated, the suspension of the customary 
juridical norms was not required for the activation of the rule of the exception 
because it was already put aside; what was necessary was the invitation of the 
exception. And the exception invoked itself at the limit of the customary law to 
take over as a rule.  
The invitation of exception into a rule can also be traced in the legal status of 
children in the customary communities. In the traditional Eritrean communities, 
the murder of a child by his or her father was not punishable within the 
traditional norms. The Adkeme Melga’e customary law, for example, asserts that 
‘a parent who killed their child should not compensate’ (Estifanos et al., 1938, 
p. 164, my translation). Here, the phrase ‘a parent’ refers to the father, 
because the customary law condemns the mother to end her life by ‘hanging’ 
herself if she were to kill a child (Estifanos, Abraham and Gebremeskel, 1938, p. 
164). This means paternal filicide was allowed under the customary law while 
maternal filicide was forbidden. Hence, children were placed in a sphere outside 
the recourse to the customary law in relation to their fathers. Mothers were, 
too. The customary logic of maternal filicide condemns mothers to become the 
victim of themselves by committing suicide. Thus, the incompleteness of the old 
traditions means that the norm and the exception would have to merge, forming 
a new totality. This inevitable union of the norm and the exception is what I 
refer to as the juridico-exception. 
The union of the norm and the rule of exception—the juridico-exception—
indicates a state of inseparability between the biological life and its political 
counterpart. In the example of child murder, for instance, killing a child was not 
punishable if committed by fathers, but it was treated as murder if committed 
by the child’s mother or other members of the community. Therefore, the child 
embodied both ‘bare life’ and political status at the same time. Children were 
born and raised in a condition of ‘bare life’ vis-à-vis their fathers but earned 
politicised status in the community. For this reason, children in the traditional 
community had juridico-exceptional status. Their legal status was posited in a 
realm of indistinction between a threat of unsanctioned death (the exception) 
and political existence (the juridical). 
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The moment the juridico-exception became the norm, naked life took over as 
the dominant form of life. The juridico-exceptional status was not confined to 
children but involved the entire communities. In the case of a blood feud 
between two neighbour communities, for example, unsanctioned killing could 
potentially continue for generations, regulated by the rule of exception. At the 
same time, paradoxically, the customary codes remained relevant within each 
community and between both communities in matters within the limit of the 
law. For instance, the traditional norms continued to serve the community on 
issues such as wedding customs and minor disputes over land or an asset. Hence, 
both the exception and the law operated in unison as subsets of the juridico-
exception to create juridico-exceptional bodies.  
Therefore, Agamben’s ‘biological life’ (zoe) and the political counterpart (bios) 
existed in unison in the body of every community member and the former 
remained in concealment until activated by exceptional circumstances such as 
murder. In the same way as the exception and the norm exist in totality, the 
naked life and its political counterpart intersect in the body. Depending on the 
subset of the totality in operation, one at a time may be constitutively 
disavowed. For instance, it is unfathomable and immoral for fathers to kill their 
own children; hence, it was unlikely for children to experience the concealed 
‘bare life’ status during their childhood. The opposite was also true with ex-
nuptial children and children of slaves. 
Finally, whether in the example of the blood feud or with regards to the legal 
status of children, we see demonstrated the traditional communities’ state of 
‘being’ in a liminal space between ‘life’ and ‘death’. This is what Yonas meant 
by ‘life in limbo’. Communities were neither fully protected by their customary 
laws nor utterly reduced to Agamben’s bare life. They embodied both at the 
same time. From this standpoint, I argue that the form of life in the traditional 
communities was posited between life and death, because their existence was 
secured neither in life nor in death. For every individual member, every given 
moment was potentially a question of life or death. Members of the communities 
occupied a precarious liminal position within the all-encompassing juridico-
exception. It is worth quoting Foucault (2005, p. 303) at length here: 
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For life—and this is why it has a radical value in nineteenth-century 
thought—is at the same time the nucleus of being and of non-being: 
there is being only because there is life, and in that fundamental 
movement that dooms them to death, the scattered beings, stable for 
an instant, are formed, halt, hold life immobile—and in a sense kill 
it—but are then in turn destroyed by that inexhaustible force. The 
experience of life is thus posited as the most general law of beings, 
the revelation of that primitive force on the basis of which they are; 
it functions as an untamed ontology, one trying to express the 
indissociable being and non-being of all beings. 
Unlike Agamben’s enigmatic figure of the bare life, Foucault’s ‘untamed 
ontology’ allows us to imagine ‘life itself… as a force’ and draws no ‘border 
between being and non-being’ (Tarizzo, 2011, p. 55). For Foucault, ‘beings are 
no more than transitory figures, and the being that they maintain, during the 
brief period of their existence, is no more than their presumption, their will to 
survive’ (2005, p. 303). Hence, Foucault argues, ‘the being of things is… a veil 
that must be torn aside in order to reveal the mute and invisible violence that is 
devouring them in the darkness’ (2005, p. 303).  
In Foucault’s analysis, there are two forces acting up on the beings: one 
‘devouring’ the being from inside and the other taking charge of it from the 
outside. The former is the ‘force-of-life’ that ‘every form-of-life is reduced to’ 
and dies from (Tarizzo, 2011, p. 55). The latter can be traced in the 
unsanctioned annihilation of beings. In traditional Eritrean society, the former is 
understood as the “will of God” and the latter the opposite, the sins and 
transgressions of humankind. While sin was broadly understood as a subject of 
religion, the law was implied as a virtuous tool to deal with transgressions and 
crimes in ways that are consistent with the divine will. The Adgna-Tegeleba 
customary system, for example, defines law as ‘a noble thing that keeps kings, 
monarchies and societies in concordance with God’s will; it also protects and 
regulates communities to live peacefully’ (Estifanos et al., 1938, p. 9, my 
translation). 
While the submission to the force-of-life—the will of God—was widely perceived 
as a divine norm and an innocuous surrender, the crimes and transgressions of 
human origin were subjects of the customary norms. The customary laws 
however existed in convergence with the unsanctioned annihilation of beings, 
forming juridico-exceptional rule. From this perspective, therefore, the subjects 
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of the juridico-exception—the juridico-exceptional bodies—were trapped at a 
point of intersection between the force-of-life and the rule of exception. Their 
state of being and right to life were mediated by these unaccountable forces, 
and communities were placed in a precarious limbo between life and death. This 
‘life in limbo’ can be theorised as an ‘untamed life’—a form of life that is 
neither articulated in life nor buried in death but trapped in a survival mode in-
between these two extremes. 
The untamed life is different from Agamben’s enigmatic characterisation of the 
bare life that is produced at a zone of indistinction between law and its 
constitutive outside. It appeals to what Jenny Edkins and Pin-Fat call as ‘politics 
of radical relationality’ or ‘a direct, unmediated, visceral response, life to life’ 
(2005, p. 23). When Yonas said that he did not ‘know’ whether the blood feud 
would stop, he was hopeful that the radical human-to-human and 
intersubjective relationality between the two rival families would stop the 
unsanctioned killing. He understood that neither customary law nor the 
country’s judiciary system would resolve the perpetuated killing. For him, the 
only way to resolve the unsanctioned killing was for the families to come 
together and reach an agreement to stop the hostility. This is why he hoped 
religious leaders and elderly in his community to bring both families together.  
At a conceptual level, the untamed life must be understood as a ‘force’ in ways 
similar to Foucault’s formulation of life itself as a force. As a force, it exposes 
the ‘radical evil’ (Owens, 2008, p. 527) that is embedded in the foundation of 
the nation-state system and produces unprotected lives or lives in limbo. The 
untamed life embodies the capacity to resist both the suspension and the limit 
of the law and appeals to an ‘intersubjective contact: eros and other forms of 
love as well as communication or understanding in terms of language and 
knowledge’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 21). In doing so, however, it also lays 
bare the natural condition of human beings to engage in ‘war of all against all’ 
as John Locke has famously argued. Unlike Agamben’s bare life, however, by 
appealing to radical human-to-human relationality, the untamed life opens a 
space for reflection and resistance to the sovereignty and anarchic capacity of 
the human nature. As such, the notion of untamed life that is neither 
recognisable in ‘being’ nor obscured in ‘non-being’ allows us to imagine an 
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ontology of existence, of being, outside Agamben’s bare life and Eurocentric 
notions of metaphysics. As a force, it has the potential to be harnessed as a 
significant instrument of a positive change.  
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Chapter 7 Eritrea as a “Carceral State” 
 Introduction 
Chapter 6 shed light on the customary formulation of the juridico-exceptional 
totality and its obsolescence following Eritrea’s independence. I described the 
immediate post-independence period as a period of biopolitical surrender, 
during which the state was able to achieve the complete submission of the 
community and the individual to its mighty power. In this chapter, I investigate 
why many Eritreans of all ages flee their country in large numbers. I examine the 
conditions of “no-laws nor rights” and the generative mechanisms driving 
emigration from Eritrea. The core aim of the chapter is to uncover the 
complexities and perplexities of life and living in Eritrea.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I examine the 
modalities of punishment and control in post-liberation Eritrea, where the 
unchanged and unelected government has deployed modes of production and 
administration of power that circumvent normality and perpetuate 
exceptionality. This power manifests itself by imposing on the country’s people a 
rule of “no-laws nor rights”, open-ended national service (NS hereafter), 
arbitrary incarceration, and forced disappearance. These practices are neither 
“legal” nor “illegal” in the context of Eritrea because no law ever existed to 
protect or rescue citizens from the threat of sovereign power. The chapter’s 
second section revisits the main findings and summarises the nature of the rule 
of “no-laws nor rights” and the politics and form of life that are produced and 
securitised by the modalities of punishment, control, and biopolitical utilisation. 
 Modalities of punishment and control 
I begin this section by offering three typical accounts of the punishment and 
control commonly faced by many Eritreans in their daily encounters with the 
state. The accounts are short summaries of several research participants’ 
experiences, which are broadly representative of the accounts of the majority of 
the research participants. 
Sada’s story  
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Sada, 34, was born in the city of Keren in Eritrea. He went to primary and 
secondary school in his hometown, before moving to Sawa (a military training 
camp) to undertake intensive military training and participate in the 
matriculation exam for grade-twelve students. Sada completed the military 
training and passed the matriculation with distinction. He then went on to 
complete a bachelor’s degree at the Eritrean Institute of Technology. 
After completing his undergraduate studies, Sada was assigned to the Ministry of 
Education’s curriculum development department, where he worked as a 
curriculum developer for primary and secondary education and was involved in 
reviewing the curriculum for secondary education. Sada described his work there 
as ‘endless national service’. After several years of service, Sada fled Eritrea for 
Sudan, as he recounts in the verbatim excerpts below. 
Researcher: Can you tell me why you decided to exit Eritrea?  
Sada: Because I was stuck in an unbearable system of administration 
in an endless national service. 
Researcher: What do you mean by ‘stuck in an unbearable system of 
administration’? 
Sada: I mean… I couldn’t move freely, nor could I speak for myself. It 
was like I was in the middle of an invisible fire that I couldn’t 
see. 
Researcher: Can you give me an example? 
Sada: One day, I asked my supervisor for a movement paper to visit 
my grandfather who was sick at the time and he referred me to 
the Ministry of Education to get permission. I went there and 
met an officer in the Ministry who referred my request to 
laEleway akal [higher authority]. I was told to come back the 
next day because the officer who signs the [approval] letters 
was not there. I returned the next day in the morning, again the 
officer was not there… I was told to come after a week. I was 
frustrated, you know… If I’d attempted to go without a 
movement paper, I would have been arrested at the 
checkpoints. 
Researcher: So, what did you do? 
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Sada: I went back after a week. Again, the officer was not there. And I 
was told to wait another two weeks before I asked again. I left 
the office and cried. 
Researcher: Did you succeed in the end? 
Sada: No, not all. 
Researcher: So, what did you do? 
Sada: I decided to do something wrong… I looked at the signature on 
my previous movement letter and signed the paper myself and 
took it to a receptionist for the official stamp, but she knew it… 
She immediately called the police… I ran away before the police 
came… That’s when the idea of fleeing Eritrea came into my 
mind. 
After the incident, Sada did not return to his house in Asmara, as he feared that 
the police would follow him to his address. Instead, he decided to walk all the 
way from Asmara to Keren to see his grandfather. Unfortunately, his grandfather 
died just a couple of days before Sada arrived at his hometown. A few days 
later, Sada received a call from his supervisor, who warned him of the ‘grave 
consequences if he did not escape the country’. He then smuggled himself to 
Sudan. 
Fortuna’s story 
Fortuna was born and grew up in Asmara. She joined the NS in 1996 as a member 
of the fourth round of military trainees in Sawa. After completing the training, 
she served in the NS for 18 months before returning home. Unfortunately, like 
all other Eritrean NS recruits at the time, Fortuna was called back to the 
military at the start of the border war with Ethiopia in 1998. She was assigned to 
the Assab frontier in the southern Red Sea region, where she remained until 
2004. 
Fortuna was engaged in combat during the three-year border war and still 
experiences pain from the injuries she sustained during the war. In 2004, after 
almost eight years in the NS, Fortuna was allowed to retire from the military for 
medical treatment. Upon her return to her hometown, she found that both of 
her parents and her only brother had died. Her parents died from illness, but her 
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brother was killed in the war with Ethiopia. She was devastated by the deaths of 
her parents and her brother. Showing me the photos of her parents and brother, 
Fortuna lamented as follows: 
I took part in the war and I saw people dying… I lost some of my best 
friends. I also expected my brother’s death because I knew he was in 
the special forces and they suffered heavy losses. But my parents’ 
death was… no words can explain… I found my home empty, no one 
was there. I went to our neighbours to find out about them [my 
family] … I never returned to the empty home afterwards… All the 
years of service were for nothing. I didn’t even have the money to buy 
bread… Our neighbours fed me for two months. 
Devastated by her loss, Fortuna decided to flee Eritrea in the hope of joining her 
only sister, who was in Egypt at the time. She managed to get a passport from 
the Eritrean authorities and safely exited the country for Egypt. 
Musa’s story 
Musa, 62, lived through much of the Ethiopian occupation of Eritrea. He even 
joined the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in the late 1970s, where he served as 
an assistant paramedic for over three years. In 1981, Musa escaped the ELF. He 
lived in Sudan for ten years before returning to Eritrea in 1991. Upon his return, 
Musa married a woman from his community, and they went on to have four 
children together. 
Like many other Eritreans, Musa was instructed by his local government to join 
the military during the border war with Ethiopia in 1998. Fearing for his life, 
Musa defied the government’s instructions and went into hiding. Unfortunately, 
he was arrested by the security police in 1999 and put in jail for more than three 
years. 
Musa recalled that he was ‘interrogated, tortured, and insulted’ in prison. After 
three years of imprisonment, Musa was recruited for military training and then 
assigned to the army. When I asked Musa about his family situation after joining 
the army, he replied: ‘Ten years later, in February 2010, my wife and my 
children visited me when I was in service in the Gash-Barka region… I was never 
allowed to visit them at all’. 
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A year later, in 2011, Musa was jailed again by his own colleagues in the army. 
Explaining why he was arrested, Musa lamented: 
I was detained because I asked about my brother who has been in 
prison since 1994. I told them that I wanted to see my brother before 
he died… I did not even know if he was still alive. They never 
responded… My unit leader ordered my arrest, and I was put in a 
container for a week and then transferred to the Miet’r prison. 
Musa reported that he was kept in solitary confinement for over six years in the 
Miet’r prison before he finally escaped the prison and left Eritrea for Sudan. He 
managed to escape with a relative who, at the time, was working as a prison 
officer in the Miet’r prison. 
In the context of Eritrea, there is nothing exceptional about either the 
‘unbearable system of administration’ and indefinite NS that Sada and Fortuna 
underwent or the decades of arbitrary incarceration that Musa lived through. In 
fact, the corroborated data from the participants’ accounts demonstrate that 
these modalities of collective repression, coercion, and punishment are everyday 
realities that Eritrean people have been living through since the country’s 
independence. As Sham, for example, explicated: 
You know, the truth about Eritrea is that it is a story of a dictatorial 
state that can only be identified with wars, death, detention, torture, 
and servitude. I lost my father, three cousins, and two uncles, who all 
got killed in war… These are the stories you will hear from friends, 
relatives, and families in Eritrea. What else can you expect? People 
flee their country to save their lives. 
Accounts of collective suffering, indignation, and rightlessness dominated my 
conversations and engagements with the Eritrean research participants. The 
most dominant theme that emerged during my extensive interaction with the 
participants is that the end of colonialism and the obsolescence of traditional 
norms in post-independence Eritrea have led to a new beginning: the emergence 
of a “carceral system” as a ruling modality. The notion of “carceral system” 
appears in Foucault’s seminal work Discipline and Punish, and is theorised as ‘a 
whole series of institutions which, well beyond the frontiers of criminal law, 
constituted what one might call the carceral archipelago’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 
297). Foucault (2012) clarifies: 
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The “carceral” with its many diffuse or compact forms, its institutions 
of supervision or constraint, of discreet surveillance and insistent 
coercion, assured the communication of punishments according to 
quality and quantity; it connected in series or disposed according to 
subtle divisions the minor and the serious penalties, the mild and the 
strict forms of treatment, bad marks and light sentences. (p. 299) 
Foucault asserts that the techniques and institutions of punishment and control 
deployed by the carceral system are not confined to the prison; they penetrate 
into society through a chain of disciplinary and punitive techniques. The prison 
complex, with its institutions and technologies of incarceration, surveillance, 
supervision, and rehabilitation (Foucault, 2012; Silverman, 2015; McNeill, 2019), 
the “smart” border and its electronic passports, biometrics, entry/exit points, 
and checkpoints (Salter, 2004a, 2008a), and the bureaucratisation of life through 
regimes of control and punishment which are inextricably embedded in our daily 
lives are just some examples of the manifestations of the carceral system in 
modern societies. 
Carceral system and biopolitical supervision can be found in many sovereign 
states, liberal and authoritarian alike. In fact, these operations of power are 
embedded within the fundamental principles of “governmentality” and 
“sovereignty”. Governmentality is commonly understood ‘as a mode of power 
concerned with the maintenance and control of bodies and persons, the 
production and regulation of persons and populations, and the circulation of 
goods’ (Butler, 2006, p. 52). The meaning of sovereignty emerges out of a 
combination of ‘authority’, ‘supremacy’, and ‘territoriality’ (Philpott, 2016, p. 
2). While “authority”, here, refers to the sovereign’s legitimacy to rule, 
“supremacy” affirms that the body which holds ‘sovereignty is superior to all 
authorities under its purview’ (Philpott, 2016, p. 2). According to Philpott, 
“territoriality” is understood as residence-based membership of a community 
within a confined space. Thus, “sovereignty” denotes a supreme political 
authority within a given territory, and is viewed ‘as providing legitimacy for the 
rule of law and offering a guarantor for the representational claims of state 
power’ (Butler, 2006, p. 52). 
Although their meanings and functions have varied throughout history, the 
concepts of “governmentality” and “sovereignty” dominate contemporary 
notions of political power. These notions of political authority were traditionally 
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displaced from kings to dictators and, more recently, from states to 
constitutions (Philpott, 2016). But it is not only the political authority that 
comes with sovereignty and governmentality that has been displaced; its 
meaning, function, and tactics of operation have all changed across time and 
space. The displacement of political power to states and institutions of law 
created a biopolitical condition in which power is ‘applied at the level of life 
itself’ (Foucault, 1998, p. 143). Such applications of sovereign power in ways 
that challenge life have sparked heated debates among scholars of philosophy 
and the social sciences. It is also imperative to explore the practical and 
political challenges that the surrender of life to sovereign power brings with it. 
The critical debates regarding sovereignty, therefore, are not about the 
etymological origin of the concept, but about its operational tactics and 
strategies. One such issue is how sovereign power is exercised to produce and 
reproduce subjectivities that are worthy of political life and those that are not. 
Wrestling with this question, prominent scholars of philosophy and political 
thought propound that sovereignty functions not only in ways that overpower 
humanity but also in ways that threaten the very existence of life itself. For 
example, referring to the monopoly of sovereign power over life in ancient 
societies, Foucault famously argues: 
The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to 
kill, or by refraining from killing ... The right which was formulated as 
the “power of life and death” was in reality the right to take life or 
let live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword. (1998, p. 136) 
Foucault’s characterisation of power elaborates the idea that, in ancient 
societies, wars were fought in the name of kings, queens, and warlords, as well 
as of religious figures. In societies that idolised kings and queens as their 
warlords and unquestionably accepted their rulers’ divine right to rule, 
sovereignty was invoked to protect the rulers, and Foucault’s notion of the ‘right 
to death’ was exercised in the name of the rulers. 
However, Foucault’s formulation of sovereignty as a ‘power of life and death’ is 
not a mere exercise of power by ancient rulers; rather, it is transformed to 
perfectly fit the principles of the nation-state so as to become an enigmatic 
feature of modern political life. Referring to the transformation of the “right to 
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death” formulae in modern societies, Foucault argues that ‘[the] death that was 
based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of 
the right of the social body’ (1998, p. 136). For Foucault, the notion of a 
sovereign state exercising power in the name of its entire population has dire 
consequences in modern political life. He rightly points out that modern 
application of power exposes to death ‘the biological existence of a population 
... because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the 
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’ (Foucault, 1998, p. 137). In 
Foucault’s view, this is the greatest threat that sovereignty brings to humanity. 
He cites ‘genocide’, ‘mass murder’, and ‘massacres’ as vital elements of the 
sovereign power exercised by states. 
Adopting a more optimistic tone, Foucault, however, reminds us that the 
application of power at the level of society is gradually taken over by what he 
calls ‘bio-power’ or ‘productive power’—a power that optimises, multiplies and 
positively impacts life (1998, p. 140). This power, according to Foucault, 
functions by regulating and disciplining bodies to maximise their utility. As 
opposed to sovereign power, bio-power ‘does not celebrate death’ (Ojakangas, 
2005, p. 7). Nevertheless, Foucault’s distinction of bio-power from sovereign 
power and governmentality has been heavily criticised. Indeed, the notions of 
bio-power and governmentality, as Foucault conceptualises them in the Western 
world, seem completely irrelevant in the context of Eritrea, where people have 
for centuries been ruled without laws or rights under colonial occupation. Bio-
power—a power that fosters life and optimises it—has never been imagined in 
the colonised world, nor has it been accessible to colonised subjectivities. The 
underlying paradox of bio-power, however, is that it is inseparably intertwined 
with the violence of sovereign power, as Agamben rightly points out. 
Dismissing Foucault’s notion of bio-power, Agamben contends that the 
distinction between “productive power” and “deductive power” is obsolete, as 
both powers essentially unite to produce “bare life” as well as to decide on the 
“state of exception” (Agamben, 1998b, 2005). For Agamben, the state of 
exception—a zone of indistinction opened up by the suspension of law—rules ‘as 
the original structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its 
own suspension’ (2005, p. 3). If the law operates in suspension, its “content” 
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becomes “empty” and, therefore, what prevails is a sphere of indistinction 
(Ojakangas, 2005, p. 9). And in the absence of the law, as Salter (2008a) shows, 
the exception takes over as a rule. The moment the exception is deployed as a 
rule, according to Agamben, the distinction between bio-power and sovereign 
power not only disappears, but also produces a life that can be destroyed 
without committing both sacrilege and homicide—“bare life”. From this 
standpoint, Agamben asserts that our understanding of politics should be 
grounded in the sanctioned life—the “bare life”—and makes the case for getting 
rid of the sovereign power that produces it (2000, p. 8). 
Drawing on both Foucault’s and Agamben’s theoretical frameworks, Butler, in 
her book Precarious Life (2006), offers a persuasive argument regarding the 
intersection of sovereign power and governmentality. She argues that sovereign 
power enters into a new field of operation to target life with all forms of its 
political authority. The withdrawal of the law, Butler (2006) affirms: 
allows for the convergence of governmentality and sovereignty; 
sovereignty is exercised in the act of suspension, but also in the self-
allocation of legal prerogative; governmentality denotes an operation 
of administration power that is extra-legal, even as it can and does 
return to law as a field of tactical operations. (p. 55) 
For Butler, sovereignty diffuses itself within the bureaucratic institutions and 
structures of governmentality. The point here is whether, in the situation of 
suspension of the law, there is an escape route for life; both Agamben and 
Butler think not. With the emergence of sovereign power within the realm of 
governmentality, sovereignty becomes ‘a lawless and prerogatory power, a 
“rogue” power par excellence’ (Butler, 2006, p. 56). Therefore, as Agamben 
rightly puts it, ‘human life is included in the political order in being exposed to 
an unconditional capacity to be killed’ (1998, p. 54). 
As demonstrated by the participants’ accounts above, the story of Eritrea 
represents an exemplary case of biopolitical surrender, where the threat of 
sovereignty to those ruled has become a practical challenge. In the analysis of 
participants’ accounts, three carceral techniques emerged, namely, the rule of 
“no-laws nor rights”, “open-ended NS”, and “arbitrary detention”. The 
participants’ stories also demonstrate that these carceral techniques operate 
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along a continuum and are administered through a centralised regime of control 
and punishment, as I discuss below. 
7.2.1 The rule of “no-laws nor rights” 
In the three decades since its independence, Eritrea has never had a functioning 
constitution, nor has it had a sovereign parliament or an elected government. In 
fact, there has never been a single election in the country since it gained 
independence from Ethiopia. All official and legal procedures for establishing a 
constitutional government and the rule of law remain suspended still today. In 
the absence of rights and legal protections, the country has been singled out on 
numerous occasions by human rights organisations, academics, mainstream 
media, and activists for its mass supervision and incarceration (Hedru, 2003; 
Tronvoll and Mekonnen, 2014; COI, 2016; Plaut, 2016b). 
In an attempt to justify the perpetuation of this lawlessness, the government of 
Eritrea has ‘established a new regime of truth, its own version of reality, by 
which it justified imposing arbitrary rule and made its leader, President Isaias 
Afwerki, an absolutist head of state, unaccountable to any government body’ 
(Woldemikael, 2013, p. x). Adam, a former programme developer for a 
government security agency, explained the government’s justification for 
maintaining the status quo as follows: 
Every government worker knows this… There are two bold 
justifications. One, national security. Two, national development. The 
national sovereignty [argument] is a defence against any form of 
aggression, external and/or internal… National development is 
expected to be achieved by getting people to work for the country for 
free… My former colleagues and I used to call these justifications “the 
inviolable rules”. 
As Adam pointed out, national security has become the government’s priority, 
particularly since the border war with Ethiopia. Participant accounts analysed 
for this research show that the government presents the border war and the 
external pressures associated with it as existential threats that must be 
defended against at any cost. National security is often presented as the 
number-one ‘inviolable rule’, as Adam and his colleagues called it. From this 
standpoint, therefore, as Agamben (2015) articulates, ‘the State does not found 
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itself on a social link but on the prohibition of its dissolution’ (p. 237). And 
defence against existential threats must be achieved at any cost, including 
human lives. This existential reality is in line with what is revealed in the 
accounts of Sada, Fortuna, Musa, Adam, and other participants. 
Adam’s second point—"national development”—points to the state’s precarious 
relationship with its people. The state’s relationship with its citizens is 
inextricably linked to its “dissolution”, in ways that Agamben (2015) discusses: 
Dissolution is not to be understood as the dissolution of an existent 
bond, because the bond itself does not have any other consistency 
than the purely negative one that it derives from the prohibition of 
dissolution. Since there is originally neither bond nor relation, this 
absence of relation is captured in state power in the form of the ban 
and of prohibition. (p. 237) 
From this perspective, the relationship between the Eritrean state and its people 
is a superfluous one, for the “link” is established not between the state and its 
people but between the dissolution of the state and its people. The role of the 
state appears to be nothing more than to mobilise its people to defend against 
the state’s dissolution and to “get” them to provide free services for its 
development, as the participants accounts have revealed. The state uses its 
people as a means to achieve two ends, namely, the prohibition of its dissolution 
and the promotion of its development. The government’s successful mobilisation 
of people of all ages and backgrounds to fight in the border war with Ethiopia 
and their subsequent recruitment for national development are just a couple of 
examples of this precarious relationship. Hence, the prohibition of the state’s 
dissolution has been the primary foundation stone of politics in Eritrea since the 
country’s independence. 
Thus, if Agamben’s formulation of the ‘ban’ as ‘the relation of exception’ 
(1998b, p. 23) is at least partially correct, then the Eritrean people have been 
abandoned to a realm of perpetual exposure to unconditional servitude and 
unsanctioned death. However, as shown in Chapter 6, because the “exception” 
in the context of Eritrea is not related to the suspension of the law, as Agamben 
argues, the abandonment cannot be located within a zone of indiscernibility 
between the law and its outside. Instead, the abandonment consists of being 
suspended in a zone of absolute absence of laws and rights—the rule of “no-laws 
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nor rights”. Similarly, for Agamben, ‘what is captured in the sovereign ban is a 
human victim who may be killed but not sacrificed: homo sacer’ (1998b, p. 53). 
Nevertheless, in the case of Eritrea, what is abandoned in the zone of the 
absolute absence of laws and rights is not Agamben’s homo sacer, nor is it “bare 
life”; it is the untamed life that is neither fully relegated to bare life nor 
articulated in political life. 
At this point, we should address the question of how the state maintains the 
precarious relationship between its own dissolution and its people. The short 
answer, as revealed in the participants’ accounts, is that the state projects the 
rule of no-laws nor rights within its institutions of governmentality. Sada’s 
description of an ‘unbearable system of administration’ points to the emergence 
of the rule of no-laws nor rights within the field of governmentality in ways that 
Butler theorises. The rule of no-laws nor rights propagates through the vertically 
organised system of coercive administration. Sada’s metaphorical description of 
an ‘invisible fire’ refers to the projection of this absolute absence of laws and 
rights. 
The country deploys coercive administrative controls at every level of the 
stratified administrative system of governmentality facilitated by the People’s 
Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) party. The PFDJ party ‘has four 
departments: political, organizational, economic and cultural affairs’ (Ogbazghi, 
2011, p. 5). Not only are these departments responsible for the administration of 
state affairs, they also control every aspect of individual and communal life in 
the country. The branches of the party, which are often referred to as “pillars of 
the party” in the national media, ‘are ultimately responsible for the centrally 
directed mobilization of the sanctioned civil society organizations and groups’ 
(Ogbazghi, 2011, p. 5). They are the instruments that the state has wielded to 
force its people to enter a docile phase. 
Once transformed into tractable subjects, the country’s people are made to 
obey the state authority, as directed by the PFDJ. Ordinary people are subject 
to coercive controls over their movements, employment, education, shelter 
building, food buying, and communication with each other. Whether it be 
national or international issues, local or regional interaction, or private or 
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communal life, the state’s grip is firm on all of them. Ogbazghi (2011, p. 5) 
describes the panoptic gaze of the state as follows: 
Local associations and organizations, such as women’s, youth and 
students, workers, and professional associations are strictly monitored 
and prohibited from making unilateral initiatives to forge any contacts 
with foreign counterparts, organizations, or agencies. State-controlled 
as they are, all aspects of their administration and organization, both 
structural and functional, including, their policies and priorities, 
financial, recruitment, and leadership positions, are determined by 
the PFDJ, of which the President’s Office is at the helm. 
Ultimately, the country, its people, and its future are in the hands of one man, 
one party, and one ideology. Any decision, whether it be to end life or protect 
it, originates from the central authority, and the people must comply. The 
source of decisions is not the law, but decrees that originate from the President 
and his inner circle. The country is ruled by what Arendt calls ‘government by 
bureaucracy’. ‘Government by bureaucracy’, Arendt (2017, p. 318) explains, ‘is 
government by decree, and this means that power ... becomes the direct source 
of all legislations’. This has become the new normal in the country since its 
independence, as the stories narrated above reveal. 
Moreover, Sada’s experience with the local administration and Adam’s metaphor 
of an ‘invisible fire’ reveal another reality: the omnipresence of a systematic 
violence that radiates from an invisible source. As Arendt (1970) famously 
reminds us: 
In a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left with whom one 
can argue, to whom one can present grievance, on whom the 
pressures of power can be exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of 
government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of 
the power to act; for the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, and where all 
are equally powerless we have a tyranny without a tyrant. (p. 81) 
In the case of Eritrea, every administrator in every institution affirms his or her 
allegiance to the higher authority, which appears to be invisible and 
unreachable, as Sada’s story reveals. In the chain of command, the 
administrative bureaucrats affirm the state’s authority through encounters, in 
the absence of laws and rights, between the state’s violent gaze and the 
outlawed citizens. The officials’ roles involve ‘merely administering decrees’, 
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and, in doing so, they feel ‘superior to these “impractical” people who are 
forever entangled in “legal niceties” and therefore stay outside the sphere of 
power’ (Arendt, 2017, p. 318). The experiences of Sada, Adam, Fortuna, and 
Musa, as well as those of dozens of the other participants who recalled similar 
experiences, reveal the subservient relationship between the petty bureaucrats 
and ordinary citizens. 
The control imposed on the Eritrean people by the centralised government is 
further complicated by tactics of governmentality that are not only extra-legal 
but also inextricably linked to the sovereign power. In fact, governmentality and 
sovereignty in the country intersect in ways that Butler describes and as I have 
reviewed above. The bureaucratic machine of governmentality facilitates the 
punishment, suppression, and control tactics of the sovereign power. As Butler 
(2006, p. 55) shows, the intersection of governmentality and sovereignty 
perpetuates practices that are ‘irreducible to law’. The absence of laws and 
rights in the country means the elimination of any distinction between 
governmentality and sovereignty, making it possible for the rule of no-laws nor 
rights to become the norm. 
As stated, therefore, the rule of no-laws nor rights perpetually embodies the 
integration of sovereignty and governmentality within a unified apparatus of 
violent power in the relatively young Eritrean state. While a return from 
Agamben’s notion of the suspension of the law—the exception—is the law, there 
can be no return from the rule of no-laws nor rights because no such possibility 
exists in the absolute absence of laws and rights. Hence, the ubiquitous coercive 
control strategies highlighted in the participants’ accounts emanate from the 
absence of rights brought about by the control imposed on their lives by the rule 
of no-laws nor rights. Faced with multiple losses, such as the loss of the 
traditional embodiments of social organisation, cultural identity, and social 
cohesion, Eritreans are reduced to rightless, obedient servants of the carceral 
state. As shown, there are no limits to the sovereign’s dominion over its 
submissive ruled. In the absolute absence of law, the government is accountable 
to neither natural nor human law; only to its obnoxious decrees. 
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7.2.2 Open-Ended National Service 
In the early years of independence, the transitional government introduced 
mandatory NS for all Eritreans between the age of eighteen and fifty, with the 
pretext of protecting and building the country. Article 5 of the National Service 
Proclamation 82/1995 notes six “objectives” as follows: 
− to establish people based strong defense force to assure the 
existence of free and sovereign Eritrea 
− to preserve the courage and culture of heroism... and pass them 
to the next generation 
− to create hard-working, disciplined and an ever- ready new 
generation that participate in reconstruction 
− to enhance the economic development of the country… ... in a 
trained and organized manner 
− to provide regular and continuous military training and 
vocational training ... promote physical fitness 
− to cement the unity of our people by promoting unity and 
nationalism and eradicating sub-national attitudes. [Emphasis 
added] 
These objectives affirm the primary goals of safeguarding national sovereignty 
and building the nation, as Adam pointed out and as I discussed above. The NS is 
a biopolitical process that organises, trains, disciplines, and transforms all able-
bodied Eritreans to achieve these goals. It involves the production of fit, 
hardworking, disciplined, and submissive bodies that can be used both as 
workforce and warriors. The state deploys this compliant workforce with a ‘siege 
mentality ... as an indispensable instrument for creating Eritrean national 
identity, nation-building and consolidation, as well as averting perceived 
internal and external threats’ (Kibreab, 2009b, p. 42). 
Leaving aside its initial objectives, to truly understand the nature of the NS 
requires examining how the submissive bodies are produced, transformed, lived 
in, and even destroyed. For analysis, I want to draw on the ways in which 
participants with lived experience of the NS described the NS itself and their 
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experiences of it. Figure 7 shows excerpts from interviews and focus group 
discussions with participants. 
 
Figure 7: Participants' descriptions of NS 
 
Combined with other primary and secondary data, the above verbatim 
transcriptions of excerpts extracted from interviews and three group discussions 
suggest three stages of the NS: recruitment (Tigrigna mkhad), training (taelim) 
and assignment (mdeba), and retirement (mtyas). Each of these stages involves 
the state deploying the rule of no-laws nor rights to produce fit and submissive 
bodies. Under the rule of no-laws nor rights, fit and obedient bodies are 
produced by deploying biopolitical exploitation at the different stages of the NS. 
7.2.2.1 Recruitment 
Eritrea’s NS was first initiated in 1991, although it did not in fact become 
operational until July 1994, when the first group of trainees was recruited 
(Kibreab, 2013, p. 636). In its first few years, the recruitment process was 
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organised by local governments in coordination with the Ministry of Defence and 
involved what is known as the “registration” process. Article 11(1) of 
Proclamation 82/1995 states: 
When the Ministry of Defense makes a call registration, an Eritrean 
national between the age of 18 and 40 who has a duty to take part in 
Active National Service shall register at the nearest Registration 
center in accordance with the program of the Ministry of Local 
Governments. 
As Kibreab (2013, p. 636) rightly notes, the government ‘complied strictly with 
the requirements of the law’ for the first four years. Until the so-called border 
war with Ethiopia, the duration of NS was eighteen months, which included six 
months of intensive military training (Kibreab, 2013, p. 635). Fortuna 
experienced recruitment through registration, although she was later called 
back to serve in the army during the war. 
Since the start of the border war with Ethiopia, the recruitment process has 
shifted radically from a semi-voluntary registration process to a compulsory and 
coercive process of forced recruitment; it has ‘become one of the most 
draconian government policies in Eritrea, causing immense suffering and 
vulnerability to a large number of Eritreans’ (Tronvoll and Mekonnen, 2017, p. 
170). The government continues to rely on an undeclared state of emergency as 
a pretext to force people into the military, despite the fact that the post-war 
‘political situation’ in the country ‘does not amount to a state of emergency’ 
(Tronvoll and Mekonnen, 2017, p. 177). In a focus group discussion conducted in 
Cairo in January 2020, the participants identified three sources of recruitment: 
schools, civilian society, and detention centres. 
Schools, in particular, and education, in general, have been the main sources of 
potential draftees for the NS. Since the 2002/2003 academic year, the 
government has required students who have completed Grade Eleven to attend 
military training in Sawa prior to taking the national exam for the completion of 
secondary education. Over the past two decades, thousands of students have 
joined the military service in Sawa every year ‘as part of a government drive to 
reinforce discipline and patriotic commitment among the student community’ 
(Müller, 2008, p. 123). As education has become indistinguishable from military 
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training, Sawa—a military training camp—was renamed Warsai Yikealo Secondary 
School. Students are required to take part in strict military training and attend 
political lessons while also preparing for their matriculation. 
After spending a year in Sawa, the students with pass grades continue to higher 
education, while those who fail the matriculation exam join the NS indefinitely. 
Following the closure of Asmara University in 2004, even the students who pass 
the national exam now join ‘technical colleges under military supervision’ 
(Tronvoll and Mekonnen, 2017, p. 181). Those going on to higher education are 
often a minority. Those not achieving pass grades are not only assigned open-
ended NS but also subjected to differential treatment. Freselam, a former 
student in Sawa who did not earn high enough grades to pass the national exam, 
described his experience as follows: 
The emotional pain of failing the exam sleeps deep in your soul. It 
brings shame, and is embarrassing and cruel… The morning we were 
told our grades, we knew only 19 out of a total of over 100 students in 
my unit passed the matriculation… They [the ones who passed] were 
sent home and we were made to stay… That’s when you start to feel 
the emotional pain. On the same day, our military leaders began to 
treat us as the worthless, ignorant, and failed… The military leaders 
would use us as their servants; they made us clean their toilets, clean 
their rooms, carry water to their shower, and some students were 
even forced to cook for them… They can call you at any time to do 
what they want … clean their rooms, cook for them, even wash their 
clothes. All in all, my experience in Sawa was ruthless, inhuman, and 
degrading. 
Similarly, Sergel, another student who did not achieve the required grades to 
pass the national exam, lamented, ‘After failing the exam, they took me to 
Assab… very far from home. There, they treated me like a dirty creature… like a 
worthless person… or a criminal from a street gang’. As illustrated in Figure 7, 
the experiences of Freselam and Sergel are common among Eritrea’s youth.  
In the same vein, teachers who have already been in the NS are also required to 
take part in regional military training. This is aimed at instilling discipline and 
fitness at every level of education. Collectively, the recruitment of students, the 
military supervision of colleges, and the training of teachers have allowed the 
government to achieve a complete ‘militarisation of education’ (Tronvoll and 
Mekonnen, 2017, pp. 180–181). Indeed, the government uses education as a tool 
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to achieve its ‘biopolitical project’ aimed at establishing a ‘collective citizenry, 
inside and outside the country’ (Müller, 2008, p. 125). 
In addition to militarising education, the government also recruits NS conscripts 
from civilian society through coercive techniques, such as roundups (commonly 
known as gifas), distributing order letters, and issuing fines to those who refuse 
to show up. With the exception of young children and married women, all able-
bodied civilians, including the elderly, are expected by their government to 
undertake locally organised military training and join the NS. Over three-
quarters of the participants whose fathers were in their sixties or above 
reported that their fathers were forced to carry Kalashnikovs as part of their 
daily activities. Regarding the recruitment of senior citizens, Tronvoll and 
Mekonnen perceptively note that senior civilians, including men in their eighties, 
are drafted under what is commonly called ‘Hizbawi Serawit or people’s army’ 
(2017, p. 181). 
Finally, the government also demobilises detainees by recruiting them to the NS. 
The detainees include, among other groups, people who have committed minor 
crimes, deserters, draft evaders, border crossers, and youths who have dropped 
out of school. Andom, a former NS draftee in Eritrea and currently a researcher 
in the UK, explained how the Eritrean government recruits detainees as follows: 
The government cannot afford to keep the sheer number of people 
being arbitrarily detained, often for perceived minor crimes, in 
detention facilities… For example, many youths are intercepted every 
month attempting to cross the border to neighbouring countries, and 
thousands of others get arrested for evading the draft. The detention 
apparatus sends these people for military training after a few months 
of detention… Obviously, this is not the case for suspected political 
dissidents, who are stuck in prison for many years… Such detainees 
include journalists, religious leaders, G-15, and so forth. 
Andom’s observations were echoed in almost every participant’s account, 
although some participants noted that detention and NS are almost inseparable 
in the context of Eritrea. Musa, for example, described the NS as a ‘large open 
prison designed to capture everything and everyone in it’. Musa was separated 
from his immediate family for over a decade, moving between prison and the 
NS. Likewise, as Kibreab notes, the NS ‘enabled the government to keep tens of 
thousands of Eritreans in perpetual control and exploitation’ (2013, p. 636). 
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7.2.2.2 Training bodies and minds, and assignment 
In a focus group discussion held in Cairo on 20th January 2020, the participants 
listed more than a dozen training centres for NS draftees in Eritrea, including 
Sawa, Kiloma, Hishferay, Mi’ether, Gahtelay, and Kormena’e. They also noted 
that there are training centres in almost all subzones for the training of local 
people, including senior citizens. Interestingly, they explained that the nature 
and type of training at the local and regional level differ from the form of 
training conducted at the national level. The participants explained that local 
and regional training is focused on educating the draftees, who are often senior 
citizens, about Eritrea’s history, the “liberation struggle”, and nationalism. For 
example, Yasir, a computer science graduate and a former statistics officer for a 
local government department in the Anseba region, expressed it as follows: 
You know, some of the uneducated men don’t even know how to sing 
the national anthem… Also, the government wants them to learn more 
about the liberation and wants to keep them in service… Singing the 
national anthem and repeating Awet Nhafash [Victory to the Masses] 
means a lot for the government… It’s basically more of symbolic 
importance. The worst thing is that the government forces the 
trainees to bring other trainees or detain draft evaders. They live in 
the same area and they know each other very well, and for the 
government to use them in that way is like sowing hatred among 
members of the same community. 
All of the participants nodded their heads in agreement with Yasir, and Hagos 
added: 
It’s a tragedy for elderly people like my father who is now in his early 
70s to be given a Kalashnikov by the government… And you know 
what, children and grandchildren grow up watching people like my 
father inundated with training sessions and appointments at their 
local administration centres… It’s like entire families in the country 
are built in the image of a military country… This is unimaginable 
cruelty. This should be called what it is: it’s state-imposed slavery. 
While the local training focuses on mobilisation and indoctrination, the national 
military training combines these with intensive physical activities, weapons 
training, and military simulations. As the participants’ accounts show, training in 
the NS is for both the body and the mind equally. In Foucauldian terms, both the 
bodies and the minds of recruits are transformed into ‘objects’ of a ‘disciplinary 
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power’, whose prime function is to train, regulate, shape, and transform the 
recruits into being submissive subjectivities. Foucault (2020, p. 155) asserts: 
In becoming the target for new mechanisms of power, the body is 
offered up to new forms of knowledge. It is the body of exercise, 
rather than of speculative physics; a body manipulated by authority, 
rather than imbued with animal spirits; a body of useful training and 
not of rational mechanics, but one in which, by virtue of that very 
fact, a number of natural requirements and functional constraints are 
beginning to emerge. 
The operations of the disciplinary power over the bodies and minds of the 
conscripts involve mundane activities ranging from simple tasks such as waking 
up early in the morning at the weekend and quarrying stones to complex 
prescheduled physical, technical, and mental exercises. Wulud, who had 
undergone training in Sawa before enrolling in an undergraduate degree 
programme, described a typical day of training in Sawa as follows: 
Okay, it goes like this. You wake up at 4:30 am and then stand in a 
queue and get counted. After that you run for about 40 minutes and 
then go to the training ground and get counted again and then start 
the training, marching or other physical activities, like push-ups. The 
morning training session finishes at around 10 am and then you return 
to your hall for breakfast… The breakfast finishes at 10:30 am and 
then you go back to the training ground. The training continues until 
12 pm… This is followed by lunch and then a break until 3 pm… The 
afternoon training starts at 3 pm and finishes at around 6 pm. Much of 
the afternoon training is learning about liberation and Eritrea’s 
history and, also, learning how to use Kalashnikov and other 
weapons… You then return back to the dormitory, have a dinner and 
study until 10 pm. After that, they call you for another round of folio 
[counting/attendance]. Then, the unit leaders assign everyone a slot 
for wardia [active duty] before bedtime… It starts again the next day 
at the same time. (emphasis added) 
These mundane practices suggest at least two ways of training the body and 
multiple ways of training the mind. The training of the body begins with building 
its fitness levels to its maximum capacity, or at least to the required capacity. 
This is done through physical training that involves, among exercises, running, 
marching, interval sprints, push-ups, sit-ups, military expeditions, climbing up 
and down a mountain, labouring, and sporting activities. Once the body has 
reached the required level of fitness, another layer of training is added: the 
learning of military skills and techniques. This requires not only organising the 
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draftees into manageable units, such as regiments and squadrons, but also 
strictly training body parts (e.g., limbs, head, and chest) to perform meticulous 
actions. Hands are trained to hold and throw grenades as well as to clean, 
assemble, disassemble, and use different types of weapons effectively. Eyes are 
trained for shooting and aiming at measured new horizons. Head, legs, hands, 
and chest are trained to perform uniform, organised, and steady marching. Every 
part of the body is fine-tuned to perform predefined workouts with perfection. 
The fittest and most talented are praised and selected for geometrically 
designed colourful parades on public occasions (see picture below). 
 
Figure 8: NS Silver Jubilee celebration (Ministry of Information, Eritrea) 
 
The mind is also trained simultaneously with the body. It is trained to learn 
military strategies and war tactics; to idolise the liberation struggle and its 
values, ideology, and nationalist project; and to accept and endure pain, stress, 
sleep deprivation, and exhaustion. The mind is also tuned to perform routine 
disciplinary procedures, such as waking up early in the morning, staying late for 
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active duty, queuing up for attendance, and obeying disciplinary rules. 
Moreover, the instilling of a warrior mindset by developing such traits as 
selfishness, altruism, heroism, and adherence to strict secrecy, are other 
essential elements of the project of training the mind in the NS. From a 
Foucauldian viewpoint, the aim of these coordinated efforts to train organs, 
limbs, muscles, and the mind is to transform trainees into tractable 
subjectivities. 
Transforming the trainees into docile subjects has become a necessary condition 
for the government’s nationalist project and its fictitious principle of “self-
reliance”. Its National Charter, adopted in 1994, for example, states: 
The six basic principles which can serve as guidelines for our activities 
are national unity, active public participation, the human element, 
linkage between national and social struggles, self-reliance, and 
finally, a strong relationship between people and leadership. 
Since the charter was written, these principles have either been disavowed or 
perpetuated in the form of unfounded rhetoric. The relationship between the 
government and its people has become one of subjection, not participation. For 
example, promises of civic engagement are nothing but empty mantras. Of the 
empty slogans, “self-reliance” is pronounced most loudly and frequently. The 
notion of “self-reliance” is defined in the National Charter as follows: 
Politically, it means to follow an independent line and give priority to 
internal conditions; economically, to rely on internal capabilities and 
develop internal capacities; and culturally, to have self-confidence 
and develop one’s own cultural heritage. 
Developed during the liberation struggle, these principles have become 
embedded at every level of the training. Data from the focus groups, interviews, 
and participants’ observations of the indoctrination of draftees confirm that the 
“six basic principles” in general and “self-reliance” in particular are essential 
components of the NS. Among the mobilisation and indoctrination strategies the 
government pursues, the participants listed training courses, workshops, 
seminars, youth programmes, festivals, cadre courses, and local government 
programmes. Such mobilisation and indoctrination programmes are presented by 
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the government as the pillars of its nationalist projects and efforts to forge 
national identity. 
The mundane biopolitical training, mobilisation, and indoctrination regimes 
inflicted on the bodies and minds of the trainees are enforced by control and 
punishment administered by military personnel (“trainers” hereafter). The 
trainers have absolute power to train, punish, discipline, and even exploit the 
trainees, without any limits. In a focus group discussion conducted in the UK, the 
participants cited examples of punishments carried out by the trainers, including 
‘push-ups, quarrying stones when others are resting, severe beatings, cleaning 
the commanders’ toilets, facing the sun with hands tied back and legs fastened 
together, and food and water deprivation’. These modalities of punishments and 
control are administered at both the individual and the group level. 
The participants also stated that women are subjected to sexual exploitation by 
the trainers and their commanders. Helen, a former student and trainee in 
Sawa, for example, described how her friend Haben had attempted to end her 
life after ‘she got pregnant as a result of repeated rape incidents by her unit 
leader’. Helen added that Haben was ‘sent home after several suicide attempts, 
but the trainer who raped her continued his abusive sexual acts’ against other 
young female students. Helen added, with falling intonation, that Haben ‘died 
from an unsafe abortion procedure’ at home at the age of seventeen. There was 
a consensus among the participants regarding the widespread sexual exploitation 
of young women by both their male counterparts and the trainers. Such 
exploitative incidents are kept shrouded in secrecy by the trainers and their 
commanders, despite the widespread prevalence of such stories of women 
falling prey to sexual exploitation (Dorman, 2004b, p. 11; Kibreab, 2017a). 
Sawa is an obvious example of a space where the bodies and minds of Eritreans 
are put through the training regimes, disciplinary procedures, and forms of 
exploitation described above. The camp has undergone a radical transformation 
since the introduction of the NS in the early 1990s. Helen, a former veterinary 
assistant at the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, rightly described Sawa as ‘a 
military training centre, a school, an educational centre and a cultural hub’. It is 
a military training camp because it is the place where soldiers, war masters, 
military commanders, and military strategists are produced. It is a multipurpose 
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school and educational centre because it is where students and teachers, artists 
and musicians, carpenters and electricians, and veterinarians and paramedics 
are trained. It is also a cultural hub because it is where people from various 
walks of life and backgrounds can go to celebrate annual military academy 
graduations, festivals, sporting events, and national holidays. Sawa has been 
transformed into a national epicentre, where military training, education, and 
socio-cultural activities are rendered inseparable. As Müller (2008, p. 126) 
observes, ‘Sawa was meant to be the place where the defence of the country’s 
sovereignty was passed on militarily and ideologically to a committed future 
generation’. 
Ironically, however, Sawa’s symbolic importance has gradually faded in the 
minds of many young Eritreans. Müller, for example, asserts, ‘In the Eritrea of 
today, Sawa first and foremost symbolises state control over the lives of its 
youth, a control that is increasingly being rejected and evaded’ (2008, p. 126). 
There is growing evidence that many Eritrean youths leave the country simply 
because they do not want to go to Sawa (Mekonnen and Estefanos, 2011; Andom, 
2018). The notoriety of Sawa is rightly attributed to the role it plays in confining 
the human capacities and ambitions of Eritrean youth within the scope of the 
country’s military apparatus and open-ended NS. 
Assignment is the stage that follows military training. It involves systematically 
distributing trained draftees to various institutions of the state. The assignment 
process varies depending on the draftees’ student status, age, gender, and 
health. As stated, for example, students who earn pass grades in the national 
exam enter higher education, while those who fail receive vocational training 
before being assigned to different civilian departments as part of the indefinite 
NS. Except for those in education, all other draftees are distributed to different 
branches and units of the state military complex. The non-student draftees are 
assigned in ways that are consistent with the government’s tacit agenda of 
internal immobilisation and maximum utilisation of their skills and capacities. 
Some of the factors the government uses to achieve its tactics of maximum 
immobilisation and utilisation cited in focus group discussions include identified 
distance from home and the border, age and gender, and fitness and skills. 
Youths with a history of attempted irregular border crossings, for example, are 
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assigned to remote places, such as the Dahlak Archipelago in the Red Sea region. 
Similarly, draft evaders and deserters are assigned to places far from their 
hometowns. 
However, neither the intrusive and inhumane training nor the indignation and 
exploitation of the bodies and labour of the draftees ends after assignment. 
Instead, the draftees must surrender to a twin regime of biopolitical control and 
servitude under the guise of the Warsay Yikealo Development Campaign (WYDC 
hereafter). Introduced in the aftermath of the border conflict, the WYDC is a 
project of open-ended NS where all able-bodied people are required to 
participate in national defence and nation-building in return for a little pocket 
money (Kibreab, 2009a; Woldemikael, 2013). Hirt, for example, expresses it as 
follows: 
The WYDC is a new strategy of total mobilization. It means extreme 
interference in the private lives of people and has a strong impact on 
the fabric of society, rendering individuals unable to follow long-
established role expectations… [It] is a form of collective life under 
military discipline quite different from community-oriented life. 
(2010, p. 11) 
The focus of the training in the WYDC may vary slightly from that of military 
training. As discussed, the latter focuses on the production of fit, regulated, and 
docile bodies and minds, while the primary goal of training in the WYDC is, in 
Foucault’s terms, ‘not [to] link forces together in order to reduce them; it seeks 
to bind them together in such a way as to multiply and use them’ (Foucault, 
2020, p. 170). Thus, the WYDC is a biopolitical project in which the trained, 
regulated, and transformed bodies and minds enter into ‘a relation of docility-
utility’ (Foucault, 2020, p. 137). Dodging this biopolitical exploitation—that is, 
the indefinite NS—is viewed by the government as a betrayal of national duty. 
Punishment for draft evasion involves several years of arbitrary imprisonment 
and torture without official charges (Kibreab, 2013, p. 636). 
7.2.2.3 Retirement 
As stipulated in Article 8 of the National Service Proclamation 82/95, the NS 
started out as a temporary form of national service, consisting of six months of 
intensive military training and a further twelve months of active service in 
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national development programmes under the supervision of the military forces. 
This continued to be the case during the first few years of the NS programme. 
Following the 1998–2000 border war with Ethiopia, however, ‘not only did the 
government remobilize those who [had been] discharged, but also those who 
[have been] conscripted since May 1998 have not been demobilized’ (Kibreab, 
2013, p. 636). Moreover, it is important to note that the intended differences 
between the ‘military and non-military components’ of the NS disappeared and 
about ‘50 per cent of the population above the age of eighteen years’ is stuck in 
an indefinite NS (Tronvoll and Mekonnen, 2017, p. 168). 
Despite the well-documented indefinite nature of the NS, the data elicited from 
focus group discussions and interviews show there are in fact some exceptions. 
These include people with severe medical problems, married women, and 
disadvantaged people, who are declared by the government to be unfit for 
service (Belloni, 2018). As in the example of Fortuna, former combatants who 
have sustained life-changing injuries are also allowed to retire from the military 
service. In general, however, neither demobilisation from the military nor 
retirement from the open-ended NS is possible for the vast majority of the 
draftees. This is one of the main drivers of youth emigration from the country, 
as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
7.2.3 Arbitrary detention and forced disappearance 
The data solicited from the participants depict experiences of detention and 
forced disappearance that are widespread among Eritrean families both inside 
and outside the country. While those who submit their able bodies and conscious 
minds to the carceral regime are stuck in bureaucratic administration and 
exploitative NS, those who do not fulfil the government’s expectations are 
trapped within the carceral complex. The carceral complex implements 
techniques and technologies of power and surveillance designed to regulate the 
Eritrean people in accordance with a prison-like model. The government deploys 
coercive techniques, such as round-ups, checkpoints, arbitrary arrest, and 
torture, to recruit for its carceral complex men and women of draft age, NS 
deserters, and perceived political dissidents. 
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In the examples above, I highlighted Musa’s experience of detention and the 
forced disappearance of his brother not because they are unique but precisely 
because they are not. During the fieldwork, I spoke to young men and women 
whose fathers had disappeared inside the country’s carceral trap; I interviewed 
young brides whose husbands had been arrested by security agents and had 
remained stuck in prison since then; and I came across poignant stories of young 
men and women who had been tortured in prison facilities when they were 
teenagers. The excerpts below are representative of the similar stories gathered 
during fieldwork in the UK and in Egypt. 
Awet’s story 
When I interviewed him, Awet was in the hands of human traffickers in Libya. He 
was in the process of being deported to Sudan. In the interview, I asked him 
about his family background as shown below: 
Researcher: Can you please tell me about your family? 
Awet: Yes, a long story… My dad is in prison in Eritrea and my mum is 
a housewife. I have five siblings: two in Eritrea, one in Ethiopia 
and the other two in Europe. 
Researcher: Do you want to tell me more about your dad’s 
imprisonment? 
Awet: A group of five to six armed men came to our house at night 
and took him and since then he has never come back… He 
disappeared. 
Researcher: How long has it been since then? 
Awet: About 19 years… I was only two years old when he was taken 
from our home. I don’t remember my father. 
Researcher: Do you know why he was arrested and by whom? 
Awet: No. I asked my mum many times, but she kept saying that she 
doesn’t know anything… The only thing we know is that he was 
working for the government in a local administration office. 
That’s all I can say. 
Zainab’s story 
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Zainab, 58, was born and raised in a small town called Geleb in the Anseba 
region of Eritrea. Her father died in the liberation war and her mother, who was 
in her late eighties, lived on her own in Geleb. Zainab is the youngest of six 
siblings. Two of her sisters were single mothers in Eritrea because their husbands 
had been in prison, each one for over five years. Her other siblings (a sister and 
two brothers) were serving in the NS. 
Zainab had lived much of her life in Saudi Arabia. She left Eritrea in the 1980s 
and had lived and worked in Saudi Arabia for twenty-eight years. In 2016, the 
Saudi Arabian government deported Zainab, her five children, and her husband 
to Eritrea. A month later, her husband was arrested by Eritrean security agents 
and has not been seen since. Zainab described the disappearance of her husband 
as follows: 
On 10 November 2016, my husband was arrested in our bedroom by 
government security agents at night. I don’t know why they arrested 
him. I don’t know where he is at the moment. I searched for him in 
several prisons but could not get any information about him… I asked 
several prison officers and prison security guards and they all 
responded that they do not know anything about my husband… When I 
shared the news of my husband’s disappearance with my siblings, they 
were all shocked… They all warned me that the government could 
target my children and me as well, and that’s why I left Eritrea. 
Draft evasion followed by attempted irregular emigration from the country can 
often lead to the detention, interrogation, and torture of teenagers and young 
adults. The excerpt below, extracted from a focus group conducted in Egypt in 
January 2020, provides an insight into the horrific ordeals that teenagers and 
young adults undergo. 
Mered is recognised as a survivor of detention and trafficking by the 
UNHCR-Egypt. He was detained in Eritrea for over five years. He was 
arrested trying to exit the country irregularly. First, he was in a prison 
in Barentu for over a year and then transferred to the Adi-Abeyto 
prison in the vicinity of Asmara, where he was detained for four years. 
He was only 16 when he was arrested… 
Mered’s friend, Teklay, added, ‘I was with [Mered]. Our stories of 
detention are the same except that I was shot in the leg’. Showing us 
the scars of where the bullet penetrated his left leg above his knee, 
Teklay lamented, ‘When I vomited because of the pain of the 
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gunshots, the security guards laughed at me and joked about it, saying 
egru qershimnayo [we smashed his leg] … They’re not humans’. 
Moreover, the government locks up prominent politicians, journalists, and 
ordinary people in solitary cells without trial (Kibreab, 2009a; Woldemikael, 
2013; COI, 2016; Plaut, 2016b; Kibreab, 2017b). The disappearance in the 
carceral trap of eleven prominent politicians—former members of the famous 
group called G-15, widely regarded as former “heroes” of the liberation war and 
prominent government officials until after the border war—is a typical example 
of the normalisation of arbitrary detention and forced disappearance. Likewise, 
tens of thousands of ordinary civilians and professionals continue to languish in 
underground cells (Human Rights Council, 2016; Plaut, 2016b). Hence, as Hedru 
observes, ‘Eritrea has become a place where comrades-in-arms of a lifetime 
have turned on each other, heroes of yesterday are the “traitors” of today, and 
brother dare not to trust brother’ (2003, p. 435). Such indistinction between 
“heroes” and “traitors” epitomises the carceral state’s control over everything 
and power to punish everyone. 
Numerous questions about the plight of the detainees have been raised by 
victims’ families and relatives, academics, journalists, and UN organs. Where is 
Musa’s brother who has been missing since 1994? Where are the G-15 members? 
Are they alive? How are they being treated? Why are thousands of Eritreans 
vanishing without trace inside carceral spaces? Why are people from all walks of 
life being detained or forced to disappear? These questions remain partially 
unanswerable for as long as the government of Eritrea refuses to evidentially 
answer them or until it allows access to families and relatives and opens up for 
independent investigation and research. The government’s answerability to no-
one, which is the deployment of the exception as a norm, and the unknowability 
of the whereabouts of the prisoners lay bare at least two biopolitical problems. 
Firstly, the arrangements expose the carceral system in which the regime of 
indefinite detention operates. And secondly, the deployment of indefinite 
detention and forced disappearance throws into question the victims’ very 
existence—the ontological state of their being. 
The country’s prison institutions constitute a characteristic feature of the 
carceral system in Eritrea. They operate as a spectacle in complex ways. The 
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data solicited during interviews and focus group discussions reveal that the 
institutions of the carceral complex constitute entwined biopolitical regimes and 
physical carceral architectures. The biopolitical regimes involve practices of 
arbitrary mass arrest, incarceration, and forced disappearance; rehabilitation 
programmes (equipped with techniques and technologies of surveillance); and 
routine attendance and mandatory self-reporting regimes, supported by secret 
intelligence services, the police, and the army. The physical architecture of the 
carceral complex extends from military training, detention camps, and the 
prison complex, with its dungeons, police stations, and repurposed shipping 
containers, to checkpoints and barracks. Odiously, it also extends its sphere to 
people’s private homes when imposing house arrest and state-imposed solitude. 
These physical architectures, in Mbembé’s (2003a, p. 28) terms, signify the 
‘panoptic fortification’ of both the public and private physical spaces. 
Together, the biopolitical operations of mass surveillance, mass supervision, and 
arbitrary incarceration, and the physical architectures form the mechanisms by 
which the government holds the entire society in check. The machinery of the 
panoptic state and its carceral architecture operate, as Foucault (2020, p. 212) 
explains in vivid terms, ‘not in the form of enclosed institutions, but as centres 
of observation disseminated throughout the society’. By deploying these carceral 
institutions, the state affirms its immediate omnipresence and its readiness to 
take swift actions against any form of dissent, resistance, or even disobedience. 
In short, the carceral state functions through the reification of exploitative and 
invasive modalities of control and punishment: mass supervision, mass 
militarisation, and mass incarceration. 
In his book, Understanding Eritrea (2016), Martin Plaut describes the country as 
repressive and mysterious, having isolated itself from the rest of the 
international community and taken its people hostage, forcing them to exist in a 
condition of incommunicado. Similarly, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea 
(COI) accused the country's government of committing ‘crimes against 
humanity’. The COI reports that ‘Eritrean officials have committed the acts of 
enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, reprisals as other 
inhumane acts, persecution, rape and murder’ (COI, 2016, p. 46). In an attempt 
to establish the committing of these crimes and hold government officials 
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responsible for perpetrating such egregious crimes against their citizens, the COI 
(2016) writes: 
Because State officials have relied so extensively on the commission 
of the crimes to establish, consolidate and maintain total control over 
the Eritrean population, the Commission has determined that they 
have engaged in a widespread and systematic attack against the 
civilian population of Eritrea since May 1991 which remains ongoing. 
(p. 46) 
Although the COI report has been vehemently rejected by the government of 
Eritrea and criticised by some academics as being politicised and biased (Müller, 
2016), it nevertheless sheds light on the unchallenged abuses that the regime in 
Eritrea has committed against its people. The government’s use of its unlimited 
power to impose unrestricted controls over its people is evidenced in its 
suspending the implementation of the constitution as well as in the absence of 
the rule of law in the country (Woldemikael, 2013; Plaut, 2016b; Kibreab, 
2017a). Drawing from interviews with ex-combatants and former government 
officials, Kibreab asserts that the government’s unrestrained use of power: 
has been demonstrated by the repressive scenarios that have unfolded 
since the betrayal of the promises, culminating in the stifling of the 
processes of transition to a democratic future, violation of human 
rights, destruction of the private sector and incommunicado 
incarceration of many innocent citizens and the prominent leaders of 
the war of liberation. (2009a, p. 358) 
In postliberation Eritrea, no one is safe from forced disappearance or 
incarceration. There is no hiding from the state’s violent machine because it is 
everywhere and anywhere. Everyone and anyone, including members of the 
inner circle of the government apparatus, is constantly threatened by being both 
visible and invisible to the violent sovereign. Put differently, citizens are visible 
to the state’s panoptic gaze while also being simultaneously subjected to the 
constant threat of forced disappearance and indefinite incarceration. 
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Figure 9: “Missing People” 
 
The second calamity of the indefinite detention and forced disappearance 
concerns the prisoners’ ontological states of being. The forced disappearance in 
the carceral system of Musa’s brother, of Zainab’s husband, of members of the 
G-15, and of thousands of other Eritreans means that their ontological state of 
being is indefinitely suspended. Figure 9 above shows just a sample of the 
incarcerated and forcibly disappeared Eritreans from different walks of life, 
including former cabinet ministers, religious leaders, graduates, professionals, 
and ordinary citizens. They are men, women, old, and young. If there is one 
thing they all share, it is their forced disappearance, not only from the public 
and private spheres but also from the imagination of being. The fact that they 
are held in a realm of permanent invisibility and unknowability implies that their 
bodies are either turned into spatially fixed disposable corporealities or 
destroyed without trace with impunity. Either way, their ontological state of 
being is constitutively included in the condition of mortality through a register of 
permanent disappearance and unknowability. 
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For those detainees whose whereabouts are known and who can be visited by 
their families and relatives, there is little tangible difference between their 
states of being and those of the “missing people”. Abdu, whose father was a 
combatant during the liberation war and has been a detainee since Eritrea’s 
independence, described the experience of meeting his father as follows: 
My father was detained right after independence for reasons I don’t 
know… I could not visit him in prison because I was always in national 
service. After almost three years, I went to see him… I waited outside 
and the guards brought him to me. He was handcuffed and 
accompanied by two guards. At first, I did not recognise him… He was 
starved, looked skinny and could barely stand for more than a few 
minutes. He was dressed in filthy clothes and his body was covered in 
scars. His hair had turned completely grey. I also noticed two of his 
front teeth were broken… He was unrecognisable. 
The fact that Abdu’s father was detained indefinitely without trial means that 
his existence is placed not only outside of recourse to law but also beyond 
recognisability. Thus, for Abdu’s father and many other inmates, the prison is a 
site where the impersonal logic of exception is applied permanently to the 
annihilation and disfiguration of its inmates. The impersonal logic of exception 
and its institutions of mass incarceration reify both the reduction of the citizens’ 
status to untamed life and its securitisation as such. Such forms of sovereign 
power, as Mbembé (2003a, p. 14) succinctly asserts, ‘are what constitute the 
nomos of the political space in which we still live’. Forced disappearance and 
indefinite detention leave subjects suspended within a sphere where there is no 
distinction between the law and its absence, or between life and death. As 
stated, untamed life becomes the condition to which all citizens are reduced. 
 Concluding remarks 
In the previous chapter, I argued that traditional norms were anachronistically 
rendered obsolete after independence. The country’s independence marked the 
end of the semi-autonomous, patriarchally organised ethnicities and their 
juridico-exceptional political landscape. For ordinary citizens, the liberation 
struggle has not fulfilled their aspirations of a better life after unimaginable 
sacrifices. As Kibreab puts it, ‘They fought for a government that rules with a 
“brake”, that is a constitution’ (2009a, p. 28). However, Kibreab adds, ‘without 
a brake’ (i.e., without any source of law or legal protection), the government of 
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Eritrea has been driving the country down a ‘dangerous road’ since its 
independence. 
Let me now turn briefly to the main findings and theoretical arguments of this 
chapter to shed light on what the anatomy of this dangerous road looks like. 
First, I have laid bare that, once they lost touch with their socio-cultural past, 
the communities surrendered to an unaccountable sovereign power ‘whose 
central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized 
instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human 
bodies and populations’ (Mbembé, 2003a, p. 14, emphasis in original). The 
omnipresence of the omnipotent sovereign power is evident in the government’s 
bureaucratised administration, exploitative biopolitical, and arbitrary mass 
incarceration of its people. The rule of “no-laws nor rights” means that the 
annihilation of individual rights and the collective biopolitical exploitation are 
perpetuated with impunity in a realm of absolute absence of laws and rights. 
The individual is often referred to in relation to issues of national sovereignty 
and security, to which s/he is subordinated and must remain subservient. People 
have dreams, but their dreams are curtailed because they are either stuck in NS 
or die in wars and incarceration, and nobody is held accountable for their 
exploitation or deaths. 
Second, the rule by decree has established a new logic of “politics” in the 
country. The post-independence politics of the state seem to oscillate between 
three biopolitical domains: the domain of prohibition, the domain of training and 
indoctrination, and the domain of biopolitical utilisation. In the domain of 
prohibition, the dissolution of the state or any form of dissent against the 
government is banned. The former is concatenated with “national security” and 
its imagined mandate relies on an oxymoronic relationship with the citizens of 
the state. The prohibition of the state’s dissolution, in precise terms, 
presupposes citizens being exposed to the unconditional threat of death. 
Similarly, any form of dissent is met with terrifying menace, and the state reifies 
the prohibition of dissent by locking up dissidents in carceral spaces by 
condemning them to forced disappearance or even systematically eliminating 
them. Indefinite detention and forced disappearance are typical of the 
systematic annihilation of prisoners’ ontological state of being. 
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The constant subjection of the bodies and minds of its citizens to all-
encompassing training and indoctrination has enabled the government to 
effectively relegate the entire population of the country to subjects of an 
agentic state in which people have no choice but to follow the authority. Put 
differently, the state has successfully subjugated its citizens’ human capacities 
and finitudes to its disciplinary power. Once the subjection of the body to 
disciplinary power is achieved, as Foucault (2020, p. 138) observes: 
it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 
“aptitude”, a “capacity”, which it seeks to increase; on the other 
hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might 
result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. 
According to Foucault, the modern state’s exploitative biopolitical utilisation of 
its human and non-human resources involves ‘the adjustment of the 
accumulation of men [and women] to that of capital, the joining of the growth 
of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential 
allocation of profit’ (1998, p. 141). The entwined notions of NS and WYDC serve 
this purpose. While the former organises and ensures the availability, fitness, 
and tractability of human resources, the latter optimises their “use value” and 
productive power for maximum production. Citizens are reduced to the extent 
where their bodies are used for the best possible outcome for the state. And if 
they express their grief deriving from the pain caused by endless servitude, or 
demand relief from their continued exploitation, their dignity and human 
existence are put into question (Hirt, 2010; Kibreab, 2013). Ultimately, as 
Foucault (1998, p. 141) asserts, ‘the investment of the body, its valorization, 
and the distributive management of its forces’ are inextricably linked to the 
modes of production. This is why the politics of so-called self-reliance is a 
fictitious rationale for the biopolitical utilisation of the country’s resources 
(human or otherwise). 
Finally, the exercise of an omnipresent rule of no-laws nor rights and the 
biopolitical logics of prohibition, self-reliance, and indoctrination define the 
characteristics and the status of the country’s citizenship. The citizenship that is 
produced by the rule of no-laws nor rights and biopolitical exploitation is nothing 
but untamed life, whose potential for political existence is put into question by 
its precarities, carceralities, immobilities, and homelessness at home. In other 
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words, a citizen reduced to untamed life is a life whose surrender to an 
impersonal logic of sovereignty—the ‘right to kill’, in Foucault’s words—ensures 
the biopolitical domains. It is the ultimate price paid for sustaining the 
prohibitions and self-reliance, on the one hand, and an object of indoctrination 
and tractability, on the other. Citizens’ exposure to death with impunity, as in 
the case of the border war, and the obliteration of all forms of dissent, as in the 
example of the G-15, reveals the “animal” part—the bare life—of the untamed 
life. If perceived as a force, the untamed life is not only oppressed but also 
rendered politically unintelligible. 
It is important to mention that, while in the country, the untamed life is also 
homeless at home. If I may return to Musa’s poignant story, he had been able to 
meet his wife and children only once in the previous two decades. He had not 
met them since they visited him in February 2010 while he was in the NS. 
Similarly, he had not seen his brother since 1994 and did not even know whether 
or not he was still alive. Neither Musa’s separation from his family nor the 
obliteration of his brother as a subject are unfamiliar experiences for many 
Eritreans; instead, they are typical examples of life and living in Eritrea. It is 
argued that Eritreans have become homeless in their home country because of 
‘their growing alienation from their “natural” homes and their increasing 
aspirations to belong to the outside world’ (Belloni, 2018, p. 163). This has been 
the case for the many thousands of Eritreans who are immobilised in the NS and 
others who are expelled from humanity into carceral spaces. 
Therefore, the intractable ironies of the rule of “no-laws nor rights” and the 
domains of a-political existence it presupposes are the primary reasons for the 
irregular emigration from Eritrea. In the next chapter, I discuss the realities of 
exiting the country to become an unprotected refugee. 
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Chapter 8 Becoming a Refugee 
 Introduction 
I have so far discussed the whims of unaccountable sovereign power, the rule of 
no-laws nor rights and the politics in post-liberation Eritrea. I have highlighted 
the Eritrean people’s biopolitical exploitation, collective indignation, and 
complete expulsion from the realms of rights. In this chapter, I turn to the 
accounts of those who exit (or fail to exit) the carceral state in search of safety 
and protection. The chapter is divided into four sections. 
The first section explores why people exit the country in large numbers and how 
decisions regarding whether or not to exit are made. Drawing from primary data, 
this section follows the line of argumentation of the previous chapter and argues 
that exiting Eritrea has become a necessity for many thousands of Eritreans for 
their continuing biological existence. 
The second section concerns border crossing. The ordeals undergone by Eritrean 
migrants forced to cross the border to neighbouring countries are incredibly 
harrowing. To complete the journey to a supposedly safe place, the refugees 
have to pass across ‘violent borders’ (Jones, 2019) and in doing so put their lives 
at risk. This section examines their experiences of crossing the border to 
neighbouring countries. I argue that the border is the threshold at which 
multiple states of exception merge so as to effect the annihilation of the border 
crossers. 
In the third section, I analyse the experiences of refugees after they have 
crossed the physical border. Drawing from survivors’ stories, I argue that the 
survivors who penetrate into the polity through the interstices of interweaving 
border controls are viewed as visible threats to the imagined communities of the 
destination states. As a result, they are confronted with the security 
architecture put in place by the destination countries, whose primary concern 
appears to be either containing the refugees in necropolitical spaces, such as 
refugee camps or detention centres, or expelling them from the polity 
altogether. This section also discusses the refugees’ experience during their 
journeys within the region. Their ordeals include being trapped at borders and in 
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detention facilities, torture camps, and refugee camps, as well as being 
stranded during perilous journeys. The section sheds light on the role of the 
various state and non-state actors involved in the bestialisation of refugees in 
necropolitical spaces such as torture camps and detention facilities. 
Finally, I revisit the main findings of the chapter to summarise the difficulties 
faced by the involuntarily displaced people in the process of becoming refugees. 
Becoming a refugee is understood as a process in which an involuntarily 
displaced person is suspended both in time and space on a journey in search of a 
relatively safer destination. It also entails a simultaneous process of unbecoming 
a citizen of one’s country of birth. It is a state of continuously existing in the 
process of becoming. 
 The decision to exit 
For over two decades, Eritreans have either been caught up in an indefinite 
cycle of national service, consigned to carceral and necropolitical spaces, or 
forced to flee the country (Kibreab, 2009a; Plaut, 2016b; Andom, 2018). As 
discussed in Chapter 7, decisions to exit the country are often made in the 
contexts of systematic and interwoven modalities of carceralities, precarities, 
exploitation, and (im)mobilities. These modalities, along with the 
institutionalised bureaucratisation of life, explain why the country is 
‘haemorrhaging’ its population, on the one hand, and eroding its ‘sovereignty 
and legitimacy’, on the other (Reid, 2009, p. 210). These compounded causal 
factors are explicitly highlighted in the participants’ accounts of exiting the 
county, as shown in the NVivo map below and the codebook table that follows. 
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Figure 10: Participants' reasons for exiting Eritrea 
 
Figure 10 shows the combination of multifaceted and interwoven factors that 
drive Eritreans to leave their country. The table below shows the meanings that 
the participants attached to each of the causal factors indicated in Figure 10. 






National service (NS) is described by the participants as the 
‘mother source’ of many other problems in Eritrea. In 
explaining the nature of NS, the participants used phrases such 
as being ‘stuck in an indefinite national service’, ‘held hostage 




by the state’, ‘stuck in perpetual exploitation and servitude’, 
‘living in lawlessness’, and ‘becoming homeless’. 
While NS was the major concern for the former conscripts 
among the participants, fear of forced conscription was 
particularly salient among teenage former students. In the 
2002/2003 academic year, the government introduced a policy 
requiring all high-school students to take military training in 
Sawa before sitting the national examination. Many students 
who grow up hearing the harrowing accounts of military 
training in Sawa defy the government’s policy and leave the 
country in large numbers. This is also the case for students who 
dropped out of school for other reasons, such as economic 
hardship. The participants also highlighted a fear of forced 
conscription as one of the main causes of emigration among the 
country’s semi-nomadic communities. 




Among the basic freedoms that are lacking, participants cited 
being targeted by the government for holding different views, 
protesting, asking critical questions, speaking out, opposing 
government policies, following a religion not recognised by the 
government, and/or simply moving from one place to another 
without movement papers. Participants stated that all such 
practices of resistance and quests for agency are explicitly 
suppressed at every level of the government and often lead to 
imprisonment. Some participants also noted political opinions 
can be imputed. Adam, for example, stated that his brother’s 
desertion was one of the reasons that had made him leave the 
country. His brother was among the ‘higher-level authorities’ in 
the government before he absconded during a visit abroad. 
Adam and his entire family were questioned and interrogated 
by the intelligence services about his brother’s defection. 
Adam was specifically targeted because of his close 
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relationship with his brother. He stated that he had been 
detained in a ‘solitary cell’ for over three months. 
A lack of opportunities was also identified by participants as a 
contributing factor. This was particularly mentioned by 
participants who had been sent abroad by the Eritrean 
government for education or for sporting and diplomatic 
reasons and had then decided not to return to Eritrea. Bereket, 
for example, had been sent by the government to India to 
pursue a master’s degree, but he refused to return after 
completion of his studies. Instead, he applied for a PhD 
scholarship in the United States and sought asylum after arrival 
in the US. 
Detention 
and torture 
As discussed in Chapter 7, stories of mass incarceration and 
torture are widespread among Eritrean families. Ten of the 
twenty-three participants referred to in Figure 10 stated that 
they had been detained at least once before they decided to 
leave their country. They recounted that torture was common 
in prison facilities. All of them stated that they had been 
seriously beaten at least once either during arrest or in the 
prison. 
The participants differentiated torture from punishment. The 
former was understood by the participants as an extreme form 
of punishment with impunity, while the latter was understood 
as a penalty imposed for wrongdoing or disobedience. The 
participants also recognised that excessive punishment could 
become torture. They also noted that both torture and 
punishment are administered with impunity in detention 
facilities. Freselam, for example, described how his two friends 
were ‘tortured to death’ by prison officials after they had been 
found crossing the border to Sudan. He described himself as a 
‘survivor of torture and detention’. 
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Oppression 
and impunity  
This preliminary code was used to capture the modalities of 
punishment and control and the impunity with which they 
operate described in Chapter 7. Whether in the form of open-
ended NS, detention, torture, or denial of basic freedoms, they 
all operate without accountability. Participants linked 
oppression and impunity with the suspension of the constitution 
and absence of any legal protections. Adam, for example, said: 
‘If you’re in Eritrea, the likes of constitutional rule, law and 





‘Not feeling at home’ was a theme that emerged in all focus 
group discussions and in over a dozen individual semi-
structured interviews. Participants associated it with feelings 
of alienation from both family and home. For example, Rozina 
stated that all her family members except for her father had 
left Eritrea for Sudan, and that she was a teenage student on 
her own in a small village in the Gash-Barka region. While her 
father was engaged in NS, she worked evenings to earn a living. 
She cited ‘the trauma of separation from her family’ as the 
main reason for her decision to leave Eritrea. Similarly, Sunny 
explained that he spent much of his adult life in Eritrea doing 
NS and that he had no feeling of home. Sunny, a psychologist 
and former counsellor, argued that the disintegration of 
families and the prolonged separation of people from their 
homes and families have led to collective trauma among 
Eritrean youth. In his view, this is the main driver of the mass 
emigration of young Eritreans. 




Customary practices include child marriage, garn gualn in the 
case of murder, and sex- and gender-based discrimination. For 
example, Salwa was forced to leave Eritrea because her family 
had tried to force her to marry the son of a man who had been 
killed in a fight with her father. Salwa was only fifteen at the 
time her family proposed the marriage as part of the murder 
dispute resolution. 
Similarly, young women face additional vulnerabilities because 
of their sex and traditionally ascribed gender roles. For 
example, Medina recounted her daughter escaping Eritrea 
because she was treated differently by her own community 
after being sexually abused by her unit leader in NS. She said 
that once the people of her village learned that her daughter 
had been raped several times by the soldiers, no one would 
want to have a romantic relationship with her. She felt 
marginalised and had lost all hope. In focus group discussions, 
participants noted this is as being more prevalent in remote 
rural areas than in large cities and towns. 
Likewise, in an interview in February 2020, Salwa explained her 
decision to leave Eritrea as follows: 
My father killed a man from another tribe in a fight. 
It was a tragic incident for the family of the victim 
but also for us, particularly for me… After the death, 
both tribes came together and agreed on 
compensation and on a girl going to the victim’s 
family. And that girl was me. I refused the marriage 
proposal and the other tribe threatened us with 
revenge… That is why I left. 
Colonialism  Colonialism is identified as the main reason for forced 
migration among Eritreans who had left the country before its 
independence. This particularly resonated with first-generation 
refugees who had either become stranded in refugee camps in 
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neighbouring transit countries or had settled in destinations 
countries. 
Some participants had exited Eritrea twice, first during 
colonisation and then after independence. Zainab, for 
example, first left Eritrea when she had been involuntarily 
displaced by the ‘brutal colonial occupation’ and then, in 2016, 
after being targeted by security agents of the government of 
Eritrea. 
 
After a thematic analysis of the preliminary codes above, three broader themes 
emerged: lawlessness, rightlessness, and homelessness. Lawlessness was 
understood by the participants in terms of the absence of legal and 
constitutional protections against the government’s infringements on their basic 
rights and freedoms. The matter of the suspension of the constitution was raised 
in almost every focus group discussion and interview, with participants 
emphasising that the suspension had become indefinite since the start of the 
border war with Ethiopia. As Butler in her book Precarious Life persuasively 
shows, the extension into the future of the rule of exception effectively strips 
people of their legal protection, defers their dreams and hopes and, ultimately, 
throws into question their very humanity. In her examination of ‘indefinite 
detention’, Butler correctly argues that: 
The state, in the name of its right to protect itself and, hence, and 
through the rhetoric of sovereignty, extends its power in excess of the 
law and defies international accords; for if the detention is indefinite, 
then the lawless exercise of the state sovereignty becomes indefinite 
as well. In this sense, indefinite detention provides the condition for 
the indefinite exercise of extra-legal state power… it seems to follow 
that the state of emergency is not limited in time and space, that it, 
too, enters onto an indefinite future. (2006, p. 64). 
Butler adds: ‘The future becomes a lawless future, not anarchical, but given 
over to the discretionary decisions of a set of designated sovereigns’ (2006, p. 
65). This ‘lawless future’ has effectively become the rule in post-liberation 
Eritrea. As the participants noted, the indefinite suspension of the constitution 
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means that the exception has effectively become the rule. The lawless future is 
the essence of the ruling regime’s system of government, which is based not on 
law but on presidential decrees. This rule by discretion exposes Eritreans not 
only to unending exploitation but also consigns them to a hopeless future. This 
threat was identified by the participants as the primary reason why people 
escape the country. Wolde, for example, noted: 
People live a miserable life, and, increasingly, they’re tending to 
refuse to drift towards the darkness of a violent future. Why would 
they continue to suffer in an indefinite national service? No way! They 
can’t stay in the country if they have other options… But there are 
also people who cannot escape because they can’t afford to do so. 
That’s why many people are stuck in national service. 
This extension of the exception into the future is explicitly manifested in the 
open-ended NS, arbitrary detention, and forced disappearance of thousands of 
Eritreans. Twenty-three of the thirty-six participants represented in Figure 10 
noted that forced conscription and open-ended NS were the primary reasons for 
their inability to continue living in Eritrea. 
Their suspension in carceral spaces is another cause that participants 
emphasised repeatedly. In focus group discussions conducted with participants in 
Egypt in January 2020, for example, the participants agreed that indefinite NS is 
the main reason that drives people out of Eritrea, followed by detention and 
torture, and the lack of basic civil rights, such as freedom of movement, speech, 
religion, and so on. The participants also cited unemployment as one of the 
reasons for their decisions to exit Eritrea. They discussed unemployment not in 
terms of a shortage of jobs but in terms of a lack of legal rights to a private 
working life outside the parameters of the state. Michael, for example, noted: 
‘The Constitution is suspended and there is no other legal protection. People are 
suffering, no protection, no law. We don’t have the right to private 
employment’. Nodding their heads in agreement with Michael, other participants 
responded with the following remarks: 
Mered: Just to add to that… the government does not want people to 
know more than they’re taught in the national service and 
sees their self-awareness as a threat to its existence and 
there is no protection against this… Nobody wants to suffer 
there forever. That is why I left. And that is why most of my 
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friends left… Ask any teenager in Cairo, they’ll tell you that 
they left Eritrea because they want a different future to that 
of their families and friends. 
Arma: There exists no other medium of instruction but the 
government’s media outlets. No proper education—ignorance is 
a political tool for the regime… My cousin was a cartoonist, and 
he is now in jail after expressing his views through his cartoons. 
How many journalists have perished in prison? Only God knows. 
Hager: I love Eritrea and am proud to be an Eritrean but not the 
Eritrea that it has become since the border war… The 
government turned everything good into bad… It turned 
Eritreans into the government’s domestic servants. 
Zara: I would prefer to use positive terms… Life goes on, even in 
Eritrea. We have families there and we should appreciate the 
fact that we have an independent state, and we should work 
together to free it from tyrants… We can bring back our 
constitution… We can build a justice system from scratch. 
The imposition of lawlessness as a rule means that ordinary citizens are stranded 
in a continuum of violence in which precarity and carcerality define the 
condition of life. The youth and educated members of society are particularly 
nervous about the hopeless future and are increasingly embarking on perilous 
journeys out of the country in search of a better future. Sunny, a psychologist 
and a former teacher and counsellor in Eritrea, is an outspoken critic of the 
government’s extra-judiciary use of power, to use his phrase, ‘to shatter’ the 
dreams of Eritrean youth. In an interview, I asked Sunny what he meant by 
‘shattered’ dreams, and he explained it as follows: 
It’s obvious. If you put people in an indefinite national service, they 
will leave; if families are stuck in economic hardship for generations, 
they or their children will leave; if youths are left with no 
opportunities, they will definitely leave; if you oppress the entire 
society with violence, then they will either resist or leave. You know 
this: those who try to resist vanish in underground prisons. There are 
no protections whatsoever. There are no rights whatsoever. There are 
no freedoms whatsoever. There is only never-ending violence. These 
are the obvious reasons why many Eritreans leave their home country. 
The notion of lawlessness is inextricably linked to rightlessness. In fact, there 
seems to exist a relationship of causality between the two concepts. The state 
of rightlessness in Eritrea starts at birth and ends with death. In the Transitional 
Civil Code of Eritrea, for example, unborn babies and new-born children under 
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the age of 48 hours are classified as ‘non-viable’ persons with no ‘rights and 
duties’ (Hagos, 2014, p. 45). This precondition of ‘viability’, Hagos (2014, p. 53) 
points out, ‘denies legal personality of a fetus and automatically strips out the 
rights and duties rendered to a person’. The same principle is applied to render 
new-born children under the age of 48 hours ‘non-viable’ persons. In other 
words, neither feticide nor infanticide would be considered a crime. This notion 
of ‘viability’ represents a precarious liminal zone, in which the right to life is 
outlawed between conception and early infancy. I return to this point in the last 
section. 
Ironically, the denial of the right to have rights never ends even after a new-
born child passes the precarious phase of “non-viability”. As argued in the 
previous chapters, the conditions for continued rightlessness beyond this initial 
phase are established by the absence of legal protections. Similar to Sunny, 
other participants described their perceptions of rightlessness in terms of a lack 
of fundamental freedoms, a lack of opportunities, the impossibility of speaking 
out against authority, and the perpetual exploitation of their human capacities 
and capabilities by their government. Remarks made by Arma, Mered, Hager, 
Wolde, and Zara all reveal this deep sense of lack and hopelessness while in 
their country. Their rights to work and live freely and their human capacities 
were all held hostage by the state before they decided to leave the country. 
Their stories reveal a people terrified by the indignant and exploitative ways in 
which they have been treated by their government. Wolde, for example, 
articulated the indignation and rightlessness he felt while he was in Eritrea as 
follows: 
My life and dignity in my country were questioned and it has always 
been about survival. There was a sense of lack which made me feel 
confused, uncertain, fearful, and not knowing who I was. I was 
lustreless, because how can I be a dignified human being without a 
purpose? And how can there be a purpose when you do not have 
rights? For the whole of my adult life in Eritrea, I felt humiliated and 
worthless… I also felt pain and a deep sense of anger that I did not 
have the right to express. I still have scars on my body and worries 
and fears in my mind. 
Moreover, some participants such as Amal, Musa, and Zainab exited Eritrea 
twice; first to escape the brutality of Ethiopian colonisation and subsequently to 
flee the repression that followed the border conflict with Ethiopia. Some of their 
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children had been born refugees in refugee camps and remain stranded in the 
camps. Their decisions to leave were born from the condition of persistent 
rightlessness and hopelessness that has continued for generations since colonial 
times. In Arendt’s terms, ‘a condition of complete rightlessness was created 
before the right to live was challenged’ (2017, p. 387). Once their lives are 
challenged, as Wolde pointed out, exiting their country becomes an unavoidable 
reality, available only to those who can afford it. 
Last, but not least, the data solicited from interviews and focus groups reveal 
that a sense of homelessness is another major causal factor influencing the 
participants’ decisions to exit Eritrea. Not feeling at home is a widely shared 
experience among Eritrean youngsters. As the NVivo map above shows, fifteen 
out of the thirty-six Eritrean participants in this study noted that prolonged 
separation from their families and homes had contributed to their forced 
displacement. Their subjective accounts demonstrate that one of the reasons 
why Eritrean youths feel homeless at home is that they were aware that they 
would spend much of their adult lives performing indefinite national service, or 
vanish in carceral spaces. Sunny, for example, explained the feeling of 
homelessness as follows: 
I can tell you that I spent more than 99% of my adult life, since I was 
17, either studying in college supervised by the military or in national 
service… I can count on my fingers the number of days I visited my 
family. And even on the days I visited my family, it’s like everybody 
was in national service with the exception of my mother… You don’t 
live at home unless you’re a retired elderly or severely ill person, and 
that is why you don’t have a feeling of home. It’s like you’re homeless 
for your entire adult life. 
Thus, as Belloni perceptively points out, ‘home’ has increasingly ‘become an 
alien and unfamiliar place’ for Eritrean youth (2018, p. 162). According to 
Belloni, young Eritreans tend to reimagine their “homes” elsewhere as they turn 
adults. Belloni (2018, p. 162) argues: 
As a result of government policies limiting individual, social and 
political freedom in the country as well as globalized desires for 
modernity, many young Eritreans increasingly perceive a sense of 
“estrangement” towards the place—physical and emotional—where 
they grew up. 
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Belloni’s argument regarding the fact that young Eritreans become increasingly 
unused to their homes is consistent with the subjective accounts of the 
participants in this research. However, her assertion that the would-be refugees’ 
‘aspirations to belong to the outside world [are] crucial… in order to understand 
the motivations and decision-making processes’ (Belloni, 2018, p. 163) overlooks 
the primary reasons why people feel homeless at home. Their decisions to exit 
the country are primarily because ‘the Eritrean state made policy choices that 
stifled economic growth and political stability and made the nation 
uninhabitable for its growing youthful population’ (Woldemikael, 2013, p. viii). 
The impossibility of making a home in their home country, as Sunny eloquently 
described, is because they are stripped of that fundamental right by the state-
sanctioned servitude, lawlessness, and rightlessness. Therefore, their 
involuntary displacement from the country should be attributed to a 
combination of the lawlessness, homelessness, and rightlessness that has 
characterised postliberation Eritrea. 
 Border crossing 
One common theme that emerged in the analysis of participant stories of border 
crossing is that different people experience borders and crossings differently. 
Participants noted that the border-crossing experience can range from crossing 
the border with little difficulty to not crossing the border at all. In a focus group 
discussion conducted with participants in Cairo in February 2020, for example: 
Some participants said they crossed the border without difficulties, 
others survived gunshots and severe detention. Four participants said 
they did not encounter any problem at the border, mainly because 
their smugglers were more experienced though expensive. The other 
two, [Mered] and [Teklay], decided to cross the border without 
assistance from smugglers because they could not afford to pay 
them… While crossing the border to Sudan, [Teklay] had his leg broken 
when shot by security guards and [Mered], having seen his friend fall 
to the ground, raised his hands up and stopped running away; both of 
them were arrested and detained, deprived of any medical attention. 
(Fieldnotes, February 2020) 
Likewise, the experiences of Salwa, Wolde, and Rozina represent the broad 
spectrum of border-crossing stories, as summarised below. 
Salwa 
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Salwa, 20, was born and brought up by her parents in the city of Afabet in 
Eritrea. She studied primary education in her hometown before deciding to leave 
Eritrea. Arranged by her brother, a Lieutenant Coronel in the army, Salwa’s 
border-crossing to Sudan was achieved with little difficulty. She told me that her 
brother had driven her all the way from her hometown to the border and then 
transferred her to his friends, who took her to safety in Kassala in Sudan. Salwa 
explained: 
I saw several checkpoints [on the way to the border], but they did not 
stop us… because my brother knew them. Then my brother sent me 
with his friends who took me to the border… They [her brother’s 
friends] work at the border. I think they stop people crossing the 
border… but also guide people to cross the border. I was lucky. 
After she crossed the border, Salwa was picked up by her uncle who had lived in 
Sudan for much of his life. Her uncle had a Sudanese passport and helped Salwa 
to get registered as a Sudanese. She subsequently used the Sudanese passport to 
flee to Cairo. 
Wolde 
Wolde, 31, left Eritrea for Sudan in March 2011. He and his three friends were 
able to avoid checkpoints and security checks and reach the border with Sudan 
clandestinely. Unfortunately, Wolde and his friends were intercepted by border 
security on their way to a border town in Sudan called Hafir. Wolde said that 
they managed to run away despite his childhood friend being shot in the leg: 
We saw them [the border security] very close to us, like, 50 metres 
from us. They ordered us to stop but we decided to run away. As soon 
as we began to run away, they opened fire on us, but we did not stop. 
In the first few minutes, they shot my friend in his leg and he fell to 
the ground. It was his left leg below his knee… but the guards did not 
see him. It was at night and it was very dark. It was a jungle. 
As Wolde went on to explain, the security guards did not manage to find any of 
them. They were able to camouflage themselves in the jungle and later on 
continued their journey to Hafir. They carried their friend with the wounded leg 
all the way to Hafir, where he was referred to the Shagarab refugee camp for 
treatment. 
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Rozina 
Rozina, 23, was born and grew up in the outskirts of Tessenei, a city in the 
western lowlands of Eritrea. Rozina’s father had been in the military for over 
two decades and she barely knew him. The last time she had seen him had been 
a few days before he was arrested at night by security agents for overstaying. 
After her father’s arrest, Rozina and her entire family decided to flee Eritrea. In 
an interview at the end of January 2020, I asked Rozina how they had managed 
to cross the border. Our conversation went as follows: 
[Rozina]: I want to start by correcting your question. We never 
crossed the border; we live at the border. 
Researcher: What do you mean by ‘we live at the border’? 
[Rozina]: Look, I am in prison now and, as you know, will be deported 
today in the evening. My parents and two siblings went 
missing in Sudan. My youngest brother is in Khartoum on his 
own… We have been living at borders and in detention 
centres for the past six years. I left Eritrea at the age of 16. 
After more than six years, I am now being deported back 
there. This feels like escaping hell and going back to it. 
Would you say I managed to cross the border? No, not at 
all... This is not just me; there are 42 other Eritreans being 
deported in the coming few weeks. 
In an attempt to escape the circumstances in their country, Eritrean men, 
women, and children traverse the border in large numbers, to neighbouring 
countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia. However, as the participants’ experiences 
above highlight, exiting the carceral state is exceptionally difficult, often posing 
life-threatening risks. This is mainly because the state has deployed vicious 
border controls at every point within its territorial reach. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, the ‘border spectacle’ (De Genova, 2013) in the militarised state of 
Eritrea features, among others, checkpoints, movement papers, surveillance, 
routine security checks, and strict cross-border patrolling at the physical border. 
The extensive border controls strictly and constantly regulate the mobility of 
Eritrean people, and include the deployment of cross-examinations at 
checkpoints, the forcible rounding-up of suspected deserters and draft evaders, 
and the violent arrest of those trying to flee the country. 
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Thus, exiting the country requires evading all of the violent traps and 
clandestinely crossing a highly militarised territorial limit. It requires resources, 
a clandestine network, and the physical ability to undertake long journeys with 
little food and scarce water. As the aforementioned examples reveal, the border 
can be relatively permeable and offer little difficulty for the privileged, but 
dangerously violent for the desperate irregular migrants. As Reisen et al. (2012, 
p. 29) explain: 
Given Eritrea’s shoot-to-kill policy at the border, payments are often 
necessary to make the crossing… [The] Eritrean Border Surveillance 
Unit is involved in the smuggling of migrants across the border; it 
organises transport and safe crossing and accepts payments for this. 
Paradoxically, inasmuch as the border is a violent and formidable fortress, it is 
also characterised by a cross-border trade in mobility. On the one hand, it 
exposes to the risk of death those attempting to traverse it, while, on the other, 
it facilitates the cross-border mobility of those who have access to resources and 
clandestine networks. 
The border, therefore, is enacted as a rogue power that both permits and 
prohibits cross-border mobility and/or the killing of mobile bodies. Everything 
and anything is possible at the border, from crossing safely to facing death. As 
Salter (2004a, 2008a) persuasively argues, the border appears to be the 
‘threshold’ in which the distinction between the law and the exception 
disappears. In fact, for the would-be refugees, I would argue that the border 
represents the threshold at which multiple states of exception collude. 
The metaphor of ‘living at the border’, as Rozina incisively articulated it, is the 
characteristic typification of the collusion of multiple states of exception at the 
border. Rozina’s deportation took a collaborative effort by the consular services 
of the state of Eritrea in Egypt, the Egyptian immigration authorities, and some 
elements of trafficking. These different actors enact multiple states of 
exception to “ban” the refugees from the realms of rights and political 
intelligibility. This ‘ban’, Agamben (1998b, p. 66) explains ‘is the force of 
simultaneous attraction and repulsion that ties together the two poles of the 
sovereign exception: bare life and power, homo sacer and the sovereign’. In the 
same way in which the ban maintains ties between bare life and sovereign 
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power, the border is enacted in the form of a continuous logic of violence within 
which multiple states of exception merge. Living at the border is a state of being 
at the point of intersection between these multiple states of exception. 
The border ensures the containment of refugees within multiple states of 
exception, which in turn generate three biopolitical mechanisms: first, the 
border fixes itself in the bodies of the unwanted mobile people in the form of 
“biometrics” and “e-borders” (Salter, 2004a, 2008a; Amoore, 2006); second, it 
identifies the othered categories of people with “rightlessness” and “illegality”; 
and, lastly, it places the “illegalised” others into necropolitical spaces where 
life and death are inseparable. While the first mechanism is the characteristic 
feature of borders in the so-called developed world, the latter two are 
commonly found in origin and transit countries such as Eritrea, Sudan, and 
Egypt. Rozina, the forty-two Eritreans detained with her, and thousands of other 
Eritrean refugees in transit countries all live at the border. In fact, those who 
have managed to reach Europe and other destination places live both at the 
border and with borders fixed inside their bodies. Their lives are relegated to a 
form of life tantamount to Agamben’s ‘bare life’ but with additional capacity for 
resistance—the untamed life. I will return to this point in the last section. 
 Life in transit countries 
The moment of crossing the border is a moment of surrender to a new 
biopolitical process in which the refugee is both illegalised and exceptionalised 
(Salter, 2004a, 2008a; De Genova, 2013). For Eritrean refugees, seeking asylum 
in first countries of asylum is a surrender to a new sovereign machinery whose 
primary goal is to shut the border for irregular crossing and intercept those 
“sneaking” to an imagined outside. Thus, for those who manage to cross the 
border, exiting Eritrea is not a solution but the beginning of a complex set of 
challenges in an even bigger carceral network. The data gathered from 
interviews and focus groups show that Eritrean refugees often had to choose 
between staying put in refugee camps, self-settling in big cities such as 
Khartoum and Addis Ababa without access to fundamental rights, or continuing 
risky journeys clandestinely in search of safety. Each of these decisions involves 
the risk of being kidnapped by human traffickers and/or intercepted by the 
border machinery of the transit states. They often risk death, imprisonment, and 
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mass deportation at the borders (Reisen, Estefanos and Rijken, 2014; Simpson, 
2014; Mudawi, 2019). 
8.4.1 Life in refugee camps 
Eritrean emigrants are among the first and largest groups of refugees in refugee 
camps in Ethiopia and eastern Sudan. The UNHCR Ethiopia Country Response 
Plan 2020-2021 (Ethiopia CRP) report shows that 139,281 Eritrean emigrants had 
been received in Ethiopia during 2019, and the caseload is estimated to be 
137,182 for 2020 (UNHCR, 2020a, p. 7). The report also shows that 70 per cent 
of the arrivals lived in the Tigray refugee camps and 44 percent were children, 
‘of whom 27 percent arrive[d] unaccompanied or separated from their families’ 
(UNHCR, 2020a, p. 9). Similarly, refugee camps in eastern Sudan host tens of 
thousands of Eritrean refugees every year (Andom, 2018; UNHCR, 2020b). The 
UNHCR Sudan Country Response Plan 2020-2021 (Sudan CRP) states: 
East Sudan hosts one of the most protracted refugee situations in the 
world, with the first influx of Eritrean refugees arriving over 50 years 
ago. Over 40 per cent of refugees in East Sudan have been in asylum 
for more than 20 years, and approximately 50 per cent of refugees 
living in the camps were born there. (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 39) 
The refugee camps in eastern Sudan that host many Eritreans include, among 
others, Kilo 26, Shagarab, Girba, and Um Gargour. The Shagarab camp alone 
hosts thousands of Eritrean refugees, earning it ‘the nickname little Eritrea’ 
(Smith, 2017, p. 11). 
The 2020-2021 Sudan and Ethiopia country response plans clearly show that life 
in the refugee camps remains extremely difficult for the vast majority of the 
stranded refugees. Refugees in these camps are deprived of basic needs such as 
food, shelter, clean water, health care, and protection. The Sudan CRP 
estimates that about ‘20 per cent of refugees are living with disabilities or 
chronic illnesses and are without access to secondary health services they need’ 
(UNHCR, 2020b, p. 41). Sunny, for example, described life in the Shagarab camp 
as follows: 
Shagarab is a terrible place to remember. It’s a place where people 
wait for hours to access a barely sufficient ration of food; where 
children suffer and even die from malnutrition, malaria, and many 
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other diseases; where unaccompanied children get kidnapped and 
disappear; where young girls are raped and forced into unwanted 
relationships with smugglers… where single mothers beg to feed their 
crying children. Nowadays, asylum seekers are waiting for over a year 
for registration with the UNHCR. It’s simply a hopeless place. 
The data elicited from interviews and focus group discussions confirms that the 
ordeals undergone by refugees in the Shagarab camp are common throughout 
the region’s refugee camps. As Sunny eloquently put it, the refugee camps in the 
region are characterised by abject destitution, bureaucratic asylum regimes, 
organised criminal activities, and repugnant exploitation. In fact, participants 
noted collusion in refugee smuggling and trafficking between multiple state and 
non-state actors, including UNHCR security guards. In camps such as 
the Shagarab camp in Sudan, the organisation’s staff go beyond their 
humanitarian responsibilities, and descend to human trafficking and blackmailing 
refugees. This cannot simply be a case of a few UNHCR security staff reversing 
their fundamental roles; it must also be a mechanism by which the humanitarian 
organisations become embroiled in realms of lawlessness, thereby establishing 
an inevitable nexus with the forces that dehumanise refugees. 
Therefore, in the camp, as Agamben (1997, pp. 75-76) articulates, ‘every 
distinction between proper and improper, between possible and impossible, 
radically disappears’. Agamben adds that refugees are reduced to naked form of 
life—'bare life’—which, he views as a depoliticised form of life that is ‘destined 
to die’ (1995a, p. 117). Although Agamben’s (1998b, p. 78) characterisation of 
the camp as a ‘pure space of exception’ might be true, his assertion that death 
is the ultimate destiny of the figure of refugees is outdated and out of context. 
Making no distinction between the concentration camps of the 1930s and the 
refugee camps in the Global South, Agamben seems to have become stuck in the 
past, as indicated by his imagining the camp as an ‘impassable biopolitical 
space’ (1998b, p. 72). The participants’ stories and experiences suggest that the 
refugee camps can be theorised as necropolitical spaces in which refugees are 
placed in a liminal register between life and death. In these spaces, refugees are 
neither allowed to thrive, but nor do they inevitably succumb to death; instead, 
they are stuck in between the two registers with the capacity to resist their 
precarious state of being. 
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8.4.2 “Self-settled” refugees 
The lack of basic needs and the entrenched insecurity that characterise the 
refugee camps force many refugees to continue their journeys to big cities in the 
neighbouring countries of asylum. Over half of the participants of this research 
reported that they had lived in one of the big cities in the neighbouring 
countries for one year or more. They highlighted Khartoum, Kassala, and Addis 
Ababa as the major destinations for refugees from both rural and urban areas of 
Eritrea (Kibreab, 1996; Andom, 2018). Historically, although these cities offer 
‘better access to services and jobs’ compared to the camps (Smith, 2017, p. 10), 
the ‘self-settled’ refugees face challenges such as a lack of protection, a lack of 
opportunities, and a lack of a foreseeable future (Kok, 1989). Sada, for example, 
described life in Khartoum as follows: 
It’s not a safe place to live in. There are police roundups almost every 
day. You have to pay up to 20,000 Sudanese pounds if you get 
arrested. If you cannot pay the money, then there is a possibility that 
they could deport you to Eritrea. You don’t have rights; you don’t 
have a life. 
The rightlessness of the refugees is manifested repeatedly in the violent arrests 
and exploitation of innocent refugees on the streets of Khartoum. For example, 
it was reported that ‘around 900 Eritreans’ were arrested on the streets of 
Khartoum and deported back to Eritrea on 24th May 2016 (Plaut, 2016a). For 
several years now, journalists, human rights activists, and members of the 
Eritrean diaspora have been campaigning against the exploitation and 
deportation of self-settled refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2016b; Plaut, 2016a; 
Siegfried, 2016). Despite these efforts, however, the incessant violence and 
exploitation directed against refugees continue to be the biggest challenges for 
self-resettled refugees in the neighbouring countries. 
In addition to the lack of safety, participants also reported an absence of 
opportunities and a foreseeable future as other fundamental problems they must 
endure. Over a dozen participants reported that they performed domestic work 
for little money, often under exploitative conditions. In a focus group discussion 
conducted in February 2020 with participants from Cairo, the participants 
explained that women are often subjected to domestic violence and sexual 
exploitation in their workplaces. The participants also specified that 
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unaccompanied children and teenage girls are the most vulnerable group when it 
comes to exploitation. Zara and Arma, both 20, stated that they had been 
sexually harassed several times on the streets of Khartoum. During the focus 
group discussion, Zara recounted: 
I worked for a Sudanese household as cleaner for several months… In 
my first week on the job, the son of the family locked me in his 
bedroom and tried to rape me. I screamed and his mother came to my 
rescue… A few months later, her husband came to me in my room at 
night. I would sleep in a small open room where I used to iron the 
family’s clothes… I screamed loudly and ran towards the gate. The 
man asked me to stop shouting and tried to catch me, but I opened 
the gate and ran away into the night… I have not returned to the 
house since. I have never received my salary for the five months. 
Likewise, the men have very little access to sustainable jobs in the transit 
countries. They often depend on remittances from relatives and/or friends in 
Europe and the Americas. Those with no relatives or friends abroad are forced to 
resort to smuggling as a means of survival. Edris is one of the many thousands of 
Eritreans who have migrated to Khartoum, where he lived for almost a decade. 
When I asked Edris how he had earned a living there, he replied: 
Initially, I worked in a restaurant owned by an Eritrean trafficker and 
earned a few Sudanese pounds for my food… I would sleep in the 
streets after work. It was not safe to stay on the streets, but it was 
not my choice either. I was lucky that I did not get kidnapped by the 
traffickers. 
Edris went on to tell me that after a few months of working in the restaurant, he 
began to help the trafficker smuggle people from Eritrea. Within a few years, 
Edris explained, he had become an independent smuggler: 
I paid some friends to find me people in Eritrea who would be willing 
to go to Sudan. I paid them 1000 Nakfa per person and they often 
found me at least ten people, so I went back to Eritrea and took them 
to Sudan immediately. I didn’t stay long there because I did not feel 
safe… In the following three years, I began to send my own smugglers 
to Eritrea. I grew it into a big business. 
Disadvantaged refugees like Edris are forced to engage in organised criminal 
activities. They are often recruited by notorious trafficking groups and by their 
collaborators within the security apparatuses of transit countries. 
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While the majority of the participants self-settled in the cities of neighbouring 
countries, those who had the resources and clandestine networks to do so 
engaged in perilous secondary movements within the region, which comprises 
the neighbouring countries and other countries in the wider region. Facilitated 
by organised smuggling networks, the refugees often crossed tightly controlled 
borders within a region extending from eastern Africa to northern Africa and the 
Middle East. The city of Cairo in Egypt is a major destination for Eritreans 
escaping unbearable lives in Sudan and Ethiopia. Thematic analysis of the data 
extracted from interviews and focus group discussions, however, demonstrates 
that the refugees’ lives were no better in destinations such as Cairo. After 
reaching Cairo, for instance, the refugees assumed the status of vulnerable 
people, as a legal appeal to the UNHCR for protection. Yet, despite extracting 
the refugee's vulnerability through its vetting mechanisms, the UNHCR hardly 
protects the refugees. 
Figure 11, amended from a staff induction workshop attended by a research 
participant, who, at the time of fieldwork, was working for a local charity, 
shows the UNHCR’s bureaucratisation of the process of granting refugee status in 
Cairo. 
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Figure 11: The UNHCR asylum process in Cairo, Egypt 
 
Upon arrival in Cairo, asylum seekers have to undergo a long process of 
registration and refugee status determination (RSD). The registration process 
involves waiting in a crowded queue for several hours in the scorching sun to 
pick up a long form (often written in English or Arabic), filling in the form to the 
satisfaction of the UNHCR’s registration requirements, and waiting for months 
for registration interview and biometrics. Participants described the registration 
process as ‘messy and corrupt’, with some suggesting the existence of a 
clandestine black market on which registration forms are bought and sold and 
people are paid for filling in the forms. Salwa, for example, stated that she had 
paid a refugee community member US$150 for the UNHCR registration form and 
for filling in the form. In focus group discussions conducted in Cairo, participants 
explained their concerns about the challenges faced by vulnerable asylum 
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If one is successfully registered with the UNHCR, s/he is issued with a yellow 
card or an asylum paper, depending on whether the claimant’s identity and age 
have been established. The majority of the registered asylum seekers, then, 
have to wait for one to several years for their RSD interviews, and another six 
months to several years for their RSD results. While the asylum seekers with 
positive RSD results are granted refugee status, the asylum seekers whose 
asylum claims are refused have to go through another long and tedious process 
of counselling and appeals, with the possibility of second rejections and file 
closures. The appeals process was described by the participants based in Cairo 
as a traumatising and extremely bureaucratic system. In fact, some participants 
suggested that asylum seekers who have exhausted their rights to appeal have 
no choice other than to resort to dangerous secondary movements in search of 
safety. 
As shown, each of the stages in the UNHCR asylum process takes from several 
months to several years, depending on the UNHCR’s capacity to assess cases, the 
individual circumstances of the claimants, and access to legal advocacy and 
psycho-social support. Participants stressed that obtaining legal and pyscho-
social support is crucial throughout the entire asylum-claiming process. For 
instance, participants noted that asylum seekers represented by local charities 
such as the StARS’ Refugee Legal Aid Project (RLAP) have a better chance not 
only of being granted shorter waiting times but also of being successful in their 
asylum claims. The participants, however, pointed out that only a small minority 
of asylum seekers gain access to legal advocacy and representation assistance. 
Speaking from his experience of working for a local charity, Sunny explained: 
The asylum process in Cairo is an all-round humiliation. You have to 
wait for several years to get your status determined. The UNHCR 
provides no support for refugees, besides a small amount of financial 
and medical assistance for extremely vulnerable groups of people such 
as unaccompanied children, single mothers, and so on. And local 
charities do not have the resources and capacity to support all 
refugees… Also, you cannot legally work in Egypt, although some 
people work on the black market. What can you do? Nothing really. 
People just sit and wait for remittances from abroad or risk their lives 
attempting to cross the sea to Europe. 
By exacerbating the refugees’ vulnerability in the process of granting 
declaratory refugee status, the UNHCR not only inflicts unprecedented trauma, 
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it also fails to provide basic protections (Yohannes, 2021). Ironically, the 
organisation maintains its links with the host state’s security machinery, thereby 
perpetuating the refugees’ precarious relationship with the violent sovereign, as 
Amal’s experience reveals. 
I am poor, disabled, and homeless. This is the only story I can tell you 
in my 16 years of life in Cairo... It all began in 2005 when many 
refugees were brutally dispersed by the security police. We sat in 
front of the UNHCR office in Jamaat El Dweli Street for months in 
protest against the organisation’s inability to provide us with basic 
protections, and then the Egyptian police used full force to disperse 
us. It was the most tragic scene I have been involved in in my 
lifetime… Some people managed to escape the police brutality, but I 
couldn’t because of my disability. I was beaten with plastic sticks and 
kicked by the police. I fell on the ground unconscious and suffered 
three broken ribs. 
The incident Amal referred to took place in December 2005, when ‘at least 28 
Sudanese were killed’ and about 650 were arrested and ‘taken to a number of 
military camps and prisons’ by Egyptian police (Mahmoud, 2007). Although 
human rights activists and journalists have called for accountability, neither the 
UNHCR nor the Egyptian police were held accountable (Mahmoud, 2007; Meffert 
et al., 2010). As Amal’s story highlights, the victims still experience ‘feelings of 
betrayal by the UNHCR’ (Meffert et al., 2010, p. 167). This, however, was not an 
isolated incident. In July 2019, an Eritrean human rights organisation—Africa 
Monitors—reported a similar case of police brutality against Eritrean refugees 
peacefully protesting in front of the Cairo UNHCR office (Africa Monitors, 2019). 
This time, a UNHCR protection officer allegedly called the police to remove the 
peacefully protesting refugees. Furthermore, participants in this research also 
recalled the deaths through self-immolation of two Oromo asylum seekers in 
front of the UNHCR Cairo office (Daily News Egypt, 2016). 
Thus, the self-settlement of refugees in transit countries such as Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and Egypt offers scant relief from abject destitution or protection from 
the violent carceral trap. The appeals made by the rightless refugees’ emissaries 
to the UNHCR for protection and ethics make no sense other than to 
acknowledge their essentialised vulnerability and the perpetuation of their 
untamed life status. The futile exercise of declaratory protection and 
humanitarian aid highlights the dilemma in the interplay between the UNHCR’s 
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rhetoric of “refugee protection” and sovereign states’ politics of exclusive 
othering. Smugglers and traffickers exploit the precarious status of the refugees 
to create an illicit business of refugee trafficking, as I will examine below. 
8.4.3 Smuggling and trafficking 
As shown, whether it is staying put in the camps or in transit countries, or 
moving on within the region, refugees risk being recruited by a chain of illicit 
“businesses” regulated by smugglers and human traffickers. The refugee camps 
in transit countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia are used by traffickers as suitable 
sites for recruiting victims (Mekonnen and Estefanos, 2011; Reisen, Estefanos 
and Rijken, 2012; Yohannes, 2021). Participants in this research particularly 
identified the Shagarab camp as a space where refugees are traded in a complex 
chain of refugee trafficking. Sada, for example, reflected evocatively on the 
insecurity in the camp, as follows: 
Shagarab is an open prison. For some people, the camp is a life 
sentence. For others, it is a market in human commodities… In 2010, I 
was abducted from the Shagarab camp by traffickers and, last year, 
my sister went through a similar experience. Thank God we are both 
alive. 
Sada alleged that security guards employed by the UNHCR Sudan were involved 
in his kidnapping. When I asked Sada how he was kidnapped, he explained: 
‘Some of the UNHCR security staff… exchange refugees for money. I was sold to 
Rashaida by a security guard called [Hassan, a pseudonym] … People make 
money by selling other people’. Over a dozen participants confirmed reports of 
collusion between traffickers and UNHCR security guards. Sergel, for example, 
stated that he had evidence that his cousin had been raped by a security guard 
in the Kilo 26 camp in Kassala before she was eventually taken to the Sinai, 
where she was tortured to death in 2014. 
Likewise, the interview accounts with victims of trafficking chronicled in Reisen 
et al. (2012, pp. 32–41) show that the Shagarab camp was used as a reservoir of 
‘human commodities’ by Sinai traffickers. Refugees have been transferred by 
smugglers to traffickers upon crossing the border, abducted during journeys, or 
kidnapped in transit towns (Reisen, Estefanos and Rijken, 2013, 2014; Simpson, 
2014; Fisseha, 2015). As Reisen et al. (2013, p. 25) point out: 
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Many of the refugees held hostage in the Sinai were kidnapped while 
in a refugee camp or on their way to a family reunion in Sudan or 
Ethiopia. A significant proportion of refugees were kidnapped from 
within refugee camps or surrounding areas, especially in Sudan (from 
Shagarab refugee camp) or while working in Kassala (Sudan). A smaller 
number of interviewees were taken on their way to Khartoum (Sudan), 
from within Khartoum or from Cairo. 
Once in the hands of traffickers, the victims are transformed into valuable 
commodities as part of the lucrative clandestine business of refugee trafficking. 
The trafficking of Eritrean refugees in the Sinai Peninsula is a typical example of 
the commodification of Eritrean refugees (Yohannes, 2021). The Sinai is a 
lawless buffer zone dominated by organised criminal groups. 
In the period between 2006 and 2014, ‘tens of thousands of Eritreans fleeing 
widespread human rights abuses and destitution in their country have ended up 
in the Peninsula’ (Simpson, 2014, p. 1). The victims were put through torture, 
involving electrocution, rape, burning with melted plastic and cigarette butts, 
hanging upside down on barbed metal, chopping body parts with knives, 
reported organ harvesting, and starvation (Reisen, Estefanos and Rijken, 2012; 
Fisseha, 2015; Yohannes, 2021). In short, the Sinai hostages were used as 
‘human incubators’ for organ harvesting (Fisseha, 2015, p. 7), sold to ‘higher 
bidder human traffickers’ (Bahlbi, 2016, p. 218), and extorted for ransoms 
(Yohannes, 2021). Some participants even indicated that pain had been inflicted 
on them for fun by sadistic traffickers. Sergel, a former survivor of Sinai 
trafficking, recalled what the victims’ disowned bodies could be forced to do to 
each other, as follows: 
They would tie our hands back and ask us to engage in dirty stuff such 
as sexual intercourse with each other while they watched and laughed 
at us, and if anyone refused, they would torture him or her severely. 
They would electrocute you or even cut off your fingers with their 
knives. That was how two of my best friends died. 
When I asked Sergel how his ‘best friends’ had died, fighting back his tears and 
in an ever-quieter voice, he described the incident as follows: 
Two traffickers asked my friend to have sex with his 16-year-old 
cousin in front of us... You cannot have sex with your cousin in our 
culture, you know. So, he refused to do the dirty stuff they asked him 
to do to his cousin. Then the traffickers chopped off two of his fingers 
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with a long knife while he was handcuffed and then asked him to do it 
again. Again, he said no. Then one of the traffickers turned to the girl 
and told her to remove her clothes and do the dirty stuff to her 
cousin. She said no. Then, the second trafficker went outside and 
came back with a heated knife; he hung the girl upside down on metal 
chains fitted to the wall and cut through the middle of her breast with 
the knife… It was the most painful thing I have ever seen. We all 
screamed and wanted to kill ourselves, but we were handcuffed... 
The traffickers chained our legs together after they realised some of 
us were trying to commit suicide. 
Two days later, Sergel added: ‘The cousins died from excess bleeding in front of 
us and the traffickers dumped their bodies in the sea’. Their deaths were not 
reported to their families and relatives until they had been tricked into paying a 
total ransom of US$20,000. Sergel was held hostage in the Sinai for about nine 
months, during which time he bore witness to the death of over a dozen victims, 
before being finally released after his family and relatives paid a ransom of 
US$25,000. 
The death of the two cousins is not an isolated incident; rather, it is the story of 
the thousands of Eritreans who perished in the Sinai. Citing CNN estimations of 
death tolls between 2007 and 2012, Reisen et al. (2012, p. 19) report that over 
4,000 refugees’ bodies were counted and many others disappeared without 
trace. Worse, many survivors were murdered with impunity by border security 
guards after they escaped or were released by the traffickers. As Reisen et al. 
(2012, p. 19), for example, point out, ‘Many refugees die after their release 
(after their ransom is paid), shot by border control on the Egyptian or Israeli 
side’. This shows that, whether it is at the hands of traffickers or state agents, 
the victims were treated as disposable corporealities, always available for 
maximum exploitation. 
Those who did manage to survive the trafficking and the violent borders 
continued to experience suffering from their traumatic experience. Sergel 
lamented: 
If you look at my back, you can see the dotted scars of melted plastic 
poured onto my body and the broken ribs crushed by a Kalashnikov 
butt. But there is something you cannot see. You know, my inner self 
is still numb… I still have nightmares. All of the survivors of the Sinai 
trafficking share this feeling. The trauma of watching our friends 
being tortured to death and our young sisters being raped by a group 
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of cruel traffickers in front of us infected our bodies like a snake 
venom. That experience will forever sleep deep inside our bodies. 
Towards the end of the interview, I asked Sergel what might be done to support 
people like him who had survived trafficking, and he replied: 
Do you think the world knows we exist? If so, justice and redress are 
the answers to your question. But I am not sure if our suffering will 
ever be met with justice... When it comes to the survivors of 
trafficking, the world has long forgotten that we exist. That’s what 
being refugee survivors of trafficking means to us. This is a burning 
anger that we all share. 
As Sergel noted, there seems to be no possibility of ever mending the survivors’ 
broken hearts or healing their wounded minds and injured bodies. Instead, new 
victims continue to be recruited to the trafficking chain, which has since spread 
throughout the region. Five years since the Sinai trafficking came to an end, the 
same treatment of Eritrean refugees is being repeated in Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, 
and other transit countries. In Libya, for example, refugees have to navigate 
through routes regulated by rogue powers, such as powerful militias, human 
traffickers, and border guards, before they get to the sea. And many thousands 
die in the hands of these rogue powers. Ariam, for example, described her own 
ordeal as follows: 
Smugglers took my friend at night and raped her. She was young, 
approximately 14 to 15 years old. Two smugglers raped her... One 
man screamed and tried to follow the smugglers who took the girl, but 
one of the smugglers shot him in the leg and dragged him back to us… 
After an hour or so, they brought the girl back to us dragging her as 
well. At first, she was crying and shouted, ‘Don’t go with them!’ They 
understood what she meant by that… They dug a small vertical hole 
and put her in the hole with her head down and then buried her in the 
dusty desert soil… They buried her alive. 
Ariam also witnessed the death of a pregnant woman, a memory, she said, that 
‘still haunts’ her. Leaving behind a five-year-old child, the pregnant woman died 
from injuries sustained in a car accident during their journey to the 
Mediterranean coast in Libya. Shedding tears of deep emotional pain, Ariam 
went on to say: 
Before she died […silence and crying], she asked me to promise her 
that I won’t leave her five-year-old son alone. She begged me to take 
Chapter 8 193 
 
him to Italy with me if I managed to survive… First, I cried and did not 
know what to say. I was only 16 myself, but I am a human being. How 
can I leave a five-year-old child on his own in the middle of a desert? I 
would rather die with him… So, I told his mother that I will take care 
of him for as long as I am alive… I remember her last words: ‘He’s 
your brother. He does not have a father. Bless you both’.… She then 
fell unconscious and died in front of us. 
Such stories are not new to many Eritrean refugees; instead, they epitomise the 
experiences faced by many refugees. At the time of writing this thesis, many 
Eritrean refugees were being held hostage in necropolitical bordering spaces, 
such as the torture camps and detention facilities in transit countries and the 
hotspots along the southern shores of Europe. These necropolitical spaces, as 
Isin and Rygiel (2007, p. 184) eloquently point out, are: 
spaces in which the intention is to treat people neither as subjects (of 
discipline) nor objects (of elimination) but as those without presence, 
without existence, as inexistent beings, not because they don’t exist, 
but because their existence is rendered invisible and inaudible 
through abject spaces. 
Once isolated indefinitely inside these spaces of abjection, the refugees are 
processed into a “subhuman” state of being that can only be understood through 
the prism of untamed life that is neither recognised in life nor buried in death. 
Isolated in a liminal zone between life and death, the refugees’ worlds become 
shrunk to their solitary confinements and their realms of personal experiences 
are consigned to suffering deep visceral pain. 
8.4.4 Detention and deportation 
As highlighted above, the detention and deportation of refugees, including 
victims of trafficking, is common throughout the region. According to the 
participants I spoke to during my fieldwork in Egypt, dozens of Eritreans are 
stranded in prisons in Aswan, Cairo, Alexandria, and other remote towns in 
Egypt. During the fieldwork in Egypt, I bore witness to the deportation of dozens 
of Eritrean refugees from prisons without due process. I visited some detainees 
and spoke to some of them before they were deported. The documentary 
evidence and excerpts from my fieldnotes below demonstrate the poignant 
realities of the detention and deportation of Eritrean refugees in Egypt. 
Chapter 8 194 
 
 
Figure 12: Tax receipt (left) and temporary passport (right) 
 
Excerpts from fieldwork, February 2020. 
For me [the researcher], some of the stories and practices of 
detention and deportation are familiar. In my previous work in Egypt, 
I witnessed many Eritrean refugees, including victims of the Sinai 
trafficking, being deported to Eritrea… None of this is unfamiliar to 
me but everything about the detentions and deportations seems to be 
against the basic protection rights of the victims. When I talked to one 
of the deportees [about] why she’s being deported, she replied, ‘It’s 
often the case when you’re arrested at the border but mine is 
unique… I was trafficked by people who are linked to both the 
Eritrean and Egyptian authorities and that’s why they decided to 
deport me in such a short time, tomorrow’… Often, the victims wait 
until their families gather enough money for their air fare (which was 
between US$300 and $500 at the time) and passenger travel document 
issuance fees ($30 to $50, depending on the individual staff members 
dealing with the issuance of the document, but often recorded as $30 
in official receipts) ... 
Another familiar but often not talked about thing I learned about 
refugee deportations from Egypt was the inability of the UNHCR to do 
anything but remain silent regarding the atrocities committed by 
traffickers and their powerful partners among the border security 
agents of the origin and transit countries involved… I talked to a 
homeless and disabled woman who was in her sixties and she told me 
that she has been dragged here and there by street gangs on the 
streets of Cairo for almost 16 years and the only thing the UNHCR has 
done is renew/replace her “blue card” when it expired or got lost. 
What’s the point of the UNHCR if its role is merely to administer the 
establishment of the refugees’ “fear of persecution” status, before 
discarding the refugees’ accounts in its archives? What does the 
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issuance of refugee status or “blue cards” do to help the bearers in 
countries like Egypt?... 
The “rogue powers”—the human traffickers and their collaborators—
seem to operate throughout state borders, and this is symptomatic of 
the fact that refugees are excepted from any form of protection. 
When it comes to the treatment of refugees, as one of my participants 
said, the most dangerous and powerful rogue powers are the ‘border 
security officers and military commanders’ of states. 
As argued above, the sovereign states not only securitise the untamed life status 
of the refugees stranded in necropolitical spaces but also engage in detention 
and deportation, on the one hand, and collude with traffickers, on the other. 
Isin and Rygiel correctly assert that the ‘detention centres function as ... a 
technology of segregation whereby subjects are constituted as strangers and 
outsiders rather than subjects with rights to have rights’ (2007, p. 195). In 
transit countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the ‘technology of 
segregation’ is entwined with an operative of the elimination or forced removal 
of those seeking refuge to their countries of origins. As Rozina correctly puts it, 
the entwined relationship between detention and deportation forms a continuum 
that begins in ‘hell’ and ends in ‘hell’. For Rozina, ‘hell’ was the carceral 
network in Eritrea where her poignant story began and, eventually, would end. 
Her story represents the stories of thousands of Eritrean refugees who were 
deported back to Eritrea from the transit countries. For the last two decades, 
the preoccupation of governments with the expulsion of refugees from the polity 
has nowhere become more visible than in these countries. 
 Concluding remarks 
Building on the central argument of Chapter 7, in which I suggested Eritrea is the 
epitome of a carceral state, this chapter has argued that the carceral system 
and the precarious life it creates are not confined to Eritrea; instead, they exist 
along a continuum that stretches from “womb” (birth) to “tomb” (death). As 
discussed, the concept of viability reduces the right to life of new-born children 
and the unborn to a matter to be decided on by their parents. In fact, the 
amended Penal Code published in 2015 clearly states that ‘unlawful’ abortion is 
punishable by imprisonment for a term of one to three years if committed by the 
pregnant woman (Article 282(1)) and three to five years if committed by a 
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different person (Article 282 (2)). However, as Hagos perceptively argues, ‘The 
criminalization of abortion appears to be for biological, socio-cultural and 
religious grounds’ (Hagos, 2014, p. 59). 
What is at stake in the application of the principle of viability is the very 
ontological state of being of the form of life in question. This means that, 
according to such a principle, any Eritrean life between conception and infancy 
would be regarded as a form of life whose very existence can only be imagined 
in a liminal zone of indiscernibility between the state of being (life) and the 
state of non-being (death) and yet possessing the capacity for political 
intelligibility. If we take Agamben’s formulation of the link between the 
sovereign and bare life in which he argues that ‘the sovereign body’ (the former) 
decides on the exception of ‘the sacred body’ (the latter) (Agamben, 1998, p. 
91), then that same precarious link is created by the notion of “viability” 
between the mother and the new-born infant. This form of life, which appears 
not to have been hitherto considered, at least in the context of Eritrea, 
constitutes the original feature of the untamed life. 
Ironically, Eritreans are not only born into rightlessness, but they are also 
compelled to live through modalities of lawlessness, rightlessness, and 
homelessness in their home country. As has been extensively discussed, the 
ruling regime froze the country’s constitution in time before its ratification and 
extended the rule of exception into an unlimited future. In the absence of law, 
the precarious link between the mother and the “non-viable” infant is 
established between the state and every citizen of the country. The moment at 
which a new-born child meets the conditions set by the principle of viability is 
when the unconditional threat of death rests solely at the whim of the state 
sovereignty. ‘The violence exercised in the state of exception,’ Agamben 
(1998b, p. 64) correctly points out, ‘clearly neither preserves nor simply posits 
law, but rather conserves it in suspending it and posits it in excepting itself from 
it’. However, what is preserved in this suspension in the case of Eritrea is not 
the law, but the rule of no-laws nor rights for there has never been law in the 
country. It is this rule of no-laws nor rights that posits rightlessness and sets the 
conditions for the institutionalised exploitation and systemic violence in the 
country. 
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The main characteristics of the protracted rule of no-laws nor rights in the 
carceral state include indefinite NS, arbitrary detention, and forced 
disappearance. The state deploys these violent and exploitative modalities, as 
revealed in the participants’ accounts, to produce disciplined and usable bodies 
and disintegrated families in its own image. The formation of the precarious 
individual and national identities, O’Kane and Redeker Hepner (2009, p. 55) 
point out: 
[are] often based on militaristic rituals, as more generally within the 
hegemonic Eritrean narrative the nation and the state appear as one. 
The material form of this oneness is the mass-conscripted national 
army. It is here where the synthesis between the citizen and the state 
is experienced concretely and any distinction between state and civil 
society disappears. 
As the citizen and the state collapse into a zone of indistinction, the former is 
confronted with uninterrupted violence and exploitation by the carceral state. 
The coordinates of the carceral network—the most visible sites where these 
modalities of biopolitical control, exploitation, and incarceration are exercised—
comprise, among others, dungeons, solitary cells, military camps, and 
checkpoints. It is in these carceral and necropolitical sites that the untamed life 
is produced, in much the same way as the “non-viable” new-born is conceived in 
the womb and born into rightlessness. From this viewpoint, the country has 
become a space where the untamed life belongs to the state. 
The relentless rightlessness, precarities, and carceralities make it nearly 
impossible to live a dignified life in the country. As the participants’ accounts 
forcefully demonstrate, fleeing the country has become a necessity for their 
continued biological existence. Leaving aside the capacity for political 
intelligibility, their untamed life status is tantamount to Agamben’s theorisation 
of the figure of homo sacer—'a human victim who may be killed but not 
sacrificed’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 83). Describing the life of homo sacer, Agamben 
(1998) persuasively writes: 
He has been excluded from the religious community and from all 
political life… What is more, his entire existence is reduced to a bare 
life stripped of every right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill 
him without committing homicide; he can save himself only in 
perpetual flight or a foreign land. And yet he is in a continuous 
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relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he 
is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death (p. 
183). 
For Eritreans, fleeing their country and entering into a foreign land constitutes a 
desperate attempt to break the inhuman bondage exercised by the omnipresent 
sovereign power. As much as their flight from their home country is a 
recognition of their status as suffering humanity, it is equally an appeal for a 
dignified life and a call for inclusion within political life. Yet, this call for a 
dignified life and political intelligibility continues to be debased even once they 
have left their country. Analysis of the participants’ subjective accounts 
demonstrates that it is at the time of their fleeing across the border that the 
indelible marks of othering—exclusion, illegality, carcerality, and deportability—
are imprinted on the bodies of the would-be refugees. 
‘The decision of exile,’ Salter (2008a, p. 370) affirms, ‘is irreducible—it is the 
decision that the sovereign owes that individual no hospitality, no protection, no 
law, only violence’. The border is where the multiple states of exception and 
axes of carcerality and precarity merge to evoke this violent stasis. The above-
reported accounts of different participants regarding their encounters at the 
border with border security agents, in which some of the border crossers were 
met with bullets while others were guided across safely, represent the poignant 
realities of the lives intercepted at the border. 
Once the would-be refugees cross the border (often after undergoing perilous 
journeys and the associated violence of bordering), they find themselves 
exploited and annihilated by organised criminal groups and the security 
apparatus of the transit states. In other words, they encounter new spatial 
arrangements designed not only to exploit and externalise them, but also to 
“destroy” their bodies or eliminate their physical presence. The refugees 
kidnapped by traffickers are forced to disown their bodies and, indeed, their 
entire human experience because they are now possessed and controlled by 
their traffickers, who are at liberty to do whatever they wish with this mass of 
bodies, as shown in the story of the Sinai trafficking. 
As discussed above, the Sinai is a necropolis of Eritrean refugees and torture 
camps and detention centres in Libya and the wider region have become 
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increasingly common. Sergel’s experience is shared by thousands of survivors of 
refugee trafficking in the region. Once taken hostage by traffickers, the victims 
are reduced to what Achille Mbembe calls ‘the slave condition’, which, as he 
describes it, ‘results from a triple loss: loss of a “home”, loss of rights over his 
or her body, and loss of political status’ (Mbembe, 2019, pp. 74–75). These 
refugees become homeless because they are deprived of their right to live in 
their homeland and denied the right to make a home elsewhere; they have lost 
control over their bodies because they are owned by the traffickers; and they 
lose “political status” because they are placed beyond political imagination, and 
yet are at the centre of politics. To use Mbembe’s (2019, p. 75) evocative 
description once again, the hostages are banished to a realm of ‘absolute 
domination, natal alienation, and social death (expulsion from humanity 
altogether)’. 
On an even more fundamental level, the refugees’ ontological states of being 
and non-being enter into a realm of indiscernibility and incommunicability in 
which the “walking dead” are inseparable from the vicarious existence of the 
physically dead. A slow and painful death might be the ultimate destiny of the 
trafficking victims (an event that occurs as an epiphenomenon of their entire 
experience), but until then, they continue to live through their vicarious 
existence until their ransom is paid or their organs are harvested. The ransom—
which, in the aforementioned example, is the value of the untamed life—is the 
liminal register at which the physically dead and the surviving victims intersect. 
News of the hostages’ deaths is sent to their families only if there is no longer 
any value to be extracted from withholding the information (e.g. after a ransom 
is paid or organs are harvested) or the traffickers have reached the point at 
which maximum exploitation has been achieved. The affirmation of their deaths 
marks the total collapse of their physical and vicarious existence—the 
annihilation of the untamed life. This point of intersection at which the “living 
dead” and the “dead living” enter into a realm of indiscernibility is the 
threshold at which the politics of life (biopolitics) meets the politics of death 
(necropolitics). 
Those who manage to avoid death are stuck in survival mode in the 
necropolitical and carceral spaces where maximum biopolitical exploitation is 
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the ultimate destiny. They are banished to a spatial and temporal continuum in 
which the exception is deployed as the norm for the ‘indefinite future’ (Butler, 
2006, p. 64). The deployment of the exception as a rule and the annihilation of 
the outlawed are primarily epitomised in the coordinates of the carceral 
network, which features, among others, borders, refugee camps, detention 
centres, and torture camps. These spaces—the coordinates of the carceral 
network—are where the exception is applied to ensure the complete domination, 
surrender, and annihilation of the untamed life. Taken hostage in a violent 
spectacle regulated by state and non-state actors, the refugees’ instincts, 
capacities, and potentialities are negated indefinitely. Muted and stranded, the 
refugees are, therefore, confined to apparent indignity and inhumanity, bereft 
of protection from the law. 
As shown so far, neither the sovereign states nor the futile efforts of 
humanitarian organisations can rescue these excluded lives. Instead, multiple 
examples and axes of carcerality and technologies of removal are drawn 
between the coordinates of the carceral network to exceptionalise them. While 
the transit states relentlessly camouflage their indifference towards refugees for 
political reasons (Mekonnen and Estefanos, 2011; Fisseha, 2015), the 
‘humanitarian organizations—which today are more and more supported by 
international commissions—can only grasp human life in the figure of bare or 
sacred life’ (Agamben, 1998b, p. 133). In fact, the banality of sovereign states’ 
indifference towards refugees not only outlaws the presence in the polity of 
those seeking refuge, but also dictates the limits of humanitarian interventions 
and the resources apportioned to them (Betts, Loescher, and Dawson Books, 
2011). As Agamben (2000, p. 113) rightly contends: ‘Sovereignty, therefore, is 
the guardian who prevents the undecidable threshold between violence and 
right, nature and language, from coming to light’. 
In the end, what remains of the capacity for the biopolitical exploitation and 
physical annihilation of the rightless refugees is tested by what the participants 
referred to as the treacherous ‘black hole’: the Mediterranean Sea. Survivors 
have to risk their lives in densely packed fragile boats to cross to the imagined 
safety in view. In the next chapter, I begin by examining these packed boats 
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carrying rightless bodies as floating necropolitical spaces over a treacherous 
‘black hole’. 
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Chapter 9 Being a Refugee 
 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the encounters between outlawed refugees trying to 
reach the imagined safe-haven in view, on the one hand, and “Fortress Europe” 
(Van Avermaet, 2009), with its border architecture and asylum regimes, on the 
other. In analysing these encounters, the chapter also sheds light on the 
exploitation of refugees in the clandestine business of refugee trafficking and 
the ethics and practices of humanitarianism. Building on the previous chapters, I 
argue that state and non-state actors are part of the same spectacle built on 
power structures designed to outlaw the “humanity” of the figure of the forced 
migrant. The chapter is divided into four sections, as outlined below. 
The first section examines how rightless refugees, during their perilous journey, 
are not only trapped in violent and exploitative practices deployed by state and 
non-state actors, but also continue to vanish in the treacherous waters of the 
Mediterranean Sea and in the carceral spectacles on either side of the sea. I 
conceptualise the packed boats carrying rightless bodies—which, I think, can 
best be described as floating necropolitical spaces—as symptomatic of a systemic 
problem of so-called “migration management” (Mainwaring, 2019). 
In the second section, I discuss the bureaucratic process of asylum in transit 
states, and argue that the primary function of such systems is to create a 
“disposable subject”, while, at the same time, presenting an imminent threat 
that needs immediate attention and swift action. Drawing from participants’ 
subjective accounts, my analysis focuses on the Dublin Regulation, whose hidden 
matrix relies heavily on a system of negation and elimination that defines asylum 
seekers and refugees in terms of what they are not, rather than what they are. 
Here, I seek to unpack the implacable hostility against migrants in general and 
against refugees in particular. 
In the third section, I discuss the asylum system in the UK as an example of a 
preferred destination country. I also look into “refugee integration”—a concept 
that functions as a rhetorical device, a political camouflage, and, to some 
degree, an assimilative process that renders invisible refugees’ positive socio-
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economic contributions in the host society and their capacity for political 
existence. Finally, I revisit the main findings of the chapter to make concluding 
remarks. 
 The ‘mammoth black hole separating Africa from 
Europe’ 
As shown in the previous chapters, once they have left their country, Eritrean 
refugees continue to be stranded in a carceral continuum in transit countries 
such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, and Egypt. If they survive the barbed traps and 
entangled spaces of the carceral spectacle deployed in transit countries, the 
refugees have to undertake dangerous maritime journeys to reach mainland 
Europe. Despite the risk of drowning, desperate forced migrants never stop 
attempting to sail across the sea as they feel they have no other choice. 
Speaking from his experience, Wulud eloquently described the impossible 
decisions refugees have to make before they embark on the maritime journey as 
follows: 
Looking at things from the perspectives of the refugees in Libya, 
everybody knows that there is a mammoth black hole separating 
Africa from Europe. People know how dangerous a challenge it is to 
attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea on packed fragile boats… I 
knew I could disappear without trace in the deep waters, but what 
else do you expect me to do if I am stuck in a burning hell? I would 
rather be swept away by tides than suffer in a detention centre in 
Libya or be burned to death by traffickers. 
Wulud went on to make a distinction between death in detention centres or 
torture camps and death in the sea. For him and for many other Eritrean 
refugees, the hope of surviving a journey in densely packed boats is far greater 
than the (im)possibility of living a dignified life in the transit countries. Deprived 
of legal routes to safety, the refugees often make such choices because they 
have no other hope. The participants in this research stressed that the act of 
waiting becomes a form of “stuckness” when there is nothing to wait for. This 
stuckness involves living in the brutal conditions inflicted up on them by state 
and non-state actors, such as border regimes and human traffickers. Thus, the 
temporal and spatial stuckness in carceral spaces has become the prime reason 
for refugees’ embarking on risky crossings of the Mediterranean Sea. 
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However, it is worth emphasising that not all refugees have the capacity, or the 
resources required to be able to choose between the two options: stuckness and 
moving on. Data corroborated by interviews and focus group discussions show 
that Eritrean refugees are more likely to embark on such journeys only if they 
have the resources and social networks to do so. In Chapter 8, I highlighted the 
story of a disabled woman, Amal, who had been living on the streets of Cairo for 
about two decades with no end in sight to her ordeal. In an interview with her, 
Amal told me that she relied for food on the generosity of some of her friends 
who had travelled to third countries, such as Canada and Australia, through 
sponsorship schemes. Shedding tears by the end of the interview, Amal 
lamented: 
I feel I am cursed. I was born poor and then paralysed, unable to walk 
properly. Nor do I have relatives who can help me resettle anywhere 
in a safe place… That’s why I live on these dirty streets of Cairo. 
When I turned to the UNHCR, they did nothing to help me but give me 
a blue card… I wish I was not disabled and had the money to make the 
journey to Europe by boat. I feel hopeless... Life has been unforgiving 
but, yes, Alhamdulillah! 
Amal added: ‘If you’re a refugee like me, there is no transition to the next step 
or to a better future. There is nothing to be waiting for but death—God’s will’. 
Regarding a similar theme, Ariam recalled that two of her friends had been stuck 
in Libya for years because they did not have anyone to help them pay for their 
journey. Ariam later learned that one of the friends had been shot dead by 
Libyan coast guards and the other deported to Sudan, where he had been 
detained. Amal, Ariam’s former friends, and many other refugees in similar 
situations to theirs endure a form of naked life in which life itself is constantly 
and imminently at stake. 
The irony, however, is that engaging in perilous journeys is equally unforgiving 
even for those who have the resources to embark on them. They have to 
navigate through routes regulated by rogue powers, such as powerful militias, 
human traffickers, and border guards, before they get to the sea. And many 
thousands die in the hands of these rogue powers. As shown in Chapter 8, these 
who have borne witness to the horrors of trafficking report that the obscenities 
and violence they have been subjected to are more banal and crueller in lifeless 
deserts, notorious torture camps, detention facilities, and at borders. These are 
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the spaces where the unprotected refugees are not only subjected to visceral 
pain, but also where they are effectively annihilated. Their reality, as Amal 
rightly pointed out, continues to be unconditional exposure to death. 
Mayhem in the Mediterranean Sea is the next calamity the refugees face. 
Survivors who manage to reach the western shores of the Mediterranean Sea risk 
their lives on a dangerous maritime journey in pursuit of a glimmer of hope—
'freedom in view’, as one participant put it. They fight a survival battle against 
the tides of the Mediterranean Sea and the maritime borders of “Fortress 
Europe”, whose primary agenda is to contain the refugees outside the EU’s 
territorial limits (Andersson, 2014; Smith, 2017; Ambrosini, 2018; Mainwaring, 
2019). To cross the sea, the refugees have to rely on smugglers and traffickers, 
who sail them via irregular means in densely packed, fragile and inflatable 
boats. Wulud, for example, described his experience as follows: 
On Friday, 31 July 2015, the traffickers took us to the coast, where 
we spent the day in a beautiful villa listening to Arabic music. The 
villa was owned by a wealthy trafficker, who, I think, was also a 
military commander… We were told that no one would come to that 
place and no one would attempt to kidnap us because the trafficker 
was a well-respected military commander. We felt secure in that 
place; it was an ideal contrast to what we have been through… A 
week later, again on Friday, they put us on a boat with another group. 
There were about 400 of us on one small ship. The traffickers sailed us 
for about 10 hours and then left us in the middle of the sea. Luckily, 
we were rescued by a rescue ship that later brought us to Italy. 
Reflecting on his experience, Wulud described the moment the traffickers 
abandoned them in the middle of the sea as the ‘darkest moment’ in his life. He 
said: ‘Being abandoned in the middle of the sea on an overcrowded inflatable 
ship felt like the end of the world’. Although the apocalyptic image of drowning 
at sea continued to haunt him, Wulud felt a ‘deep sense of relief’ once he had 
safely arrived at the Italian coast. Yet, he also recalled the death of over a 
dozen of his childhood friends and former colleagues, some of whom, he said, 
have disappeared without trace. Indeed, as Laczko et al. (2019, p. 11) report, ‘It 
remains a largely unmonitored sea crossing where boats may disappear without 
trace’. 
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Once the refugees are in the middle of the sea, floating on inflatable boats, they 
only have the stars to use for direction, and when the sun shines bright, they 
surrender to the natural forces of the sea to guide them. The other possibility 
for the refugees is to prepare to die at any moment. Wulud recalled: ‘You pray 
for the high tides not to come your way, and if they come, you are defenceless; 
the tides can turn the boat upside-down’. Abandoned in the middle of the sea, 
laden with rightless bodies, the fragile and overcrowded boats can be best 
understood as floating necropolitical spaces in which life and death are rendered 
inseparable. As Butler (2006) would say, the migrants’ deaths are regarded 
neither as a loss nor as something grievable, but rather as disposable matter. 
According to the IOM’s Missing Migrants Project, over 20,000 migrants, including 
1,600 children, have died or gone missing in the Mediterranean Sea since 2014 
(Laczko, Black and Singleton, 2019, p. 41; IOM, 2020). Although it is difficult to 
obtain accurate figures on the number of deaths by nationality, Eritreans make 
up a significant proportion of fatalities in the Mediterranean Sea. The island of 
Lampedusa, where about 400 people, mainly Eritreans, sank in a matter of 
minutes on 3 October 2013, is the emblem of the unprecedented loss of Eritrean 
lives in the Mediterranean Sea (Ambrosini, 2018, p. 104). The story of a young 
Eritrean woman, Yohanna, who drowned off the coast of Lampedusa with her 
new-born baby still attached to her by its umbilical cord, still shocks many 
Eritrean refugees in the diaspora. While Yohanna’s death epitomises the 
unconditional threat of death that refugees are constantly exposed to, her new-
born baby was born to death. Michael Adonay’s memorialised artwork titled, I 
was not born to be a refugee, portrays Yohanna’s story. 
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Figure 13: I was not born to be a refugee by artist Michael Adonay. 
  
As the wrecking of migrant-carrying boats is repeated every summer, Eritrean 
refugees continue to perish at sea and their relatives in Eritrea and in the 
diaspora suffer the anguish of the season of obituaries. In Eritrea, families who 
had hoped to hear news of their relatives reaching a safe place instead lament in 
disbelief on receiving the bodies of their loved ones covered with white sheets. 
Eritrean refugees such as Zainab, whose son was killed by human traffickers, 
articulated that they ‘leave their country rightless and return to it lifeless’. 
During the sailing seasons across the Mediterranean Sea, neighbours move from 
one house to another to visit a mourning family. Every time a death knell rings in 
neighbourhoods, all mothers succumb to grief, thinking that it might signal their 
son’s or daughter’s obituary. In the diaspora, after investing their possessions to 
help their loved ones survive, the victims’ families, relatives, and friends are 
constantly being consumed by grief. It seems that refugees’ ‘lives are not 
deemed to be worth living even by the angels and saints, who seem to have 
stopped listening to our prayers,’ said Ariam, who had witnessed her friend 
being buried alive. 
In “Fortress Europe”, on the other hand, the annihilation of undesirable migrants 
is concatenated with the protection of the citizen, and, hence, with national 
security. Stoking discourses of “crisis”, “fear”, and “invasion”, populist 
governments back the deployment of exclusionary tactics such as the repulsive 
containment, abandonment, and systematic elimination of irregular migrants 
(Ambrosini, 2018; Mainwaring, 2019). In fact, the EU continues to expand and 
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equip its border machinery with modern surveillance technologies to detect, 
intercept, and push back incoming refugees. These new technologies of border 
control feature, among others, ‘aero-naval assets with the dual aim of 
protecting borders and national interests and rescuing lives in danger’ 
(Ambrosini, 2018, p. 105). In short, the border has become, at the same time, 
both smarter (Salter, 2004a) and more ‘violent’ (Jones, 2019). 
The innovative designing of border architecture places border security above the 
human security of migrants. The new border technology has allowed states not 
only to detect the irregular mobility of incoming migrants, but also to trace and 
eliminate them before they reach mainland Europe. It has become common for 
migrant-carrying boats to be blocked from crossing the Mediterranean Sea, and 
those found within close range of Europe’s southern coastline are deported back 
to Libya, where the refugees are kept incommunicado (Human Rights Watch, 
2009; Ambrosini, 2018). According to a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) press 
release, ‘Almost 8,000 refugees and migrants [were] intercepted at sea and 
forced back to Libya’ between the months of January and September 2020 (MSF, 
2020). Several southern European countries, such as Italy and Greece, are 
implicated in violations of international legal frameworks and human rights 
norms. A Human Rights Watch report from 2009, for example, points out that 
‘Italy violates the international legal principle of nonrefoulement when it 
interdicts boats on the high seas and pushes them back to Libya with no 
screening whatsoever’ (2009, pp. 7–10). 
In addition to preventing boats carrying migrants from safely landing on the 
shores of Europe, a general reluctance to rescue abandoned forced migrants in 
dangerous waters has become widespread over the last few years. Spijkerboer 
(2017, p. 26), for example, correctly points out that: 
States act as if they have no responsibility to prevent risks to life of 
irregularised travellers because they die outside their territory and 
rely on non-state actors such as smugglers… Because these travellers 
do not comply, states feel they do not have to protect the right to life 
of the people concerned beyond search and rescue—an obligation 
which is only triggered when the risk to life already has materialised. 
Paradoxically, not only do the states deprive irregular migrants of sovereign 
protection, they also make it illegal for non-state actors to attempt rescue or 
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provide humanitarian assistance. For example, southern European states such as 
Italy and Greece have enacted restrictive and punitive laws that prohibit private 
rescue operations. In its ‘briefing notes’ of August 6, 2019, the UNHCR pointed 
out that: 
Under changes approved by [the Italian] Parliament, fines for private 
vessels that undertake rescue of persons and do not respect the ban 
on entry into territorial waters have risen to a maximum of €1 million. 
In addition, vessels will now be automatically impounded. 
At the same time that local charities and private rescue operations are being 
banned from rescuing any sinking migrant-carrying boats, emergency service 
provisions to assist survivors have been suspended. Even worse, international 
and non-governmental organisations that engage in rescue operations are 
subjected to accusations of alleged collusion with traffickers and ‘mafia’ groups 
(Ambrosini, 2018, pp. 114–115). For instance, the non-governmental 
humanitarian organisations Cap Anamur and MSF have been accused by the 
Italian government of aiding and abetting the crossing of irregular migrants, a 
charge that the organisations vehemently deny (Cusumano, 2018). In its 
September 2020 press release, for example, MSF strongly criticised the EU’s 
approach to irregular migration as follows: 
Across the Mediterranean, from preventing rescues at sea to purposely 
holding people in Moria refugee camp, the EU’s current approach to 
migration is to systematically trap, push back and abandon people; 
whether that is leaving them to die at sea or trapping thousands of 
men, women and children in appalling conditions in camps on the 
Greek islands. (MSF, 2020) 
Threatened by the judicial powers of sovereign countries, therefore, private 
rescue ships, NGOs, and humanitarian organisations are increasingly subjected to 
restrictive and punitive laws designed not only to contain refugees and irregular 
migrants but also to securitise their naked status. Linking it to Agamben’s notion 
of the camp, Edler (2020) contends that the Mediterranean Sea has become ‘a 
camp that regulates who lives and who dies, which ‘bare life’ is inscribed into 
the population of the European Union and which is excluded’ (p. 23). According 
to Edler (2020), ‘the power to decide on who lives and who dies’ rests in 
Europe’s hands (p. 21). These necropolitical spectacles are nowhere better 
exemplified than in the capsized necropolitical spaces carrying rightless bodies. 
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 Asylum in transit countries in Europe 
In spite of all the setbacks and struggles to survive, many Eritrean refugees 
continue to reach mainland Europe. Brekke and Brochmann (2015, p. 4) point 
out that: 
Eritrean refugees follow two main routes to Europe: most use the 
central Mediterranean route, through Sudan, Libya and by boat to 
Lampedusa, Sicily or Malta; others follow the land route through 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Israel or Jordan to Turkey and Greece. Some 
asylum seekers have enough resources to fly directly into one of the 
major cities in Europe. 
Of these main routes, the land one is almost impenetrable for many Eritrean 
refugees due to the highly sophisticated borders and violent state interventions. 
Among other reasons, Israel’s construction of a fence in 2012 and the increased 
Egyptian government intervention in the Sinai Peninsula has confined the 
refugees’ mobility to within the deadly central Mediterranean route (see van 
Reisen et al., 2017). Despite strict immigration rules, a “lucky” few also come to 
Europe through legal routes, such as via family reunion visas and resettlement 
schemes, like the UK Gateway Protection Programme (Darling, 2009; Platts-
Fowler and Robinson, 2011). 
As the refugees cross the Mediterranean and reach the shores of mainland 
Europe, the ‘smart border’ (Salter, 2004a) system tracks them from their 
starting points to their arrival points and separates them from the “inside” by 
means of localised bordering regimes (Ambrosini, 2018, pp. 121–123). The would-
be refugees are subjected to the Dublin Regulation, which was ‘formulated to 
ensure that only one country shall be responsible for processing an asylum 
seeker’s application’ (Brekke and Brochmann, 2015, p. 3). The Dublin Regulation 
is a system designed to contain irregular migrants within the first countries of 
asylum at any cost. At the policy level, the regulation poses two main problems: 
it ‘lays a disproportionate burden on the countries on Europe’s southern border 
(e.g., Italy and Greece); and differences in reception conditions, processing 
ability, and access to social rights prompt regime competition’ (2015, p. 3). 
Upon arrival, intercepted refugees are taken to inadequately resourced and 
highly bureaucratised reception centres. As Wulud recounted: 
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I was caught by police in Italy, and they took me to one of the 
[reception] centres in Milan. You know, the centres are like police 
stations where you are subjected to excessive control and have no 
access to basic needs. They don’t provide you with adequate basic 
services such as food, clothing, shelter, and health services. I had 
injuries from the journey but could not even get painkillers in the 
centres… I did not know how to seek asylum and how long the asylum 
process takes. It’s like you’re in the middle of nowhere with so little 
information. Also, the officials there don’t treat you well. I remember 
one officer asking me if I was a smuggler or a trafficker. 
The bureaucratisation of asylum processes, the poor living standards provided 
for people seeking asylum, and the lack of any foreseeable future in the first 
countries of asylum all mean that the would-be refugees have little choice but 
to continue their journeys to their preferred destinations. Like other refugees, 
Eritrean refugees often move on to other parts of Europe. Research participants 
identified, among others, the growing backlash against migrants, family links, 
social networks, and a lack of opportunities as some of the reasons why Eritrean 
refugees undertake protracted journeys within Europe. The excerpts below are 
from a focus group discussion conducted with participants in the UK in 
September 2019: 
Andit: After we were rescued from the sea, we met very hostile local 
groups holding protest banners like “Refugees Go Home”, 
“Refugees Not Welcome”, “Stop Illegal Migration”, and so 
forth. It was so scary. I genuinely thought the protesters would 
be violent to us had we not moved to a different city 
immediately. 
Saba: Andit is right. We have two tainted qualities: black skin and 
refugee status. No refugee can escape these… 
Desale: I agree. I would also add relatives. I mean, all of us here have 
parents living in Eritrea, so it is important to go to a place 
where you have relatives who can help you adapt to the new 
life. 
Hayat: Don’t forget about family reunion, [Desale]. I mean, like 
people travel to places where they think they have the best 
chance to reunite with their loved ones who are refugees in 
other places… My friend waited ten months in Calais to come 
to the UK because he heard that it is easier to bring his wife 
from Sudan. 
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However, the poor reception and asylum conditions in first asylum countries are 
not the main challenges the participants identified. Many of the interviewees 
and focus group participants cited what they called “fish”—a term used by the 
participants to describe the EURODAC system of registering fingerprints—as the 
main limiting factor. Identified by the participants as the main deterrent for 
moving on, fish is the first thing to avoid for the refugees. For them, avoiding 
fish means that they can continue their journeys to other European countries. 
Based on their fieldwork with Eritreans in Italy and Norway, Brekke and 
Brochmann (2015, p. 10) report: 
A common mantra heard during our interviews was ‘anywhere but 
Italy’. This was mirrored in the stories of people trying to avoid having 
their fingerprints taken and their envy of those who had actually 
managed to avoid registration in EURODAC and travel through Italy to 
other destinations.  
The irony however is that their right to seek asylum in countries other than their 
first country of entry is outlawed by the Dublin Regulation. If identified by the 
‘biometric borders’ fixed in their bodies (Amoore, 2006), asylum seekers whose 
fingerprints are taken in southern European countries are barred from seeking 
asylum in the rest of Europe. In such cases, all of Europe but for the first country 
of entry is rendered a state of exception. Thus, those who travel outside their 
first country of entry are often associated with deception, illegality, and 
criminality. Yonas, for example, recalled: 
I crossed the sea and reached Italy in the summer of 2002. My sister 
lived in the UK, so I continued to the UK to join her. Upon arrival, I 
sought asylum in the UK, but my asylum claim was immediately 
rejected because I had fish [(my fingerprints taken)] in Italy… 
Eventually, I was arrested by immigration officers and deported to 
Italy after a year in hiding with my sister in the UK… I could not find a 
job in Italy for almost a year, so I decided to go to Switzerland. 
Yonas said that he had changed his name and date of birth to avoid deportation 
by the Swiss immigration authorities. Luckily, Yonas added: ‘my fingerprints 
were not identified by the Swiss immigration officials and I got my papers’. 
Other participants went further by burning off their fingertips to avoid 
identification in their new asylum countries. Zenawi recalled: 
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I had my fingerprints taken in Italy but managed to get residence 
papers here [in Sweden]. The authorities did not identify my 
fingerprints because I had slightly burnt my fingertips and rubbed 
them off against a rough surface. I was lucky enough to avoid 
deportation to Italy where I could have been stuck in limbo… I have 
my small business here and earn enough to help myself and my family. 
Zenawi added that burning fingers was a common “strategy” used by many 
refugees seeking to avoid identification and the resulting deportation legitimised 
by the Dublin Regulation (Grant and Domokos, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 
2016a; IRIN, 2017). Desperate asylum seekers have to destroy parts of their 
bodies to remove the biometric borders drawn through their bodies. In its 2016 
report, Human Rights Watch described the Dublin Regulation as an ‘inefficient 
and inhuman’ system that is founded on ‘forcibly transferring asylum seekers 
back to those countries of first arrival, without achieving a fair distribution of 
responsibility across the Union’ (Human Rights Watch, 2016a). However, neither 
refugees’ bodies nor their human dignity seem to matter. In fact, their bodies 
and humanity have become sites for the deployment of sophisticated border 
technologies. 
Furthermore, many asylum seekers and refugees remain stranded in refugee 
camps and in ephemeral spaces at transit borders within Europe as ‘they try to 
negotiate inflexible and insufficient levels of EU protection’ (Davies, Isakjee and 
Dhesi, 2017, p. 1264). The Moria refugee camp in Greece, which was burnt to 
ashes in September 2020, and the Calais “Jungle”, located at the French border 
with the UK, are just two examples of the constitutively excluded spaces in 
which many refugees are abandoned. Like other refugee camps, these spaces are 
utilised to contain, immobilise, and illegalise forced migrants, as well as subject 
them to hopeless destitution. I come back to this point for further analysis in the 
concluding remarks of this chapter. 
Therefore, in far-flung and unfamiliar places, Eritrean asylum seekers in Europe 
are subjected to institutionalised bordering, ‘impoverishment’, and ‘slow 
violence’ (Mayblin, 2020). They remain suspended in space and time throughout 
the continent. Upon entry to Europe, some asylum seekers become ‘stuck in 
transit’ (Brekke and Brochmann, 2015), while others move on only to face 
immigration detention, forced removal, and/or vetting bureaucracy in their 
preferred destinations. Both in transit and in their preferred destinations, such 
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as the UK, as I will discuss below, the imagined “freedom in view” turns out to 
be a bureaucratic experiment in othering those seeking refuge. In fact, the 
refugees are defined by what they are not, rather than by what they are. They 
become subjects of a narrative formulated by negation and exception. And their 
capacities and potentialities are disavowed in favour of false narratives of 
“invasion”, “crisis”, and being “unwanted”. They are cast as deviant and 
dangerous aliens who cannot be admitted, far less welcomed. 
 Seeking asylum in the UK 
Asylum seekers who manage to avoid biometric registration and have the right to 
seek asylum in countries such as the UK find themselves trapped within a 
complex vetting bureaucracy of asylum regimes. In the UK, for example, asylum 
seekers have to navigate a “hostile environment” that is deliberately designed 
by the Home Office to discourage irregular immigration. As Webber rightly points 
out, ‘the explicit intention’ of the hostile environment is ‘to weaponise total 
destitution and rightlessness, so as to force migrants without the right to be in 
the country to deport themselves, at low or no cost to the UK’ (2019, p. 77). The 
deliberate design of the hostile environment features immigration detention, 
unlawful refusal of asylum claims, forced removals, forced evictions, and abject 
destitution. 
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Figure 14: UK Asylum system prepared by Right to Remain in March 2018 
 
The UK asylum system’s complex vetting system provides limited rights of 
protection for asylum seekers. To be granted the right to remain in the UK, 
asylum seekers have to go through a long and highly bureaucratic asylum 
process. Upon arrival, asylum seekers claim asylum at ports of entry or by 
booking an appointment for screening with the asylum intake unit in Croydon. 
They are then interviewed by an immigration officer in an encounter commonly 
referred to as a screening interview. In this interview, immigration officers 
gather information from asylum seekers, documents, and other sources, which is 
used to establish or refuse asylum claims. Some participants recounted being 
asked background questions, such as about their names, relationships, journeys, 
and reasons for leaving their country of origin. Others said they were not 
believed by the immigration officers. Andit, for example, recalled: 
You know, the screening interview was the worst of all for me. You 
don’t know anything about it on arrival. I was challenged by an officer 
who did not believe my age. I told him I am 17 but he did not believe 
me. The officer told me to bring ID documents to prove my age and 
identity. You know, in Eritrea you don’t get passports and stuff. I tried 
to explain why I did not have ID documents, but the officer still did 
not believe me. He told me that I have to go through age assessment 
for my claim to be considered… This whole process took me about 
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eight months and by the time I had my second interview, I’d turned 
18. You know, they just want you to tell them that you’re an adult 
regardless of your age. I still cannot say why. 
Andit’s experience appeared to be very common among young asylum seekers. 
When I put the question of age assessment to Andom, who had worked with 
asylum seekers and refugees in the UK for about six years, he replied: 
I know of over a dozen unaccompanied children who remain stuck in 
age assessment procedures. This is an endemic problem, to say the 
least. For the Home Office not to believe children’s ages and refer 
them to social workers and local authorities to decide on the age of 
unaccompanied children is deeply problematic. The use of physical 
features and demeanour to ascribe ages to vulnerable children is 
incomprehensible. The margin of error that an age assessor can make 
regarding a child’s age is simply immeasurable. It is symptomatic of 
the Home Office’s discriminatory policies against some asylum 
seekers. 
In May 2019, in a case involving a young Eritrean child, the Court of Appeal ruled 
that the age assessment policy at the time was ‘positively unlawful’, and 
suggested that ‘any policy must seek so far as possible to avoid the Secretary of 
State acting unlawfully’ (EWCA Civ 872, 2019, Paragraph 57). Vice-President of the 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Lord Justice Underhill added: 
In my view this defect in the policy/guidance gave rise to a real risk of 
children being (unlawfully) detained. That conclusion would in my 
view be justified even without evidence of specific cases where that 
had occurred: in the absence of guidance as to the width of the 
margin of error there is inevitably a real risk that immigration officers 
will place too much trust in their own assessment that a particular 
young person is “significantly” over 18 (EWCA Civ 872, 2019, 
Paragraph 68). 
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision, the Home Office has amended its age 
assessment guidance. This guidance was further amended ‘to take in to account 
legislative and procedural changes arising from […] the UK’s exit from the European 
Union on 31 January 2020’ (Home Office, 2020, p. 5). The legal and practical 
implications of the new guidance are yet to be seen. 
In the focus group discussions conducted in the UK, participants expressed 
particularly strong dissatisfaction about the linking of age assessment to the 
maturity and conduct of child asylum seekers. They stressed that the children 
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whose ages are being assessed have been through extremely difficult and 
traumatic experiences that have shaped them as persons. The participants’ 
accounts indicate that child asylum seekers are exposed to ‘childhood 
adultification’, which is to say that they are ‘prematurely, and often 
inappropriately, exposed to adult knowledge and assume extensive adult roles 
and responsibilities’ (Burton, 2007, p. 329). As pointed out by the participants, 
the children have to deal alone with complex situations such as smuggling during 
their journeys, during which their unforgiving circumstances force them to make 
life and death decisions. 
As Burton argues, therefore, ‘adultified children’s behaviors do not necessarily 
conform to normative expectations of “appropriate” behaviors for children of 
similar ages’ (2007, p. 343). On the one hand, child asylum seekers may become 
more mature than their ages suggest, while, on the other, they may become 
extremely vulnerable due to their circumstances. In both scenarios, however, 
asylum claims that involve age disputes may be adversely affected by the 
circumstances of the child asylum seekers. Thus, the focus on children’s 
maturity and demeanour when assessing their ages not only widens the margin of 
error, but also overlooks the children’s precarious experiences and their socio-
cultural backgrounds. 
Adult claimants face their own challenges in the screening interviews. They are 
expected to establish their backgrounds, identities, family relationships, and 
journeys. The participants also explained that they were required, on a regular 
basis, to affirm their compliance and disclose their immigration and criminal 
histories in order for them to be deemed admissible and safe. In ‘The 
architecture of asylum in Britain’, Canning (2020b, p. 266) argues that the 
system ‘relies heavily on compliance, including opening up interpersonal 
experiences to scrutiny in the main (or substantive) interview, and weekly or 
monthly signings at the Home Office’. Moreover, asylum seekers face 
immigration detention and forced removal if they have passed through another 
country that is deemed safe by the UK government. 
After the screening interview, asylum seekers go through a substantive interview 
in which they are required to establish well-founded fear of persecution as 
defined by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugee (see Art. 
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1(A)(2)). In other words, the asylum seekers have to perform victimhood and 
establish fear of persecution. Claims of persecution are established through 
detailed questioning and cross-examinations mediated by legal representatives 
and interpreters in a cross-cultural and multi-lingual environment. Despite being 
assisted by legal representatives and interpreters, research participants 
highlighted that their vulnerability, lack of knowledge of the asylum system, 
cultural issues, and linguistic barriers adversely affect the process of establishing 
persecution or fear of it. As Harnet explained: 
If you are too vulnerable, like a single mother, a victim of trafficking, 
a child or even a shy person, it is difficult to perform as required in 
the second interview [substantive interview]. I have been an asylum 
seeker for 13 years and am still an asylum seeker. I still feel nervous 
in front of the interviewers and I cannot speak my mind. Also, I start 
to cry if they ask me about how my mother died in the UK or even 
about my life in general. I often go into interviews crying and come 
out of them crying… Some interpreters do not help you; they’re not 
able to communicate all that I tell them. Everything is bad. 
In addition to experiencing vulnerability and language barriers, participants 
noted that many asylum seekers do not disclose information that might be 
relevant to their asylum claims. One issue that was brought to my attention in 
the focus groups was that women and young girls in particular are less likely to 
disclose culturally sensitive experiences such as rape. In a face-to-face interview 
with her, Hayat, for example, revealed: 
Researcher: You said, you did hide some information from the Home 
Office caseworker and, if you don’t mind, what was it 
and why did you do so? 
Hayat:    I trust you won’t say anything about this, but I was raped by 
a group of traffickers in Sudan. One of the rapists is a man 
from my husband’s hometown… My friend and I were also 
raped twice by Syrian refugees in Calais before we came to 
the UK. It’s sad and it breaks my heart even now, but neither 
of us wanted to speak of these parts of our stories. With 
young girls like us, it is often the case that we don’t tell 
them everything that has happened to us. And many things 
happen to us. 
Researcher: I am sorry these terrible things happened to you […]. Was 
there any reason you did not want to tell the caseworkers 
about them? 
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Hayat:    At the time, my boyfriend was in Sudan and I did not want 
him to know about this. And my friend was too scared to 
speak about it in front of her Eritrean interpreter. 
Researcher: How can your boyfriend know about your experience? 
Hayat:    Like, if I apply for family reunion, my boyfriend will have to 
answer questions about me for his application. To be honest 
with you, I copied all the Home Office documents and sent 
them to him so that he can prepare for his [entry clearance] 
interview. If he learns about the rape, I fear he would either 
divorce me or even fight with the person [from his 
hometown] who raped me. So, I better stay quiet about it. 
Accounts such as Hayat’s demonstrate that in order to survive and remain 
members of their communities, survivors deny and conceal their suffering. The 
prevalence of maltreatment and misunderstandings ‘frustrate clear 
communication and understanding’, which prevents asylum seekers from 
establishing coherent and consistent testimonies (Byrne, 2007, p. 624). In an 
asylum system wherein assessment of claims relies heavily on credibility issues, 
these structural problems relating to the eliciting and interpreting of details 
about asylum claims have an adverse impact on the outcome. 
After the substantive interview, Home Office caseworkers make asylum 
determinations based on assessments of the testimonies established through 
subsequent interviews with the asylum seekers and country of origin information 
(COI). In reaching their decisions, the caseworkers focus on any (in)consistent or 
(im)plausible elements within the testimonies. The claimants’ testimonies are 
then subjected to international refugee law, humanitarian clauses, and regional 
or national legislations before status is granted. In this process, Home Office 
caseworkers make first instance decisions, which can take the form of a refusal 
of the claim, the granting of leave to remain, or the concession of humanitarian 
protection. 
Failure to establish persecution, or fear thereof, results in asylum seekers losing 
their asylum claims and therefore being denied the limited rights offered under 
national and supra-national conventions. Asylum seekers whose claims are 
refused by the Home Office can appeal against the decision in First-tier 
Tribunals. Appeal hearings are arranged in the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal 
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by the refused asylum seekers supported by their legal representatives. These 
hearings are often attended by the asylum seekers, their representative, Home 
Office presenting officers, clerks, an interpreter, and immigration judges. They 
are often open to the public. The judges control the legal proceedings in the 
asylum court. The burden of proof is on the asylum seekers, who must justify or 
clarify the grounds on which the Home Office based its negative decisions. 
However, although asylum seekers have a right to appeal against negative 
asylum decisions, the exhaustion of their appeal rights would effectively put 
them outside of any legal protection. In such an event, the presence of those 
seeking refuge is illegalised, and they are stripped of their rights as human 
beings. If they are not deemed suitable for forced removal, the illegalised 
asylum seekers can make fresh claims. 
 
Figure 15: Fresh claims process prepared by Right to Remain in March 2018 
 
As illustrated by Figure 15, asylum seekers whose appeal rights have been 
exhausted continue to be trapped in an unending cycle of legal liminality. These 
illegalised asylum seekers then start the traumatising and dehumanising process 
of claiming asylum again, and they do so with the added burden of having to 
bring forward new evidence. The evidence of persecution they provided for their 
first instance interviews has either not been believed or deemed not worthy of 
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protection. Harnet, for example, came to the UK as a child with her mother at 
the end of 2003. Two years later, Harnet’s mother died of a chronic illness when 
they were still inside the asylum process. Since the death of her mother, Harnet 
has been in the UK without recognised status. She eloquently articulated: 
I have been an asylum seeker for almost 16 years. I became a lonely 
child after my mother died of an illness. My mother’s claim was 
withdrawn, and I had to apply for asylum. When I did so, I was 
rejected. I then made several fresh claims and provided new 
evidence, but, again, I was rejected every time I did so. No one seems 
to believe my story. For 16 years, I have been without any residence 
papers. I have no status, no home, no life. I have lived most of my life 
in G4S accommodations and, at times, I camp on the streets without 
shelter or food to eat. 
After shedding tears silently, Harnet added: 
To me, being a refused asylum seeker is like being in a grave. My 
grandma used to say, ‘The soul is for God and the body is for the 
land’. In a grave your body decays until it’s rotten to debris. But if 
you’re a destitute asylum seeker like me, both your body and soul 
decay simultaneously until you become lustreless… You know, the 
asylum system fears neither God nor land; it’s evil. Nobody cares 
about you. 
Harnet has been in the asylum system since the end of 2003. The constant 
uncertainty means that she has suffered from depression, anxiety, and a sense 
of utter hopelessness. Yet, Harnet’s story is not an exception. She listed over 
half a dozen of her friends who were in a similar situation to hers. Harnet said 
that they had been ‘moved between G4S asylum housing and emergency 
accommodations’ for years without adequate support. G4S is a private security 
company contracted by the UK government to provide accommodation for 
people seeking asylum. Emergency accommodation consists of temporary 
shelters provided by local authorities and housing associations for homeless 
people. Neither the G4S accommodations nor the temporary shelters are 
adequately serviced. 
According to the government’s asylum policy, asylum seekers have to rely on 
their asylum allowance (£37.75 per week per person) to meet basic needs such 
as food and clothing. The allowance is even less (£35.59 per week per person) 
for refused asylum seekers, who are offered temporary accommodations. Asylum 
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seekers shunted between different accommodations and asylum regimes, and 
reduced to abject destitution, with little or no provision. As such, operating at 
the fringes of the law, the ‘state-corporate’ alliance inflicts ‘further harm’ and 
‘coercive control’ on asylum seekers (Canning, 2020b, p. 272). While the body of 
a destitute asylum seeker is being deprived of the basic necessities for life, his 
or her ‘soul is an anxious and depressed one, one that suffers every day while 
waiting’ (Topak, 2020, p. 1863). 
9.4.1 “Integration”—the ‘untranslatable term’ 
While the refused asylum seekers are left disenfranchised and impoverished, 
those who do manage to navigate the asylum regime and are granted legal status 
have to undergo a further ambiguous process, often referred to as “integration”. 
In focus group discussions and in semi-structured interviews with participants, 
“integration” was discussed as an elusive term, both as a concept and a 
practice. One of the themes that emerged in the discussions was the lack of an 
equivalent term for “integration” in Eritrean languages, such as Tigrigna, Tigre, 
and Blin. In my attempts to investigate the term “integration” and the meanings 
the participants attach to it, over a dozen multilingual participants said that 
they could not translate it to their mother languages. Zenawi, a former 
journalist in Eritrea who had reported extensively in the Tigrigna and Tigre 
languages explained the difficulties he encountered finding equivalent words for 
some English terms as follows: 
For me, words such as “integration” don’t make sense in Eritrea. You 
know, there are a lot of Italian and English words in Tigrigna and in 
other local Eritrean languages. This is mainly because some words and 
concepts were introduced to the local languages during the colonial 
period. It is hard to find equivalent translations for concepts that are 
new to the culture and way of life of the people… Terms such as 
“integration” can only find sanctuary in the languages of the 
colonisers. This was one of the challenges we used to grapple with in 
my previous journalism work. 
Similarly, Aman—a native Tigrigna speaker and author of several books and 
articles written in Tigrigna—described integration as a ‘practical but 
untranslatable term’. As a fluent speaker of Blin, Tigrigna, and Tigre myself, I 
am unable to think of a word that is equivalent to, and or even a close 
approximation of, the meaning of “integration” in those languages. 
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My intention here is not to engage in linguistic and semantic analysis of the word 
“integration” but to understand the meanings that participants attach to it. In 
general terms, the participants understood integration as a continuum of 
encounters, engagements, and adaptations in a new life in the host society. In 
focus group discussions, as illustrated in the diagram below, participants created 
a list of adaptation and engagement activities, which they called ‘steps to 
integration’. 
 
Figure 16: ‘Steps to Integration' 
 
The different layers in the above figure illustrate the various stages and levels 
(i.e., seeking asylum, the granting of a residence permit, settled status, and, 
possibly, citizenship) involved in the participants’ legal standing in the UK. The 
relating of these ‘steps to integration’ to the different levels of their status 
demonstrates that integration is intricately linked to the legal status of the 
immigrant population. This link is attributed to the fact that ‘most rights 
conferred upon refugees and immigrants remain predicated on their immigration 
status and subsequently on citizenship, should they become naturalized’ 
(Lomba, 2010, p. 419). As shown in the diagram, for example, asylum seekers 
are deprived of basic rights, such as employment, education, and access to 
welfare. Their enforced unemployability and lack of access to welfare not only 
exposes asylum seekers to abject destitution but also hampers their capacity to 
“integrate”. Lomba (2010) observes: 
Chapter 9 224 
 
[…] the balance of rights and restrictions that characterizes the status 
of asylum seeker engages two principles relating to the concept of 
integration. First, it engages the multidimensional nature of 
integration. Indeed, asylum seekers are excluded from key domains of 
integration, such as employment, and their access to others, such as 
education, is limited. Secondly, it conflicts with the principle that 
integration starts upon arrival. (p. 424) 
From this perspective, integration is a selective process that is heavily 
dependent on the legal status of the immigrant population. This renders it 
impossible to translate into practice the rhetoric of “integration starts upon 
arrival”. For the participants, therefore, integration is not only untranslatable 
into any language they can understand, but is also seldom translated into 
practice. As such, it can be argued that integration exists only through its 
practical absence and rhetorical dominance. From the perspective of prisoner 
re-integration, McNeill (2019) observes ‘that social integration has become well-
nigh impossible in these conditions, but sustain a rehabilitative fiction or 
imaginary in and through their professional or occupational discourses and 
practices’ (p. 144). It is this fictitious imaginary that has been applied in the 
context of so-called “refugee integration”. 
Those who have acquired a legal status that authorises them to live in the UK 
are not exempt from the challenges posed by the deliberate conflation of 
integration with legal status. Within the “hostile environment” framework, 
immigration discourse, law, and practice are deployed as instruments of 
biopolitical exclusion and control. They can be deployed to create deportability, 
docility, and destitution even when the right to remain in the UK is granted. The 
goal of creating a hostile environment is apparently to use power to degrade, 
disqualify, disempower, discourage, and expel undesirable migrants. Examining 
the ‘harm’ inflicted by the UK asylum system, Canning (2020, p. 272) affirms: 
While at the surface it embodies the ideals of welfare by providing 
financial support and housing, at the micro-level, it erodes human 
autonomy, infantilizes adults, and enforces dependency. Complicity is 
the foundations of a relationship built on unequal power, and non-
adherence to (often unclear) instructions or expectations bears 
punitive results from an increasingly authoritarian set of actors, state 
as well as corporate. 
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Participant accounts show that the hostile nature of the country’s immigration 
laws and policies is experienced at every stage of adapting to life in the UK. For 
example, immigration law related to family reunion and its application by entry 
clearance officers were highlighted by participants as being particularly hostile 
and discriminatory. Andom, for example, articulated: 
It took my wife and I three years to convince the Home Office entry 
clearance officers that we are in fact a married couple. My 
application for family reunion was twice rejected simply because the 
entry clearance officer was not satisfied that we were married. In 
fact, the second rejection was partly because my wife forgot to 
include her bank statements in the application package… It was a 
nightmare. 
Andom added that he was lucky that he and his wife had been able to meet the 
high-income threshold set for family reunion by the immigration regulations. 
Under the family reunion rules introduced in 2012, the ‘minimum income 
requirement rose from the previous threshold of £5,500 per annum to a new 
minimum level of £18,600 per annum’ (Sirriyeh, 2015, p. 6). Given their 
enforced unemployability during the asylum stage and the unlikelihood of finding 
a job that meets the high-income threshold, these regulations deprive many 
refugees of their right to family life. For example, two focus group participants 
stated that they knew of friends who had divorced their spouses because they 
could not meet the financial requirements for family reunion. Such income-
based discriminatory practice demonstrates a ‘hierarchical ordering of acceptable 
and less acceptable family formations which explicitly links rights to family life with 
levels of income, creating those who are seen as more or less “deserving” of such 
rights’ (Sirriyeh, 2015, p. 19). 
Moreover, family visa applicants are expected to establish their identities and 
relationships with their sponsors. Obviously, refugees do not always have the 
right documentation (e.g., identity cards, passports, and marriage certificates) 
to prove their identities and relationships. Establishing identity and relationship 
is especially difficult for Eritrean refugees due to the lack of passport and other 
document provisions in their country of origin, as well as the nature of their 
journeys. As part of my fieldwork, I attended several family reunion appeal 
hearings that involved establishing identities and relationships at immigration 
tribunals in the county of Yorkshire and in the city of Glasgow. The excerpts 
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below provide a glimpse of how identity and family relationship disputes can 
lead to a complex spectacle of legal obscurities. 
I am inside a courtroom at the Eagle Building waiting for an appeal 
hearing session about a family reunion case about to start… I spoke to 
the appellant’s husband in the reception area, who explained to me 
that the Home Office refused his wife’ application for entry clearance 
to the UK. The husband showed me the refusal letter, which stated 
that the application was refused because the applicant did not 
provide ‘enough’ evidence to prove her identity and relationship with 
the sponsor… 
The hearing session started at 10:11 am... It began with the judge 
asking the interpreter to establish the language with the appellant’s 
sponsor, at which point the interpreter struggled to communicate with 
the appellant’s sponsor... The judge, respondent, and appellant’s 
representative spoke back and forth for about fifteen minutes before 
agreeing to adjourn the hearing, despite the appellant submitting new 
evidence, including two witness statements and dozens of wedding 
photos... The judge told the appellant that the case is adjourned, 
pending further evidence. And the court session ended at 10:36 am. 
I found the whole hearing session bizarre. The sponsor was neither 
involved in the decision to adjourn the appeal, nor did he understand 
how it was agreed. He was constitutively absent throughout the 
hearing session and then left confused and bewildered after the 
hearing session. (Fieldwork notes, November 2019) 
Appellants with no passports or identity cards are expected to submit a range of 
other documents, such as witness statements, private messages, wedding 
photos, remittances, and so on. They must expose everything, including their 
private and public lives, in their attempts to earn the right to family life. 
Therefore, “integration” remains inextricably linked to immigrants’ legal 
statuses and socio-economic backgrounds. Lomba (2010) asserts that ‘legal 
status purports to reflect one’s position vis-a-vis the nation state’ (p. 420), 
adding: 
How remote [one’s relationship with the nation state is], however, 
depends on the status ascribed to the immigrant or refugee. While 
precarious immigration statuses presume loose ties with the state of 
residence, more secure immigration statuses assume a closer bond. 
Accordingly, the host state assumes that non-nationals with secure 
immigration statuses are well integrated. (Lomba, 2010, p. 420)  
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The participants’ accounts also demonstrate that “integration” is conceptually 
misleading and practicably inapplicable; it remains a rhetorical device for 
ordering and bordering othered categories of people. Countering this empty 
rhetoric of integration requires imagining a restorative form of integration that 
begins with restoring the rights and dignity of the subjects in question. Only an 
‘Other’ whose right to legal protection and capacity to give and receive 
language, culture, and knowledge are restored can meaningfully be integrated 
with the host society. As a concept, therefore, restorative integration insists on 
horizontal intersubjective interaction and vertical biopolitical recognition. Put 
differently, restorative integration insists on establishing a multilateral and 
multinational relationship between incoming and host societies and on mending 
the broken link between the state and the refugee. 
 Concluding remarks 
Throughout the chapter, I have shown that carcerality and precarity are 
inextricably linked with the (im)mobility of the forced migrants. I put forward 
notions of carcerality and precarity that are neither confined in space nor 
bounded in time, but, rather, diffused in both space and time. This spatial and 
temporal unlimitedness of carcerality and precarity sheds light on at least three 
overlooked arguments concerning the plight of refugees. First, it reveals the 
futility of the unconvincingly constructed normative neoliberal argument that 
associates mobility with “freedom” and immobility with “unfreedom”. When it 
comes to refugees, techniques of incarceration and necropolitics are enacted 
across the different stages of the refugees’ experiences of (im)mobilities. Forced 
migrants are subjected to regimes of containment, incarceration, bordering, and 
biopolitical ordering wherever they stay or move. In the detention camps 
regulated by states and in the torture camps run by human traffickers, indefinite 
detention and torture are orchestrated with impunity against the forced 
migrants. As shown, every year, many thousands of irregular migrants die or 
disappear without trace in necropolitical spaces such as torture camps, refugee 
camps, and treacherous waters—the floating camps. 
These necropolitical and biopolitical actions and inactions of enforced 
immobilisation in spaces of exception and their associated necropolitics—politics 
of death—represent what Mbembe (2003b, p. 35) calls the ‘morbid spectacle of 
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severing’: the politics of everyday death. Every year, the apocalyptic imagery of 
migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea is recycled to instil fear of 
clandestine mobility and facilitate state-sanctioned activities. Yet, little 
attention is given to the total annihilation of the forced migrants in those 
treacherous waters. In fact, the human security of the forced migrants is 
paradoxically subordinated to border security. 
Likewise, throughout their journeys through transit countries to imagined safety, 
those forced migrants who manage to survive the perilous ordeal are met with 
stringent borders, arbitrary detention, containment, and pushbacks (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018; Loschi, Raineri and Strazzari, 
2018; Mainwaring, 2019). Fortress Europe, for example, deploys sophisticated 
border zones and ephemeral camps to subject these migrants to institutionalised 
regimes of control. Hotspots along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, 
reception centres, and refugee camps, such as the Moria camp in Greece and the 
Calais camp, are designed to isolate and identify the unwelcome outsiders that 
have sneaked inside and registered their presence in the polity. These constantly 
expanding physical spaces embody ‘suffering’ as a ‘political technology’ to 
inflict a ‘permanent wounding’ of the forced migrants’ bodies (Davies, Isakjee 
and Dhesi, 2017, p. 1268). For example, apparently distressed by the realisation 
of his bestialised and rightless existence in the reception centres, Zenawi 
lamented as follows: 
If they [the immigration authorities] put me in a reception centre and 
keep me hungry and cold, what do I become? I appreciate that might 
not be what the centres are designed for, but can you imagine going 
through such a painful life? For how long should I wait and what 
should I wait for? There is nothing to wait for but plenty of time to 
waste and acute trauma to surrender to. 
Placed at the threshold of the law, people like Zenawi are stuck in ‘abject 
spaces, spaces in which the intention is to treat people neither as subjects (of 
discipline) nor objects (of elimination) but as those without presence, without 
existence, as inexistent beings’ (Nyers, 2003, p. 184, emphasis in original). As 
evidenced by the participants’ accounts, these constitutively excluded spaces of 
abjection deploy ‘waiting as a form of time management to create docile and 
submissive bodies’ (Topak, 2020, p. 1863). Topak (2020) adds: ‘Those who wait 
lose control of their time and begin to experience themselves as passive and 
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submissive beings’ (p. 1859). For the migrants, therefore, nothing is more 
haunting than waiting for nothing but more waiting and more bureaucracy. 
Second, the spatial delocalisation and temporal extension of carcerality reveals 
the inhumanity embedded within humanitarianism. Obviously, international 
organisations such as the UNHCR and IOM are mandated to protect involuntarily 
displaced people. These organisations, along with international and local 
charities, often provide a lifeline for vulnerable people including refugees 
stranded in conflict zones, refugee camps, and shanty towns. The UNHCR, for 
example, provides nominal legal protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention. 
In addition to granting refugee status, the UN Refugee Agency and the IOM also 
promote the basic rights enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, such as the 
right to seek asylum, protection against refoulement, and access to durable 
solutions. In the absence of sovereign protection, forced migrants rely on these 
organisations as their lifelines. Once the involuntarily displaced people are 
removed from sovereign protection, Arendt (2017, p. 387) eloquently argues: 
the prolongation of their lives is due to charity and not to right, for no 
law exists which could force the nations to feed them; their freedom 
of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence 
which even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course; and their 
freedom of opinion is a fool’s freedom, for nothing they think matters 
anyhow. 
Arendt’s argument is as relevant now as when she first published her book in 
1951. In fact, the relics of the post-WWII legal framework—the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol—are still in use today without any changes. In 
so far as they continue to be barred from sovereign protection, the displaced 
people’s condition of rightlessness remains suspended both in time and space. 
Ironically, however, humanitarian organisations are themselves part of the same 
coercive system that perpetuates exclusive regimes of migration control and 
border securitisation. Giant international organisations such as the UNHCR and 
IOM, Mainwaring (2019, p. 28) correctly points out: 
are important in laying the foundation for logics that assume the need 
to manage migration, to order the disordered. For instance, in 2012, 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) chose the theme 
“managing migration in crisis situations” for its International Dialogue 
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on Migration. Indeed, the IOM has played a central role in promoting 
the managed migration paradigm. A creative public relations effort 
centred on humane and orderly migration obscures the fact that the 
IOM engages in coercive practices, such as interdiction, detention, 
and deportation, at the behest of states who are unable or unwilling 
to do so directly. 
This logic of managing migration is the same logic that Fortress Europe uses to 
justify the deployment of highly militarised and sophisticated borders to 
contain, detain, pushback, and deport migrants who appear at the shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea. Likewise, as discussed, rescue operations are carried out (or 
not) by humanitarian organisations at the behest of the sovereign. As Oliver 
(2017) observes, therefore, ‘military and humanitarian organizations operate in 
tandem, and often in coordinated efforts, both to save and to contain refugees’ 
(p. 7). 
Moreover, humanitarian organisations such as the IOM and UNHCR are reported 
to be involved in training and monitoring Libyan coastguards and border controls 
with the intention of containing the inflow of migrants and disrupting smuggling 
and trafficking activities (Loschi, Raineri and Strazzari, 2018). On the other 
hand, private NGOs and international organisations (e.g., MSF) engage in migrant 
search-and-rescue operations on the European shores of the Mediterranean. One 
participant, Andom, summed it up as follows: ‘Some organisations collaborate 
with border security on the African side of the Mediterranean Sea, and others 
count rescued children and dead bodies on the other side of the sea’. These 
practices of humanitarian organisations reveal a growing convergence between 
‘securitarian management and humanitarian care’ (Sanyal, 2017, p. 4). 
The third point I wish to make regards the utilisation of the bodies of the forced 
migrants as suitable sites for the deployment of sophisticated borders. 
Sophisticated biometric technologies are used to draw on the migrants’ bodies 
indelible marks of illegality, carcerality, and deportability. The same biometric 
technologies are also used for the ‘categorization and enumeration of the body 
via processes of risk profiling’ (Amoore, 2006, p. 342). The clearly identified, 
illegalised, and profiled migrants have no choice but to “deal” or “live” with the 
border fixed on their bodies. To avoid the worst, as shown, some asylum seekers 
burn their fingers to remove the borders on their bodies; others are forced to 
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change their names, their stories, and their destinations in the process of 
gaining a declaratory right to residence in their countries of asylum. 
The (in)admissibility, (il)legality, and (im)mobility of a person can be decided 
based on the information his or her body provides. The indelible biometric marks 
drawn on the migrants’ bodies can be used to tell whether a person must be 
deported or not under the Dublin Regulation, for example. In an era of 
electronic identification and biometrics, Aas (2006, p. 154) persuasively argues: 
The coded body can “talk”. An iris scan or a fingerprint is a first and 
necessary step into the world of information. A talking individual, who 
owns the body, is in fact seen as unnecessary and, even more 
importantly, insufficient for identification. Now, only the body can 
talk in the required ways, through the unambiguous and cryptic 
language of codes and algorithms. When a body provides the 
password, a world of information opens. Databases begin to talk. On 
the other hand, when the individual talks, the words are only met 
with suspicion. Quite often in cases of biometric identification, the 
body can communicate when the mind does not want to. DNA samples 
and fingerprints can give out information without individuals’ 
concession, often without their knowledge. 
The sophisticated techniques and technologies of the border allow states to 
examine not only migrants’ journeys, trajectories, and histories, but also the 
credibility of their asylum claims. Coupled with the strict use of credibility tests 
in assessments of asylum claims, biometrics provides crucial information while 
also being embedded within the asylum decision-making process. Aas asserts: 
‘The whole point behind biometric identification is, in fact, that the mind is 
deceiving while the body is “truthful”’ (2006, p. 154). As such, migrants’ bodies 
are utilised as indisputable sites of electronic and biometric information. In fact, 
one would argue that the body is deployed alongside states’ surveillance 
technologies and border regimes to police the mobility and activities of the 
migrant population. The greatest danger, however, is when: 
Necropolitics is connected to biopolitics in that individuals are not 
killed (punished) as individuals who have defied the sovereign, they 
are targeted because their existence is seen as detrimental to the 
wider population. Their death is beneficial to the whole population, 
and their suffering is of little consequences to society as a whole. 
(Mayblin, 2020, p. 39) 
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As the participants’ accounts reveal, this connection between biopolitics and 
necropolitics appears to be the goal of the carceral system that penetrates into 
the body of the unwelcome immigrants. The border-body relation produces the 
conditions for the deployment of necropolitics against targeted categories of 
mobile people. Eritrean refugees have become easy targets for necropolitical 
experimentation at ‘Europe’s edges’ (Mainwaring, 2019) and for biopolitical 
supervision and containment within Europe (Davies, Isakjee and Dhesi, 2017; 
Canning, 2020a; Topak, 2020). 
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Chapter 10 Conclusion 
 Introduction 
In general terms, the main goals of this doctoral research are to examine and 
theorise the experience of Eritrean refugees in a carceral age. The thesis sheds 
light on the generative mechanisms and biopolitical structures that produce and 
reproduce the refugees’ experiences. In this concluding chapter, I revisit some 
of the main findings, as well as the theoretical and methodological contributions 
of the research. Towards the end, I outline the need for decolonial research and 
conclude by suggesting that the findings and theoretical insights of this study are 
provisional and incomplete. 
 Research findings 
In this study, by de-centring the focus away from the human rights approach and 
territorial imaginations of the refugee problem and placing participants’ 
accounts at the centre of my inquiry, I have examined the concealed 
dehumanisation and de-politicisation to which Eritrean refugees are subjected. 
Here, referring back to the concluding remarks in each chapter, I want to 
summarise the main findings. These findings fall into three broad categories.  
First, I have demonstrated that Eritreans are born into and live in conditions of 
absolute rightlessness that began with the colonial occupation of what is now 
known as Eritrea. Apparently, ‘Colonial occupation itself was a matter of 
seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over a physical geographical area—of 
writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations’ (Mbembé, 2003b, 
p. 25, emphasis in original). From the 1890s onwards, when the Italians first 
occupied and carved out a country called Eritrea, the people of Eritrea were 
subjected to constant wars, brutal segregation, and abject impoverishment by 
successive colonisers. Throughout the colonial time, as shown in Chapters 2 and 
6, local Eritreans were dispossessed of their land, culture, traditions, and ways 
of life, and slaughtered in the process. As Maldonado-Torres (2016) correctly 
asserts, 'The colonized are meant to be bodies without land, people without 
resources, and subjects without the capacity for autonomy and self-
determination whose constant desire is to be other than themselves' (p. 17). In 
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short, colonialism destroyed the humanity of the colonised and relegated them 
to naked rightlessness and sub-humanity. It is this rightlessness and sub-
humanity that Eritreans were born into and lived through during the colonial 
period. 
As shown in Chapter 7, similar modalities of lawlessness and rightlessness have 
continued in the post-independence period. Although independence marked the 
end of colonialism (Chapter 2) and anachronistically rendered obsolete the 
juridico-exceptional landscape of the traditional norms (Chapter 6), it did not 
free the Eritrean people from the trap of inhuman bondage. In fact, the colonial 
master-slave relations continued in post-independence Eritrea in the form of 
“coloniality” and “totalitarian domination”. The former ‘refers to long-standing 
patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define 
culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production’ (Maldonado-
Torres, 2007, p. 243). As highlighted in Chapters 2 and 6, the most visible 
manifestations of coloniality in the case of Eritrea are the founding of the 
carceral state and the use of human rights as an unquestioned pretext for 
producing a distorted reality that is not necessarily the same as the everyday 
reality of the Eritrean people. Through the prism of the human rights approach, 
all problems in Eritrea are viewed as human rights violations, rather than as 
problems of exploitation, incarceration, lawlessness, and/or injustice 
perpetuated by a rule of no-laws nor rights. As shown in this paper, the mass 
emigration of Eritreans is created by rule of no-laws nor rights—conditions of 
lawlessness and rightlessness—and the total domination by a carceral state of all 
spheres of life. 
Successive wars and “totalitarian domination”—a ‘total domination, which 
strives to organize the infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings as if 
all of humanity were just one individual’ (Arendt, 2017, p. 573)—have played key 
roles in the transformation of Eritrea under the ruling government. Between 
1998 and 2000, as shown in Chapter 6, the government’s actions led to the 
country becoming embroiled in a border war with its former foe, Ethiopia. This 
war not only destroyed lives and livelihoods on both sides but also propelled the 
Eritrean people into an indefinite future defined by a continuum of successive 
wars, lawlessness, and rightlessness. 
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Since the border war with Ethiopia, the rule of no-laws nor rights has continued 
through the imposition of modalities of punishments and control over the people 
of Eritrea. These modalities include coercive administrative controls, open-
ended national service, arbitrary detention, and forced disappearance. In the 
absence of laws and rights, these modalities and the successive wars have 
trapped citizens from all walks of life in a precarious state of ‘human 
uncertainty’, which often results from: 
[…] appearances of convergence and intersection of epochs resulting 
in instabilities and doubts about the adequacies of the existing 
normative order of life, lack of confidence in existing worldviews, 
fragmentation of identities, rupturing of known values of sociality and 
civility, and visible signs of emptiness of notions of the nation-state 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013, p. 239). 
This condition of human uncertainty imposed on the Eritrean people is 
inextricably linked to and constitutive of the various modalities of precarity, 
carcerality, and (im)mobility. As shown in Chapter 7, these modalities have 
exposed people from all backgrounds to exploitation, domination, and 
indignation at the hands of the carceral state. 
Second, as elucidated in Chapter 7, due to their state of disenfranchisement and 
rightlessness, Eritreans have been left suspended in time and space; first, by the 
colonisers and then by their own government. Maldonado-Torres (2016, p. 17) 
eloquently asserts: 
Time, for the colonized, is less the time of production, and more the 
time of surveillance and of waiting for denigration, violation, and 
murder to take place. Life is lived as in a torture chamber making life 
acquire the overwhelming feeling of it being worse than death. 
Once placed at the threshold of an inevitable death, the colonised ‘lived waiting 
for the permanent possibility of one’s body to be violated by another’ 
(Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 17). As shown in Chapters 2 and 6, Eritreans lived 
through successive oppressions, annihilations, and wars throughout the colonial 
era. Their cultural traditions, religious rituals, juridico-exceptional legal norms, 
knowledge production systems, and ways of life were not only dismantled but 
also replaced by the colonisers. And still today, the country and its people 
continue to bear the consequences of colonisation and the colonial world order. 
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Yet, as shown in Chapter 7, the state of rightlessness and lawlessness were 
perpetuated by the transitional government even after independence. For 
almost three decades since independence, the former revolutionary guards who 
led the struggle for independence transformed Eritrea into a self-colonising 
carceral state. The ruling government suspended the very possibility of 
transitioning into a civilian government and perpetuated a rule of no-laws nor 
rights in the guise of a no-war no-peace conundrum. In fact, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2, the country has been engaged in an active war between regional and 
federal governments in Ethiopia since November 2020. As I conclude this thesis, 
tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees remain stranded in refugee camps in 
northern Ethiopia in the middle of this calamitous war (see Abai, 2021). Although 
the fate of these refugees is yet to be fully uncovered, there is an overwhelming 
number of reports of many refugees being killed and raped. 
Once marked as rightless corporealities, Eritreans are either immobilised in the 
carceral state indefinitely or they end up fleeing their country in large numbers. 
Only those who have the capacity, resources, and social network to do so can 
flee the country in an attempt to escape the never-ending immobilisation, 
incarceration, and exploitation, with youths and young adults among the largest 
groups to flee Eritrea. The mass emigration of the country’s youth is driven by 
their uncertainty and hopelessness about the future as much as by the violence, 
carcerality, and ignominy of their present. Whereas the colonial past, at best, 
imagined their futures and, at worst, destroyed them, their futures now lie 
buried within the violent stasis imposed by their own government and the legacy 
of colonialism. Put differently, their involuntary displacement is a result of 
entangled relations of power, space, and subjectivity, shaped by what 
Maldonado-Torres (2016) calls ‘a battle of temporalities’ (p. 2). It is worth 
quoting Maldonado-Torres’ (2016) analysis at length here: 
Since youth represent the future, their view as a problem causes a 
battle of temporalities to ensue, but also one of definitions of space 
and subjectivity, particularly if the youth in question are part of social 
groups whose lands have been taken and whose forms of subjectivity 
are vilified. Nothing less than the definition of the very basis of 
sociality—the self and its relation to the other in time and space—is at 
stake, and so also the understanding of the conditions on which 
people should get to explore ideas and share expressions that would 
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help them to make and remake themselves, their space, and their 
sense of time (p. 2). 
In this way, the carceral state has successfully whittled away at its citizens’ 
imaginations and their expectations of sociality, civility, and dignity, leaving 
them suspended in time and space. For ordinary citizens, there are neither 
hiding places from the traps of the violent sovereign power nor expectations of a 
better future in sight. The spatial and temporal scales are suspended, and their 
suspension marks the opening of multiple possibilities of control, exploitation, 
and incarceration by the carceral state. Left lamenting the spectacle of their 
own demise, the Eritrean people continue to risk their lives in pursuit of a safe 
harbour elsewhere. 
Yet, fleeing Eritrea does not end their precarious status; instead, as shown in 
Chapter 8, the flight securitises them in a constant state of precarity within a 
carceral continuum. Throughout their journeys from their country to their 
transit and destination states, the refugees’ existence has become a 
battleground for state and non-state actors. As discussed in Chapter 8, they have 
been recruited by human smugglers and traffickers for sexual gratification, 
extortion of ransom, torture, reported organ harvesting, and commodification. 
At the borders, the refugees have become easy targets for arbitrary detention, 
deportation, and unnecessary death. Moreover, the refugees’ very bodies are 
used as sites on which to fix borders, such as ‘biometric borders’ and ‘e-borders’ 
(Aas, 2006; Amoore, 2006). 
The floating carceral spaces over treacherous waters—in the form of inflatable 
migrant boats—are other sites in which refugees are exposed to perpetual 
exploitation and unconditional death. Indeed, the refugees’ disposability is 
nowhere more evident than in the Mediterranean Sea, where thousands perish 
without a trace every year. Blocked from safety and condemned to death, their 
bodies are transformed into sites of biopolitical control and annihilation, which 
reduces them to rightless and lifeless corporealities. As Mbembe (2003b) puts it, 
their bodies become ‘simple relics of an unburied pain, empty, meaningless 
corporealities, strange deposits plunged into cruel stupor’ (p. 35). Eritrean 
refugees are subjected to a form of necropolitics, in which their human 
attributes and possibilities of political existence are suspended in time and 
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space. They are no longer grounded in life and continue to be unrecognised in 
death. 
Aas (2006) observes that the nexus of the border and the body made possible by 
technological innovations has allowed states ‘to maintain order through the 
rituals of bodily control’ (p. 155). From this perspective, Aas (2006) raises an 
important question: ‘what kind of order is it’ (p. 155)? Most importantly, what 
kind of subjectivity and humanity does the order create? These questions bring 
me to the last finding I want to highlight: the “non-viability” of Eritreans as 
human beings worthy of protection and grief. Grounded in empirical data and 
drawing from the literature, I have maintained that Eritrean refugees have been 
recognised neither as humans nor as political subjects. Throughout the thesis, 
more specifically in Chapters 6-9, I have argued that refugees have been 
declassified in the field of humanity and constitutively excluded from the 
domain of politics. In other words, the refugees have been condemned to 
dwelling within a realm of “subhumanity”, which, according to Maldonado-
Torres, is ‘the zone of endless war’ (2016, p. 13). 
Once trapped inside with the dynamics of war and the politics of death, the 
refugees’ experiences constitute ‘a permanent struggle against an omnipresent 
death’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 254). When asked how they would describe 
the totality of their experience, over half of the research participants used the 
Tigrigna word "h’sem”, which literarily translates to “plight”, to describe their 
lived experiences. In the Tigrigna language, h’sem refers to a precarious 
condition of being, in which the pain and suffering are beyond words. In the 
participants’ perspectives, h’sem is the collapse of all the positive experiences 
and relations of the subject in question into a state of absolute precarity, 
leading to the total negation of the subject’s humanity. In conditions of h’sem, 
occurrences of dehumanisation and depoliticisation are endless; murder is not 
unusual, nor is it a crime. The lives of those condemned to h’sem are neither 
liveable nor grievable, as Butler would argue. No utterance of pain or misery and 
no sense of rightlessness or lawlessness is outside the sphere of h’sem. 
If h’sem is to be understood as a precarious state of being, the pain and 
suffering of this mode of existence are felt and lived by its bearers—the 
refugees. As bearers of a condemned status, refugees express their h’sem 
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through crying and dying as well as by seeking refuge to breathe and live free. 
The bearers of h’sem “cry” to express their pain, sadness, loss, and anger. 
Beyond responding to these emotions, the “cry” also has a deeper meaning, as 
Maldonado-Torres (2007, p. 256) explains: 
The cry, not a word but an interjection, is a call of attention to one’s 
own existence...It is the cry that animates the birth of theory and 
critical thought. And the cry points to a peculiar existential condition: 
that of the condemned. 
This is what Sergel meant when he asked, with tears in his eyes, whether ‘the 
world knows’ that they ‘exist’? His tears and calls for attention emanated from 
the realisation of his own (and his friends’) h’sem—a condemnation of one’s own 
life to a sphere of ceaseless violence, exception, impoverishment, and 
rightlessness. 
In the system of citizens and Others, therefore, ‘the calculus of life passes 
through the death of the Other; or that sovereignty consists of the will and the 
capacity to kill in order to live’ (Mbembé, 2003b, p. 18). In this necropolitical 
spectacle, as shown in Chapters 6-8, the refugee represents the original figure of 
Fanon’s damné, ‘an embodied subject who is pinned down in hell in various 
ways’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 20). Once reduced to damné, the refugee’s 
cry for rescue and death in necropolitical spaces is met with abandonment and 
ungrievablity, respectively. In Butler’s terms, the refugee’s ‘derealization of 
loss—the insensitivity to human suffering and death—becomes the mechanism 
through which dehumanization is accomplished’ (2006, p. 148). 
Yet, the refugee also seeks refuge in the former colonial metropolises and, in 
doing so, the refugee has shaken ‘the principles of the nation-state’ (Agamben, 
1995a, p. 117). If the refugee has a future in the system of nation-states, and 
the nation-states have the political will to address the refugees’ h’sem, then the 
sovereign must admit the violence and dehumanisation to which refugees are 
consigned and wage a war against its own necropolitics and colonial foundations. 
The nation-states must consider the refugee, with all his/her vulnerabilities, 
precarities, and (im)mobilities, as a central figure in their political imaginations. 
Only if nation-states do so can we truly begin to abandon the colonial world 
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order in which varying degrees of human viability are imposed on the human 
race to produce varying degrees of mortality and illegality. 
 Theoretical contributions 
At this point, let me briefly revisit some of the analytical themes and concepts 
discussed to highlight some of the theoretical contributions of this research. I 
will focus on four original analytical tools: “juridico-exception”, the principle of 
“non-viability”, “carcerality” and “untamed life”. In Chapter 6, I have shown 
how the norm and the exception would have to co-exist in traditional Eritrean 
societies to form a new totality: juridico-exception. That is to say, Agamben’s 
naked life (zoe) and its political counterpart (bios) intersect in the body, with 
the former remaining in concealment until activated by exceptional 
circumstances such as murder. Unlike Agamben’s notion of a “state of 
exception”, the juridico-exception is formed not through suspension of the law 
but because of the limit of the law. Outside the colonial order, juridico-
exception was the juridico-political landscape upon which traditional 
communities in today’s Eritrea relied. 
Based on the principle of “non-viability”, I discussed how decisions regarding the 
right to life of unborn and new-born children could be placed in the hands of 
their parents; for example, a pregnant woman can freely decide (or not) to 
terminate her pregnancy or to “discard” the child at birth, without any limits. I 
then demonstrated how the precarious link between a mother and a “non-
viable” infant is established between the state and every citizen in post-
independence Eritrea. As shown, the moment at which a new-born child meets 
the conditions set by the principle of viability is the time when the viability of 
the subject in question depends solely on the whims of state sovereignty. What 
is at stake when applying the principle of viability in the context of Eritrea is the 
very ontological state of being of the form of life in question. This form of life, 
which appears not to have been hitherto considered, at least in the context of 
Eritrea, constitutes the original feature of what I call “untamed life”. I return to 
this point below. 
In discussing Foucault’s notion of “carcerality”, I have argued that it is neither 
confined in space nor bounded in time, but, rather, diffused both in space and 
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time. In Chapter 7, for example, I have argued that not only are Eritreans born 
as “non-viable” children, they are also compelled to live through modalities of 
lawlessness, rightlessness, and homelessness in their home country. I have 
maintained that the link between the government and its people has been 
precarious, for the link is not established between the state and its people but 
between the dissolution of the state and its citizens. The function of the state 
has centred on mobilising its able-bodied people to defend against the country’s 
dissolution while also keeping them in conditions of indefinite servitude 
disguised as national development campaign. 
Stripped of sovereign protection and held hostage in an exploitative relationship 
with their government, Eritreans have been fleeing their home country in large 
numbers. As discussed in Chapter 8, they have been trapped in a condition of 
human uncertainty and carcerality in which they become subjects of biopolitical 
and necropolitical experimentation. Yet, holding onto a kernel of radical hope 
and a will to survive, the refugees move between and across the interstices of 
violent borders and necropolitical spaces to reach places of relative safety. 
Nevertheless, they continue to be “illegalised” and regarded “dangerous” 
persons who cannot be admitted into the polity nor integrated in the system of 
nation-states. 
In their constant struggle for survival and political existence, the refugees play a 
disruptive role by shaking the principles upon which the nation-state system is 
built. As Agamben argues persuasively, ‘the novelty of our era, which threatens 
the very foundations of the nation-state, is that growing portions of humanity 
can no longer be represented within it’ (1995a, p. 117). He correctly asserts that 
the refugee has broken ‘the identity between man and the citizen’ and thrown 
into inquiry ‘the old trinity of state/nation/territory’ (Agamben, 1995a, p. 117). 
According to Agamben, the ever-increasing presence of the refugee exposes the 
“bare life”—an unprotected form of life that can be destroyed without 
committing a crime or sacrilege—that is inscribed in the very foundation of the 
nation-state. This association of the refugee with the bare life is common in the 
works of migration scholars, who single out the refugee as a protagonist figure of 
bare life (see, for example, Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004; Darling, 2009). 
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Nonetheless, as I have highlighted in the concluding remarks of Chapters 6-9, 
neither Agamben’s political theory nor Foucault’s carceral system are complete. 
In fact, they constitute abstractions of a complex Eurocentric biopolitical 
structure. The obvious blind spot in Agamben’s and Foucault’s seminal works is 
their glaring omission of “coloniality”, which, according to Maldonado-Torres 
(2016), is: ‘a peculiar construction of knowledge, power and being that divides 
the worlds into zones of being and not-being human’ (p. 19). In simple words, 
coloniality is an umbrella term for the indelible marks left by the European 
colonial venture and its contemporary mutant twin, ‘modernity’. Despite 
presenting sophisticated critiques of the use and abuse of power, both Foucault 
and Agamben glaringly fail to account in their analyses for coloniality and its 
constituent features, such as race and gender. Political theorists such as Butler 
offer a stern critique to address the omission of race and gender. Yet, Western 
thinkers continue to overlook coloniality as an overarching mode of critique.  
Coloniality should be viewed not merely as an antithesis of Foucault’s bio-
politics and Agamben’s theory of bare life; rather, it should be seen as a primary 
mode of critique and an urgent call for the rearticulation of power, knowledge 
and being. According to Maldonado-Torres (2016), coloniality ‘creates the line 
between the human and non-human, between the world where perpetual peace 
is considered a possibility and the world that is defined as perpetual or endless 
war’ (p. 20). Both Agamben and Foucault fail to see the conflation between 
these two worlds—the “world of modernity” and the “world of coloniality”—and 
hence the subjectivities these worlds create, shape, and reproduce. For 
example, Agamben’s theory ‘does not answer the question of who is detained in 
camps, nor why’ (Whitley, 2017, p. 7). The reality is that there have never been 
“ex-pat” camps in the world, only refugee camps and “settler colonies”, or, 
increasingly, tourist sites. 
Likewise, Agamben fails to account for the agency and resourcefulness of the 
refugee.  Thus, he ‘effectively forecloses any notion pf a power which resists the 
sovereign, and resists a different vision of the decision’ (Darling, 2009, p. 660). 
In fact, Agamben’s obsession with the product of Western biopolitics (or the 
“bare life”) risks a complete erasure of the subject of coloniality: the damné. 
Different from Agamben’s bare life, ‘the damné is the subject who appears at 
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the crux of the coloniality of power, the coloniality of knowledge, and the 
coloniality of being’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 20). If one assumes Agamben’s 
bare life-citizen binary to be the primary principle upon which the European 
nation-state is founded, the subject of coloniality—the damné—is its analogue 
for the so-called post-colonial states. That is to say, ‘Europe became modern in 
the process of conquest and colonial expansion’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 
11), and in so doing, created nations of citizens and damnés. Outside of the 
West, therefore, Agamben’s theory of bare life can only be considered as an 
example of the use of power (of positionality and academic prowess) to 
disempower decolonial subjectivities and their epistemological and political 
agencies.  
Therefore, the h’sem of Eritrean refugees can only be understood through the 
prism of untamed life, whose very existence and (im)mobility disrupt the 
colonial constellation of sovereign power, borders, and world order. As shown, 
the untamed life is the enigmatic figure of the damné who disrupts the colonial 
roots of the nation-state by seeking an intersubjective relationality that is free 
from ‘vertical/hierarchical relationalities’ (Vieira, 2019, p. 156). Unlike 
Agamben’s bare life, by appealing to intersubjective human-to-human 
relationality, the untamed life opens up a space for reflection and for resistance 
to the violent sovereignty, as well as for the anarchic capacity of human nature. 
The untamed life embodies the capacity to resist both the suspension and the 
limit of the law and appeals to an ‘intersubjective contact: eros and other forms 
of love as well as communication or understanding in terms of language and 
knowledge’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 21). Untamed life recognises not only 
the agency and resourcefulness of the progressively nascent figure of refugee 
but also its potential for political existence. Grounded in the lived experiences 
of the oppressed, the untamed life points to other forms of being “human” and 
opens other ways of knowing. This requires decolonial work grounded in 
‘epistemic rebellion’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013, p. 263), and ‘practical and 
metaphysical revolt’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 30). 
Thus, I have presented insights into how the untamed life as a force can be 
harnessed as a powerful instrument for bringing about positive change. The 
untamed life calls for a ‘decolonial turn [that] involves a resignation from the 
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order of validation of modernity/coloniality and a declaration of war against 
naturalized war’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 24). In other words, it calls for a 
comprehensive re-examination of the covert matrices and colonialities of power; 
biopolitical and necropolitical paradoxes; and epistemic and ontological blind 
spots. As shown, I have discussed critical optics through which we can see the 
limits of Agamben’s notion of “state of exception” inhabited by “bare life” and 
Foucault’s “carceral system” as they apply to the forced migration of people 
from the Global South to the Global North. I have suggested that these 
biopolitical theories must take into account not only the temporal and spatial 
dimensions of viability and carcerality but also the colonial configuration of 
power and how it is wielded against the subjects in question. In so doing, the 
untamed life clears the field to counter the practices of constitutive exclusion, 
depoliticisation and dehumanisation. 
 Methodological contributions 
Now, let me turn to the methodological shortcoming that this research has 
identified in the existing literature on Eritrea and the experience of Eritrean 
refugees. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that none of the so-called international 
human rights norms have ever existed or been implemented in Eritrea. With its 
constitution—the supposed would-be source of all other laws—suspended before 
it was ever implemented, Eritrea has never been governed by a “rule of law” 
since its independence. In other words, in the absence of laws and rights, the 
state is assumed to be the only legal order. At the helm of the state stand the 
only party and the only president that have ever ruled the country. Thus, there 
has never been any human rights-based system of administration adopted in the 
country; instead, as I have shown in Chapters 7, the ruling regime has 
maintained lawlessness and rightlessness as the modalities for sovereignty and 
governmentality. Hence, I have argued, any attempts to understand Eritrea 
through the prism of human rights are simply futile exercises based on Western 
normative legal, and social presumptions. 
Moreover, the application of human rights frameworks in examining refugees’ 
experiences is equally problematic more widely. This is partially because human 
rights frameworks are inextricably linked to human rights work or 
humanitarianism. Despite the charitable intentions of such efforts and the 
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rhetorical claims of “neutrality” and “impartiality”, humanitarianism is not free 
from sovereign logics of containment and politics of othering. As shown in 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9, humanitarian organisations are complicit (either directly or 
indirectly) with the containing of refugees at the peripheries of political life. In 
Chapters 7 and 8, for example, I have demonstrated how Eritrean refugees 
remain enclosed for protracted periods in refugee camps run by the UNHCR in 
eastern Sudan and northern Ethiopia. In the refugee camps, the refugees are 
subjected to precarious conditions ‘in which power confronts nothing but pure 
life, without any mediation’ (Agamben, 1998b, p. 171). Oliver (2017, p. 76) 
correctly observes: 
As it is, humanitarian aid that leaves refugees locked in camps and 
detention centers, barely able to survive, hardly counts as tolerance, 
let alone hospitality. Camps are places of containment, not welcome, 
in a world where is it becoming more and more difficult to distinguish 
humanitarian aid from humanitarian warfare. 
The UNHCR presides over these refugee camps, in which refugees are exposed to 
abject destitution and subjected to unmediated violence and exploitation by 
state and non-state actors. The story of the Sinai trafficking discussed in Chapter 
8 is an exemplary case of the convergence of humanitarian interventions and 
sovereign logics in the annihilation of the Eritrean refugee (Yohannes, 2021). 
The question, however, is whether the so-called human rights norms provide a 
useful framework to understand the experience of Eritrean refugees. As shown, 
the logic and practice of human rights and humanitarianism operate in tandem 
with the logic of sovereign power that designates some lives as being worthy of 
protection while rendering others dispensable. The nexus between human rights 
and humanitarianism, on the one hand, and member states, on the other, must 
be understood as a ‘carceral humanitarianism’, which, according to Oliver 
(2017), is ‘the outgrowth of humanitarian warfare in which war and aid are two 
sides of the state sovereignty’ (p. 7). For example, over the last two decades, 
we have increasingly witnessed powerful states aggressively intervening (e.g., by 
imposing sanctions or even waging wars) in the domestic affairs of smaller 
countries on the pretext of human rights violations, terrorism, or national 
security. These operations of war and carceral humanitarianism perpetuate 
exclusionary discourses of human rights as well as the citizen/Other binary, with 
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the distinction between the two maintained through what Butler (2006) calls 
‘schemas of intelligibility’ (p. 147). Butler (2006, p. 147) clarifies: 
There are two distinct forms of normative power: one operates 
through producing a symbolic identification of the face with the 
inhuman, foreclosing our apprehension of the human in the scene; the 
other works through radical effacement, so that there never was a 
human, there never was a life, and no murder has, therefore, ever 
taken place. 
Butler’s analysis is relevant to understanding the experience of Eritrean 
refugees. The participants’ accounts discussed in this study have shown that 
Eritrean refugees are relegated to a sphere of “subhumanity”, in which their 
existence is identified with non-viable life and ungrievable death, as Butler 
would argue. As demonstrated by the accounts of the survivors of trafficking 
who participated in this study, humanitarian organisations, such as the UNHCR 
and IOM, keep the testimonies of survivors shrouded in secrecy. These 
humanitarian organisations, working under the shadow of UN member states, 
inadvertently conceal the violence inflicted on refugees through a process of 
exclusionary b/ordering of populations. Most importantly, by relying on 
numerical logics that reduce refugees to figures and audit schemata, these 
international organisations perpetuate the unquestioned inhumanity and 
dehumanisation that festers within humanitarianism (Oliver, 2017, pp. 73–74). 
Therefore, the claims of human rights violations in the context of Eritrea and the 
attempts to understand the experience of Eritrean refugees through the prism of 
human rights violations constitute unwarranted methodological fallacies at best 
and political synergies at worst. For example, the non-existence of laws and 
human rights in the country means that that which does not exist cannot be 
violated. Hence, the human rights reports and literature produced by perennial 
lobbyists and academic activists through the prism of human rights violations are 
simply not grounded in truth. The discourses of human rights violations and the 
human rights approach through which these discourses are produced are simply 
shibboleths of Western intellectual thinking and esoteric political imagination. 
Outside Eritrea, as reviewed in Chapter 3, the projects of human rights and 
humanitarianism have recently been subjected to stern critique by migration 
scholars. Notably, for example, Didier Fassin uses the example of the recent 
Chapter 10 247 
 
invasion of Iraq to construct a persuasive critique of humanitarianism, theorising 
it as a potentially alternative politics that is ‘aimed at those who are considered 
at risk of physical disappearance and incapable of maintaining their own 
[political] existence’ (2007, p. 511). Likewise, as shown in Chapter 3, the 
quixotic projects of human rights and their claims of universalisation and 
emancipation are envisaged to come to a halt where their Western origins and 
racialised geopolitical intentions go unchallenged (see also Dembour and Kelly, 
2011; Costas, 2013). Although nuances may vary, these critiques of 
humanitarianism and human rights are consistent with the findings of the study 
and its line of argumentation. 
 Research limitations and mitigation strategies 
Admittedly, several practical, methodological, and theoretical limitations were 
also identified in this research project. The main practical challenges are linked 
to the temporal and spatial delimitations of the study. In temporal terms, the 
study focuses on the experience of Eritrean refugees since the country’s 
independence, while paying little attention to forced migrations during colonial 
times. At the spatial level, Eritrean refugees are stranded across various carceral 
and necropolitical spaces in their countries of origin, transit, and destination; it 
was almost impossible to examine the various forms of carceralities and 
precarities in these spaces. For example, while I could have developed a deeper 
understanding of why people leave Eritrea if I had conducted research inside the 
country, this was not possible due to safety and security concerns. 
The methodological limitations are mainly linked to the nature and type of data 
gathered. Gathering data from various state and non-state actors, such as 
traffickers, border agencies, government institutions, humanitarian 
organisations, and hosting communities, could have provided a broader (and 
clearer) picture of the generative mechanisms that led to the h’sem of Eritrean 
refugees. To give one specific example, it would have been enriching to have 
access to larger data sets, such as statistical data and survivors’ testimonies 
from UNHCR and IOM archives. Unfortunately, despite my best efforts, I was 
unable to access larger data sets from the various state and non-state actors, 
mainly due to practical and safety concerns, but also owing to the strict data 
confidentiality procedures. 
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At the theoretical level, it was limiting to engage with abstract and 
decontextualised theories and conceptual frameworks developed in the West to 
understand systemic biopolitical and necropolitical entanglements. However, 
while it would certainly have been enriching to ground the theoretical analysis in 
indigenous forms of knowledge, there is a lack of adequate research in this area. 
At least to my knowledge, this is the first study to attempt to theorise Eritrea as 
a carceral state that offers neither laws nor rights. As such, it was not an easy 
analytical task to adopt a stance that ran counter to the dominant narrative, 
according to which Eritrea constitutes a case of human rights violation. 
I took several mitigating steps to minimise the impact of these limitations on the 
research findings. First, as Moser (2008, p. 386) points out, one way of 
mitigating limitations and problems in field research is ‘to engage in fieldwork 
that utilizes one’s strengths’. This is reflected in the fact that I was not only 
familiar with the subject of study, but I also possess an extensive community 
network as well as lived and professional expertise. Grounded in a deeper socio-
cultural understanding of the subjects of study, I used my strengths not only to 
identify potential limitations but also to mitigate them effectively and 
efficiently. This insider knowledge allowed me to access the scarcely available 
primary and secondary data (e.g., by conducting virtual interviews with 
smugglers and traffickers, as well as with trafficking victims and detainees, and 
by accessing reading materials and other information from Eritrea). Being armed 
with insider knowledge also enabled me to capture participants’ experiences, 
perspectives, traditions, and customs. Moreover, the insider knowledge helped 
me to navigate the intricate ethical, socio-cultural, and political sensitivities 
involved in working with vulnerable people in a complex environment.  
Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 4, the research design was exceptionally 
helpful in mitigating the potential limitations. In this regard, it was extremely 
useful to implement method and data triangulation, validity and reliability 
strategies, detailed positionality and reflexivity considerations, and nuanced 
theoretical and philosophical examinations, all of which helped reveal and 
mitigate the potential limitations. 
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 Closing 
To close, in addition to unpacking the h’sem of Eritrean refugees, this study has 
prised open an aperture through which to explore unique empirical, theoretical, 
and metaphysical clues that can deepen our understanding of the experience of 
refugees in a carceral age. These contributions must be carefully considered, 
which calls for critical decolonial research. In the words of Maldonado-Torres 
(2016), decolonial research ‘requires embodied subjects coming together to 
create, think, and act in the effort to decolonize being, knowledge, and power’ 
(p. 30). Any decolonial research must also involve recognition of the refugee’s 
damné status ‘as a questioning, speaking, writing, and creative subject’ 
(Maldonado-Torres, 2016, p. 29). Eritrean refugees, however, continue to be left 
to fester in carceral and necropolitical spaces, where they exist in, in Sergel’s 
words, ‘ayh’luw aymuwut’ state, meaning no longer alive and not yet dead. 
Given the limited scope and purpose of this doctoral thesis, further rigorous 
published research and practical work are required to determine what needs to 
change so that lives such as Sergel’s matter. To this effect, this research 
remains an unfinished project, and it is my intention to pursue the project 







Appendix A – Data Gathering 
Table 6: Observation Proforma 
Project title  The Realities of Eritrean Refugees in a Carceral Age  
Name of 
observer  
Hyab Teklehaimanot Yohannes  
Purpose  The sole purpose of this observation is to source data for the research 
project named above. I observed participants’ day-to-day activities, their 
interactions with each other and the host community and their dealings with 
service providers.  
 
 Date Start time  End time Remarks 











Social activities    
Employment    
Education    
Shopping     
Sporting 
Activities 








Other refugees    
Host Community    
State agents    
Religious 
institutions 
   
UNHCR, IOM, 
MSF etc. 







Legal services    
Local charities    
Health services    
Financial 
support 
   






Table 7: Focus Group Discussion Guide 
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Welcome Thank you for agreeing to take part in this group discussion. You have been 
asked to participate as your participation is essential for the research. I 
appreciate your time. 
 
Introduction Let me briefly introduce you to the research. The research project aims to 
investigate how and why Eritreans leave their country of origin, what 
challenges they face after they become refugees, and how state and non-
state actors respond to their displacement. Building on existing knowledge, 
this research project seeks to understand the process of becoming a 
‘refugee’ (how and why), being a refugee (what it means to be a refugee) 
and beyond (protection/ lack of protection). 
 
Confidentiality I have already shared with you a participant information sheet and a consent 
form. I hope you all have read the participant information by now. This focus 
group session will strictly adhere to the guidelines given in the participant 
information sheet. Although I will be taking notes throughout the discussion, 
I would like to assure you that the discussion will be confidential. My records 
will contain no information that would link you to specific statements. I 
appreciate it if you would not discuss comments of other participants. If 
there is any question you do not want to answer, you do not have to 
respond; however, please engage with the group as much as possible. 
 
Ground Rules  The first rule is that only one person speaks at a time. Please wait until 
whoever is speaking have finished. 
 It is important that every one of you participate 
 There are no right or wrong answers 
 You do not have to agree with the opinions of other participants  
 Does anyone have any questions? 
 OK, let’s begin 
 
 














Sex Ratio Male Female 
  
Age Range  
Languages Spoken by 
Participants 
 
Language of Discussion   
Venue and Date Venue Date 
  




Let me give you a couple of minutes to think about your experiences... Is 















Background  Can you describe your status and how you 
came here? 
 How do you support yourself?  
 
Life before exile 
 
 What did you do for living in Eritrea? 
 What do you think are the main problems of 
living in Eritrea? 
 
Decision to exile  What would you list as the main reasons that 
made you leave Eritrea? 
 Can you describe the reasons?  
 

















 Can you describe how you have come to live 
here? 
 Can you describe if anything happened to you 
during the journey? 
 How would you describe your experience? 
 
Moving on  What are your plans for the future?  
 Do you plan to stay here, return to Eritrea, or 
move on? 
 
Interactions with state 
and non-state actors  
 How did you cross over the borders along the 
way to here? 
 Have you registered with IOM or UNHCR? 
 Can you tell us your status and how you got it? 
 What services are you able to access? 
 
Concluding Question  Of all the reasons we have discussed today, 
what would you say are the main reasons why 
many Eritreans leave their country? 
 What are the main challenges after becoming a 
refugee? 
 What do you plan to do for the future? 
 Does anyone have anything to add? 
 Does anyone want to say anything about the 
focus group? 
 
Conclusion  Thank you for participating. The session has been 
very successful. I hope you have found the 
discussion interesting. If you have anything that 
you are unhappy with, please speak to me later. 





Table 8: Interview Themes 
Participant 
details 
Pseudonym  Gender Age Family 
situation 




       
 
Background In this part, I invited participants to introduce themselves (place of birth, 
education, family composition…etc) and asked questions such as: 
 Can you describe your status and how you came here? 




This theme focused on participants’ day-to-day (normal) life in their country 
of origin. They were given a chance to describe what it was like to live in 
Eritrea in their own perspective. Examples of questions: 
 What did you do for living in Eritrea? 





In this section, I asked participants to describe what made them decide to 
flee Eritrea. Sample questions included: 
 What would you list as the main reasons that made you flee Eritrea? 






This theme aimed to understand participants journeys—challenges faced, and 
coping strategies used—and whether they have reached their preferred 
destination. They were asked questions such as: 
 How did you leave Eritrea? 
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 Can you describe how you have come to live here?  
 Can you describe if anything happened to you during the journey? 





This theme explored participants’ preferences and future plans. Sample 
questions include: 
 What are your plans for the future?  




with state and 
non-state 
actors  
This theme focused on establishing participants’ interaction with state and 
non-state actors and how that affected them. The section was also used to 
explore services available to the subjects of study. Sample questions: 
 How did you cross over the borders along the way to here? 






This theme explored participants’ status (refugees, asylum seeker etc.) and 
the rights that come with it. 
 Can you tell me your ‘status’ here? 
 Can you describe how you got this status? 
 What are the services you’re able to access with your status? 






In this section, participants were asked if they want to add anything and if 









This section was used designed to get participants’ feedback and to check if 
their participation has affected them in anyway. Questions may involve: 
 How do you feel right now? 
 Do you want to say anything about the interview/focus group? 
 Has it affected you in anyway? 
 If so, what support do you need? 
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